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Abstract
This work outlines a programme of research tasked with the exploration
of representing psychologically grounded theories of emotion through fuzzy
logic systems. It presents an introduction to the specific goals of the project,
followed by an overview of the wider, multi-disciplinary field of emotion rep-
resentation.
Two emotion theories are explored in detail. One, rooted in behaviourism,
proposed by J. R. Millenson in 1967; the other, the Geneva Emotion Wheel
proposed by K. R. Scherer in 2005. Each of these theories is independently
abstracted mathematically, and represented in terms of both type-1 and type-
2 fuzzy logic systems. Six potential implementations of these systems are
presented. Of these, five are tested within this report. The results of these
tests are analysed and discussed in the context of both computational be-
haviour and psychological analogue. There follows a critical review where
the effectiveness of the different implementations and models is considered,
informed by both testing results and the psychology upon which they are
based.
A prototype of one implementation applied to govern the behaviour of an
agent in a predator-prey scenario is included. Discussion of this prototype
includes examples of how the implementation was practically applied to the
environment, and an assessment of the behaviours of the agent in testing.
The work concludes with an overview of the thesis, including discussion
of the results of the project and future avenues of research related to the
completed work. The contributions of the thesis are explicitly outlined: the
research of pre-existing, psychologically grounded models of emotional state
suitable for computational representation; construction of mathematical rep-
resentations of two models of emotion, using both type-1 and type-2 fuzzy
logic; and, the presentation of five computational implementations of those
representations, of which four are explicitly tested, compared and critically
reviewed.
To Aladdin, Bob and Simon. With deepest thanks.
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The subject of accurately modelling the emotional state of an agent, in
such a fashion as to be psychologically consistent while computationally ef-
ficient, is an area that has enjoyed consistent growth in interest in recent
years [11, 50]. This work has varied in scope from the philosophical ques-
tions about why to make an emotional agent, to the sociological questions
about what impact emotional agents have on human-computer interactions
[20, 21, 105, 76, 100, 89, 38, 10, 40].
There have been some notable prior research efforts focussed upon con-
ceptual issues regarding the quantification and categorisation of psycholog-
ical concepts[61, 112]. Complementing these works are equally worthy ex-
plorations of the role emotion plays in human cognition and decision-mak-
ing[54, 127, 119, 55, 34, 1, 5]. In the context of character representation, some
recent work has centred around the establishment of hierarchical structures
of behaviour that include emotional components as a key element [3, 96].
In general terms, however, the direction of such research has tended to-
wards affective control systems [37, 120, 74, 52], and rarely specifically upon
the determination of the emotional state of an agent outside that somewhat
narrow context [33, 59]. While some efforts have been made to introduce
fuzzy logic to the field of emotion modelling [31, 116] they have tended to dis-
cuss emotion in the context of deterministic behavioural architecture, rather
than in the context of a psychological construct in its own right.
This work approaches the topic from the direction of fuzzy logic, with
a view to establishing new results and providing meaningful discourse. Our
goals are to show, within this document, the programme of research under-
taken during the course of the research project.
1.1 Scope
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the topic of emotion modelling and rep-
resentation, particularly when such research is approached from a primarily
computational perspective, it is necessary that the limits of scope defined at
the outset of the work are presented in the context of each discipline under
consideration. Within this section, we consider scope as it applies to each
separate discipline falling under the auspices of the project in question.
Firstly, the psychological aspect of the project is considered. From this
perspective, it was determined that the scope of the project should extend
to the exploration of previously published psychological models of emotion,
2
and the theories upon which they were based. It was expressly determined
that the scope should not extend to the establishment of wholly novel psy-
chological models of emotion, as so doing would sacrifice veracity of the work
and weaken the foundations upon which it would be built.
While multiple models of emotion would be explored, this exploration
would be by no means wholly exhaustive of the field; that, in itself, would
form a wholly separate research project. Instead, models with geometric
structure that combined situational input with emotional output would be
directly considered, with their psychological provenance a determining factor
in their selection.
From a computational perspective, the scope of the work extended to
the selection of models whose conceptual structure resonated strongly with
the unique capacities for multi-value (fuzzy) logic systems to represent un-
certainty and abstraction. It was determined that no orders of fuzzy logic
higher than second-order would be considered, nor would adaptive training
be used to weight desired results against those generated by psychological
consistency with the geometry of any selected model.
The importance of this work lies in its goal of applying artificial intelli-
gence methods to models of emotional state, while maintaining psychological
analogue. As shall be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Two, the ap-
plication of fuzzy logic to such situations is almost intuitive. Emotions are
by their nature linguistic variables, bound by the strictures of the lexicon
in which they are employed; Zadeh discusses the applicability of fuzzy logic
to situations where linguistic variables are a consideration at some length
[123, 124, 125].
In particular, the consideration of type-2 fuzzy logic is unique to the
explorations of the field considered within this work. It has been asserted
that type-2 systems grant a level of inherent uncertainty that is denied their
type-1 equivalents [51]. We assert that this uncertainty is particularly worthy
of exploration in the context of emotion representation, as a function of the
uncertain nature of response to complex stimulus.
We concede that there are arguments made in favour of crisply defined
emotions as determined by the lexicon [28], but assert that inconsistent hu-
man response to complex stimulus alone is enough justification for an explo-
ration of uncertainty in a computational sense. To that end, representations
using both type-1 and type-2 fuzzy logic are discussed and presented, where
possible, as direct analogues to one another. Any testing is performed, and
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comparisons such as are made, within the scope of the project outlined in
this section.
1.2 Thesis Outline
We shall first provide such background to this multidisciplinary topic as it
appropriate for the level of the content, along with discussion regarding the
more practical preliminary concerns of the development portion of this work.
We shall discuss two published, psychologically-grounded models of emo-
tion. The first, published by J. R. Millenson in 1967 [53], is built upon con-
ditioned emotional response theory and associates emotional response with
stimulus input. The second, published by K. Scherer in 2005 [88], builds upon
the previous work of Russell [75] to establish a system that draws connection
between relative experiential magnitude of valence and control to emotional
response.
Full mathematical representations, from the perspective of type-1 fuzzy
logic, are defined and presented. Following this, we discuss the same two
models in the context of type-2 fuzzy logic, similarly providing exhaustive
mathematical representations.
Having clarified the mathematics upon which we base our implementa-
tions, we present a full account of the process of implementation undertaken
during the course of this project, presenting five functional software imple-
mentations, four of Millenson’s theory and one of Scherer’s, and one hypo-
thetical implementation of Scherer’s theory.
The five functioning implementations are then exhaustively tested. The
results are analysed in both mathematical and psychological terms, and test-
ing data are used to provide contextual frames of reference. The behaviours
of each implementation are then critically reviewed. Prototyping is then pre-
sented and discussed in the context of a single implementation, followed by
our conclusions and discussions of future work.
In this section we also provide brief summaries of the contents of the
chapters to follow, to facilitate ease of navigation within the document.
• Chapter Two: This chapter provides the first part of our literary overview
of material relevant to the research discussed within this document.
This chapter considers in particular detail the psychological modelling
of emotional state; affective computing; relevant prior research; and,
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presents the two psychological models of emotion the remainder of our
work shall focus upon.
• Chapter Three: This chapter concludes our literary overview. It pro-
vides an introdction to the type-1 and type-2 fuzzy logic computational
methods applied in later chapters. It also provides an overview of the
selected development platforms, both hardware and software, and the
specifications of rejected potential development platforms.
• Chapter Four: In this chapter are presented three representations of
psychologically grounded emotional state models, relying upon type-1
fuzzy logic. The first two representations are alternative interpretations
of the Millenson theory as discussed at length in Chapter Two. The
third representation is an interpretation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel,
similarly discussed in Chapter Two.
• Chapter Five: This chapter presents three type-2 fuzzy logic represen-
tations of psychologically grounded models of emotional state. As with
Chapter Four, two of the representations are built upon Millenson’s
theory, and the third draws from the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
• Chapter Six: The sixth chapter of this work presents implementations
of the six representations discussed in Chapters Three and Four, three
utilising type-1 fuzzy logic inferencing, and three utilising type-2 fuzzy
logic inferencing.
• Chapter Seven: In this chapter we present the testing of five of the
implementations outlined in Chapter Six. The schedule of testing, and
rationale, is discussed at length. The results of these tests are then
discussed in an isolated context.
• Chapter Eight: This chapter provides a critical analysis of the experi-
mental results obtained in the previous chapter. It draws comparison
between the implementations in addition to appropriate comparison
between their associated psychologically grounded theories.
• Chapter Nine: This chapter provides discourse regarding a software ap-
plication of one of the implementations presented in Chapter Six, using
a Predator-Agent-Prey scenario. The testing environment is discussed,
as is the fashion in which the model of emotional state influenced agent
behaviour. Subsequently, two example tests are analysed in detail.
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• Chapter Ten: This chapter concludes the work as presented in this
document. Results and analysis from Chapters Seven and Eight are
discussed, along with the consequences of those results. The original
contributions outlined in Chapter One are revisited with a critical eye,
with a view to assessing the meaning and impact of the work provided
herein.
1.3 Aims and Objectives
This work seeks to further the field of affective computing through consider-
ation of mathematical representations of psychologically grounded emotion
models. Its particular aim is to present not only the models themselves, but
to present them in such a way as to prompt further exploration into these
and other psychological models of emotion from a computational perspective.
It is an objective of this work that it will demonstrate the process of
extrapolation of the psychological emotion models and their conversion into
fuzzy logic constructs. This shall be performed with all due deference to the
abstract concepts represented in their makeup, so as to maintain psycholog-
ical analogue, which shall be the key aspect of this research.
Further to this, it is intended that each representation presented herein
shall be implemented in a fashion that is consistent with the mathematical
abstractions of the model. These implementations, as with the representa-
tions they are built upon, shall concern themselves more with psychological
consistency than computational efficiency. They shall be subject to a robust
schedule of testing designed to demonstrate adherence, or otherwise, to those
psychological principles.
It is the intent of this work to demonstrate, through exhaustive testing
and analysis, the behaviours of these representations. In so doing, the work
shall demonstrate consistency in its structure and goals.
1.4 Contributions of Thesis
In overview, the contributions of this work aim to be:
• Research of psychologically grounded models of emotional state suitable
for computational representation.
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• Construction of mathematical representations of one or more psycho-
logically grounded models of emotional state, using type-1 fuzzy logic
systems.
• Construction of mathematical representations of one or more psycho-
logically grounded models of emotional state, using type-2 fuzzy logic
systems.
• Computational implementations of these representations for the pur-
poses of comparison and review.
The primary contribution of this work shall be the conversion, represen-
tation and implementation of psychologically grounded theories of emotion
into computational constructs. In particular, we emphasise the psycholog-
ically consistent nature of the systems proposed, whereby the work is ap-
proached from the perspective of maintenance of psychological analogue over
computational expediency. In this, the work presents novel methodolodies
in the field of emotion modelling, and a foundation for future exploration of
the place of emotion in agent behaviour.
Further to this, the work approaches representation of the two psycho-
logical theories discussed herein from the perspective of multi-value logic in-
ferencing systems. It is the nature of these inferencing systems that provides
an additional layer of novelty to the work, whereby conceptual inputs to a
fuzzy system directly lead to a psychologically consistent emotional output.
The work presents the first known application of type-2 fuzzy logic in the
field of computational emotion modelling. It seeks to provide new insight into
the comparative behaviours of type-1 and type-2 fuzzy logic within this new
and growing field, while establishing the foundations for further exploration
of higher order multivalue logic within emotion modelling.
Subsequently, the work outlines original implementations of the incipient
representations; their construction, testing, and analysis of their compara-
ble behaviours. These implementations form the basis for our subsequent
conclusions and the foundation of future related work.
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Chapter 2





The scope of this project was broad and cross-disciplinary requiring as it
did intimate familiarity with both fuzzy logic systems and the pan-human
psychology of emotion. Further to this, hardware and software development
platforms had to be considered from both perspectives, as well as the more
engineering-based concerns regarding versatility and capacity.
In order to fully appreciate the manner in which the subsequently dis-
cussed models were implemented, and the context in which they exist, it is
necessary to include some significant preface regarding these areas of partic-
ular research interest. This preface forms our literature review, divided into
two chapters. This chapter considers exclusively matters relating to psychol-
ogy of emotion, and affective computing.
We first discuss the topics of research into and representation of emotions
from a psychological context. This forms a foundation of the work that is to
follow, providing an overview of the most relevant schools of thought from
the nineteenth century onwards.
Following this psychological preamble, we approach the general subject
of affective computing. We initially consider the topic from a wider scope, to
provide context for the work this report presents. We subsequently highlight
landmark developments within the overarching field of affective computing in
the context of goal-oriented systems. Following that, we present and consider
specific examples of work which bears some analogue with our own to provide
insight into the state of the specific area our work regards.
We next outline the psychologically grounded emotion models that this
research has primarily concerned. We discuss them from a psychological con-
text, paying particular attention to their structures. Latterly, we define our
usage of the term geometry in the context of each of the models the remainder
of this work shall focus upon.
2.2 Emotion Research and Representation
2.2.1 Darwin
Within the various fields of psychological research, two schools of thought
appear to dominate the debate regarding the nature of emotions and how
they are best modelled [28, 60]. From a philosophical perspective, the nature
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of their divergence and their theoretical differences are of great importance;
from a computing sciences perspective, however, their differences lie entirely
in the nature of the models they propose.
The view of emotions as an evolutionary construct was initially proposed
by Darwin in 1872 [17]. It was this work which postulated the idea of basic
emotions, differing combined intensities of which might give rise to an overall
emotional state.
Over the past century this has given rise to significant amounts of psy-
chological research dedicated to determining both the number and nature
of these basic emotions. The exact number of ’fundamental’ emotions given
varies widely from theory to theory. Plutchik first proposed his system of
emotion classification in 1980 [69], containing eight fundamental emotions. In
contrast, Ekman proposed a system consisting of six fundamental (or basic)
emotions in 1982 [28]. Nevertheless, the maximum number of basic emotions
is generally thought to be fourteen [88].
Following on from the definition of basic emotions comes the definition
of more complex emotions. Occasionally, these categories are divided using
nomenclature indicating primary and secondary emotions as in the structure
proposed by Parrott [60]. Oftentimes, however, these more complex emotions
are simply defined by the relative intensities of their parent emotions. In
general terms, however, it is the view of this school of thought that the sum
of human emotional experience can be defined as a function, or construct, of
less than a dozen named emotions [29, 25].
2.2.2 Wundt
An alternative to the view that basic emotions could be named and cate-
gorised, proposed by Wundt in 1904, suggested that emotions could be bet-
ter defined in the context of experience rather than crisp linguistics [114].
Research based on this principle has, as with the Darwinian view, given rise
to many varied schools of thought following the same fundamental idea.
In Wundt’s original model, emotional state was represented in terms
of three facets of experience which he labeled Pleasantness, Approach and
Arousal. He asserted that any individual emotion would be better mod-
elled in the context of relative magnitudes of these facets of the emotional
experience than through verbal labels.
Subsequent to Wundt’s original work, significant research has been per-
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formed regarding this idea of a dimensional emotion model. In many cases
it is common for the third axis to be ignored and, instead, for proponents of
this view to model emotions in the context of Valence, which might be seen
as a crisper definition of Pleasantness, and Arousal [88].
2.2.3 Plutchik
Robert Plutchik is generally credited with creating the psychoevolutionary
theory of emotion [69]. Much of Plutchik’s rationale is rooted in psychologi-
cal behaviourism, citing as support for his eight basic emotions their link to
the perceived "fight or flight" response when observed in nature. In addition
to his eight basic emotions, Plutchik also supported the view of complex, or
’Advanced’ emotions, these being defined by multiple emotions being expe-
rienced simultaneously.
This concept is useful to us when we consider the representation of emo-
tional state by membership grade, which is a necessity when dealing with
Fuzzy Logic. Indeed, all of our representations include the capacity for mul-
tiple emotions to be experienced to differing levels of intensity. While both
of the selected models that are later discussed justify this within their own
psychology, Plutchik’s recognition of the concept is also worthy of note given
the key role he played in the exploration of evolutionary emotions.
Plutchik’s psychoevolutionary theory of basic emotions had ten postulates
[69]:
1. The concept of emotion is applicable to all evolutionary levels and
applies to animals as well as to humans.
2. Emotions have an evolutionary history and have evolved various forms
of expression in different species.
3. Emotions served an adaptive role in helping organisms deal with key
survival issues posed by the environment.
4. Despite different forms of expression of emotions in different species,
there are certain common elements, or prototype patterns, that can be
identified.
5. There is a small number of basic, primary, or prototype emotions.
6. All other emotions are mixed or derivative states; that is, they occur
as combinations, mixtures, or compounds of the primary emotions.
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7. Primary emotions are hypothethical constructs or idealized states whose
properties and characteristics can only be inferred from various kinds
of evidence.
8. Primary emotions can be conceptualized in terms of pairs of polar op-
posites.
9. All emotions vary in their degree of similarity to one another.
10. Each emotion can exist in varying degrees of intensity or levels of
arousal.
Plutchik presents us with eight basic emotions and eight advanced emo-
tions. Advanced emotions were considered compounds of basic emotions, ex-
panding the breadth of human experience represented by his theory. Each
emotion, basic and advanced, had a diametric opposite which described its
emotional antithesis. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 present all sixteen of these emotions,
identifying whether they are basic or advanced, providing a brief definition
drawn from the Oxford Dictionary of English, and stating their diametric
opposites. We note that the definition of Aggressiveness is drawn from the
definition of Aggression within the Oxford Dictionary of English; this is due
to the lack of an explicit definition of Aggressiveness in the context of an
emotional experience [93].
We note that the Wheel of Emotions Plutchik provides, when one includes
both the basic and advanced emotions, becomes analogous with our own
geometric representations of complex emotional states, particularly in the
context of Scherer, which is discussed later.
2.2.4 Ekman
Paul Ekman’s work on emotions, their modelling, detection and classification
has defined a career that spans over three decades. When considering his
contributions to the field, it is necessary to discuss the multiple facets of his
work individually.
The Autonomic Nervous System
Ekman provides an argument for specific basic emotions to elicit distinctive
patterns of activity within the autonomic nervous system (hereafter ANS)
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Table 2.1: Representation of Emotions Presented in Plutchik’s Theory (i)
Definition, Including
Name Type Component Basic Emotions Opposite
Where Appropriate
Anger Basic ‘A strong feeling of annoyance, Fear
displeasure, or hostility.’
‘An unpleasant emotion
Fear Basic caused by the threat Anger
of danger, pain, or harm.’
Sadness Basic ‘Feeling or showing sorrow; Joy
unhappy.’
‘A feeling of revulsion or strong
Disgust Basic disapproval aroused by Trust
something unpleasant or offensive.’
‘A feeling of mild astonishment
Surprise Basic or shock caused by Anticipation
something unexpected.’
‘The action of anticipating
Anticipation Basic something; expectation Surprise
or prediction.’
‘Firm belief in the
Trust Basic reliability, truth, or ability Disgust
of someone or something.’
Joy Basic ‘A feeling of great pleasure Sadness
and happiness.’
‘Hopefulness and confidence
Optimism Advanced about the future or the Disappoint
success of something.’ -ment
Anticipation + Joy
Love Advanced ‘A strong feeling of affection.’ Remorse
Joy + Trust
‘The action of accepting
or yielding to a superior
Submission Advanced force or to the will or Contempt
authority of another person.’
Trust + Fear
[23]. This concept is of interest to us, particularly in the context of emotion-
induced or emotion-attenuated behaviours of a virtual agent, connecting as
it does reaction with emotional experience. Ekman also presented empiri-
cal analyses that indicated ANS reactions for given emotions were identical
irrespective of the manner in which the emotion was generated [26, 48].
Examples he provides of ANS response to emotional stimuli include blood
flowing to the hands in anger, as a predication of a fight response, and blood
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Table 2.2: Representation of Emotions Presented in Plutchik’s Theory (ii)
Definition, Including
Name Type Component Basic Emotions Opposite
Where Appropriate
‘A feeling of reverential




caused by the non-
Disappoint Advanced fulfilment of one’s Optimism
-ment hopes or expectations.’
Surprise + Sadness
‘Deep regret or guilt
Remorse Advanced for a wrong committed.’ Love
Sadness + Disgust
‘The feeling that a person
Contempt Advanced or thing is worthless Submission
or deserving scorn.’
Disgust + Anger
‘Feelings of anger or
antipathy resulting in
Aggressive Advanced hostile or violent Awe
-ness behaviour’
Anger + Anticipation
flowing to the large skeletal muscles in fear, as a predication of a flight
response [48]. From the perspective of our work, this assertion explicitly
stipulates that emotional experience leads to physiological reaction, as such
reinforcing our position that emotional experience can be argued to have a
role in agent response to environment.
It should be noted that his work only draws connection between anger,
fear, disgust and sadness and specific patterns of ANS reaction, his basic
emotions of surprise and enjoyment lacking such connections. His counter
argument revolves around the evolutionary basis of ANS responses, and the
purpose which they have evolved to serve. We have chosen to interpret this
in our implementation of Millenson in a game environment as a reaction to
emotions we connect to enjoyment (Pleasure, Elation, Ecstasy - see Chapter
Nine) being akin to contentment. This is discussed later.
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Facial Expressions and Universality of Emotion
Much of Ekman’s work in the field of emotions has revolved around the
manifestation of emotions through facial expression, and the idea that one
can determine emotional experience from certain key, physiological cues to
facial muscles [25]. In this, Ekman takes initial cues from Darwin [17].
While expression itself is an issue conceptually distant from the purposes
of the research within, some slight commentary should be provided in the
context of potential future associations with the work. Indeed, some justi-
fication for the work can be considered in terms of emotion simulation and
determination on the part of interactive agents.
Briefly, we consider Duchenne’s preposition that while there are many
different forms of smile, only one is associated with truly positive emotions
[22]. Let us consider, then, the possibility that a computational model of
emotional state might not be used simply as a behavioural governer for a
given agent, but also hypothetically a measure for a system designed to
determine the emotional state of the user.
The concept of universality in emotions is also a consideration in the
context of justification of our work. Ekman’s research into emotions and
basic emotions is both built upon, and informs, the concept of universality of
emotion expression whereby happiness has ubiquitously shared physiological
markers [25].
Thus, the generation of a non-context-specific computational representa-
tion of emotional state which utilises emotion models grounded in psycho-
logical theory applies universally to all emotional agents and, hypothetically
speaking, all affective computing environments. Of course, experimentation
of that kind lies beyond the scope of this work in which the focus lies plainly
upon the research, justification and modelling of emotion models, and their
comparative consideration.
In either case, the concept of universality also permits us to draw direct
comparison in otherwise disparate models of emotion, as shall be shown in
subsequent sections of this work.
Basic Emotions
As we have observed previously, much work has been performed in the context
of emotional experience in opposition to named, basic emotions. A great deal
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Table 2.3: Representation of Basic Emotions Proposed by Ekman’s Theory
Name Definition
Anger ‘A strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility.’
Disgust ‘A feeling of revulsion or strong disapproval aroused by
something unpleasant or offensive.’
Fear ‘An unpleasant emotion caused by the threat of danger, pain,
or harm.’
Happiness ‘Feeling or showing pleasure or contentment.’
Sadness ‘Feeling or showing sorrow; unhappy.’
Surprise ‘A feeling of mild astonishment or shock caused by
something unexpected.’
of this work has been performed by Paul Ekman, and a brief overview of that
work is included here.
Ekman is a strong proponent of the view that there are a limited number
of basic emotions. He defines his usage of the word basic in three forms. First,
that there are a number of separate emotions that are distinguished from
one another in important ways. Second, that evolution was instrumental
in defining both the unique and shared features that experience of these
emotions displays. Finally, that there is a postulation that other, non-basic
emotions exist, and that these are combinations of these basic emotions,
which may be called ’blends’, or ’mixed emotional states’ [30, 68, 103].
This third concept is key to all aspects of the work we present here. Subse-
quently, multivalue logic systems are used to generate these ’mixed emotional
states’ on the basis of agent experience and, in test scenarios, inform the be-
haviour of said agent. Understandably, therefore, much is predicated upon
this interpretation of the nature of ’Basic’ emotions.
The six basic emotions Ekman defined in 1972 are shown in table 2.3,
along with definitions drawn from the Revised Second Edition of the Oxford
Dictionary of English, printed in 2005 [24, 93].
However, additions to this list were made in 1999 [25], adding new basic
emotions, some of which were not encoded in facial expression (unlike his
previous work). This enhanced list of basic emotions is included in table 2.4,
along with definitions drawn from the same reference [93].
He concedes the possibility that ’guilt’ is an arguable point, describing it
as a ’likely candidate’ [25], but makes no assertion that it not be included in
his definitive list. He discounts ’interest’ as a distinct emotion, as suggested
by Tomkins and Izard, considering it rather a cognitive state. He also notes
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Table 2.4: Revised Basic Emotions Proposed by Ekman in Later Work
Name Definition
Amusement ‘The state or experience of finding something funny.’
Anger ‘A strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility.’
Contempt ‘The feeling that a person or thing is worthless or
deserving scorn.’
Contentment ‘A state of happiness and satisfaction.’
Disgust ‘A feeling of revulsion or strong disapproval aroused by
something unpleasant or offensive.’
Embarrassment ‘A feeling or self-consciousness, shame, or
awkwardness.’
Excitement ‘A feeling of great enthusiasm and eagerness.’
Fear ‘An unpleasant emotion caused by the threat of
danger, pain, or harm.’
Guilt ‘A feeling of having committed wrong or failed in an
obligation.’
Pride ‘A feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived
(in Achievement) from one’s own achievements, the achievements of one’s
close associates’
Relief ‘A feeling of reassurance and relaxation following release
from anxiety or distress.’
Sadness / ‘Feeling or showing sorrow; unhappy.’ /
Distress ‘Extreme anxiety, sorrow, or pain.’
Satisfaction ‘Fulfilment of one’s wishes, expectations, or needs,
or the pleasure derived from this.’
Sensory ‘A feeling of happy satisfaction and enjoyment’ in the
Pleasure context of ‘sensation or the physical senses’.
Shame ‘A painful feeling of humiliation or distress caused by
the consciousness of wrong or foolish behaviour.’
his own omission of romantic and parental love, grief, jealousy and hatred.
He has argued that these are emotional plots, and endure longer than ’basic
emotions’ [27, 29, 28].
Ultimately, from Ekman’s work on basic emotions, we draw support for
their inclusion, support for the idea that there could be as few as six, or as
many as fifteen or more, basic emotions, and concessions to the concept of
’mixed emotional states’ being comprised of multiple ’basic’ emotions.
Emotion Families
In the context of Ekman’s work, when he describes basic emotions he does
so in terms of each basic emotion actually representing a family of emotions
that share the characteristics of these basic emotions [25]. In this, his work
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bears analogue with the model presented by Millenson which we later discuss,
whereby it is possible to interpret Millenson’s approach in the context of three
’families’ of emotions (see Chapter Five).
He expands upon this point to state that basic emotions constitute a
"theme", with associated "variations" [25]. The theme consists of character-
istics unique to the associated family. He defines variations on a given theme
to be the "product of various influences: individual differences in biological
constitution; different learning experiences; and differences specific to and
reflecting the nature of the particular occasion in which an emotion occurs"
[29].
One benefit of Ekman’s reasoning on the concept of emotion families is
the freedom it grants him from lexicographal considerations. He observes
that many of the issues and confusions that reside in the field of emotion
research are due, in part, to a "failure to recognise that many of the emotion
terms refer to variations within a family" [29]. By declaring families, there-
fore, Ekman avoids the pitfalls associated with exhaustive reliance upon the
lexicon, and neatly avoids debates on the question of ’how angry is angry?’.
It is worth noting that Ekman has previously stipulated that he does not
consider the boundaries between basic emotion families to be "fuzzy" [29],
although how the word "fuzzy" is applied in this context is open to interpre-
tation. Given that it follows on from discussion explicit to the manifestation
of emotions through shared facial expression traits [30], the statement can
be interpreted as a stipulation that he does not believe that in situations
where a single, basic emotion is experienced, that this basic emotion could
be confused with any other. Given his concessions to the idea of multiple
emotions being experienced simultaneously, this does not directly counter
the logic upon which our work is based.
2.3 Affective Computing
Affective Computing is a term generally applied to the study and develop-
ment of systems and devices that analyse or simulate human emotions, or
some combination of the two [63]. As the broad nature of this chapter high-
lights, it is a strongly multidisciplinary field including elements of cognitive
science, psychology, computing sciences and philosophy.
While significant work has been done within this field in the context of
recognising the emotional state of a human user [4, 43, 11, 104, 14, 16, 117,
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118, 115, 2, 44], or specifically on designing agents to simulate emotions
[41, 70, 108, 98, 99, 97, 102, 45], our interest focuses exclusively on the
virtual representation of psychologically grounded emotional states. As such,
the work herein is non-partisan in the context of emotion simulation versus
emotion detection, as the product of our work should ultimately have uses
in both.
Rosalind Picard is often credited with defining the field of Affective Com-
puting in its accepted form, in her paper entitled Affective Computing [63],
and has remained one of the defining influences in the field [66, 67, 65]. The
context in which it was initially presented was primarily analytical, centered
almost exclusively around designing "empathic" systems designed to adapt
their behaviour on the basis of the emotional state of the user.
It is, perhaps, easy to dismiss this area as an esoteric approach to complex
user interfaces and, perhaps, as an answer to questions that the computing
industry at large has no interest in asking. The practical benefits of re-
search into this area, however, cannot be overstated when viewed from the
perspective of some of the most vulnerable members of society.
Much research centered around emotion analysis (the aforementioned em-
pathic agents) has been undertaken in a medical context, to aid those suf-
fering from ailments such as Autism and Down Syndrome [64, 35, 46]. In
addition, much of this research has focussed on the physiological identifiers
discussed elsewhere in this publication in the context of Ekman’s emotion re-
search. Again, this emphasises the multidisciplinary nature of the Affective
Computing field [12, 18, 106, 62, 57, 58, 113, 101].
Our particular interest lies in the application of the principles of Fuzzy
Logic to an affective computing environment. We discuss in an historical
context three such contributions here, following a consideration of the con-
tributions to the field of affective computing made in the area of cognitive,
goal-oriented systems.
2.3.1 Cognitive, Goal-Oriented Approaches to Affect
Our work centres upon psychological representations of emotional state and,
as such, our focus largely shies away from exploration of systems where emo-
tion is embedded within a control system. Further to this the natural bias
of our work, relating as it does to emotional state as a concept in and of
itself generated by perception of external factors, leans towards the appraisal
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approach which is generally perceived as at odds with the goal-oriented ap-
proach. We would be remiss, however, if we did not address the wealth of
research relating emotion to cognition in a goal-oriented, computational con-
text.
Of particular interest is the fashion in which emotion can be linked to
autonomy [19] which provides both context and value to our own work, even
though that work is undertaken outside the scope of goal-oriented models of
emotion. That stipulation made, one purpose of the work we undertake is to
generate computational representations of psychologically grounded models
of emotion such that those representations can be utilised in an agent that is
aware of and affected by its environment. This reinforces the justification of
our considering the fashion in which recent psychological theories have drawn
links between emotions and goal-oriented cognition.
A goal-oriented view of emotions takes the position that emotions are the
side-effect of environmental analysis, affected by the achievement, or other-
wise, of goals defining agent desires or similar concepts. If we consider Frijda’s
definition of emotion [32], connecting stimuli to emotional response as a func-
tion of relevance to the agent’s goals, we see immediate analogue with the
Millenson Theory as discussed later in this Chapter. Indeed, the argument
could be made that any strongly stimulus-based representation of emotional
state is, on some level, goal-dependant.
Ortony, et al , associate emotional output with other agents, events and
other items which exist within the agent’s universe [56]. This assertion largely
supports the models explored and implemented within this work, although
the most obvious connections are found in the complex, subjective inputs we
discuss later in the context of the Geneva Emotion Wheel. That model, con-
necting emotional output with perceived environmental valence and control,
abstracts inputs away from the purely valenced perspective of Millenson’s
theory.
Considering more complex representations of emotion theory, the SPAARS
model derived by Power and Dalgleish [71] adopts a multi-level approach con-
necting verbal associations, non-verbalised abstract concepts, and recalled
situational analogues with eventual emotional output. Its multi-level nature
presents a complex, interconnected web of the fashion in which these con-
cepts both inform each other and the ultimate emotional state, but that
same structure places a great deal of emphasis upon the perceptions and
past experiences of the individual agent.
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While we can draw little in terms of direct inspiration from goal-oriented
models in the course of our own research, the topic does introduce layers
and levels upon which the eventual manifestation of our work can be super-
imposed, to inform or be informed by goal-oriented analysis of an agent’s
particular environment.
2.3.2 OCEAN
Ören and Ghasem-Aghaee [72] considered ’state-of-the-art’ psychological prin-
ciples in their attempt to simulate human behaviour through fuzzy logic.
Their model was based upon thirty facets of human personality, clustered
into five groups, and they presented three concise representations of the pri-
mary characteristics of human personality.
The model they adopt is often referred to as the OCEAN model [36], and
summarises human personality Traits into the aforementioned five Clusters
under the following headings:
• O: Openness, culture, originality, or intellect
• C: Conscientiousness, consolidation, or will to achieve
• E: Extraversion
• A: Agreeableness or accommodation
• N: Need for stability, negative emotionality, or neuroticism
This model, while supported by a contemporary psychological theory re-
ferred to as the Five-Factor Model of Personality [13], seems to have its roots
in socio-political consideration as much as in that psychology - the fact that
the score of a personality’s intellect and originality is dependent upon their
emotional awareness and liberality [72] for example.
The proposed model for computational purposes gives each facet three
possible values (low, medium, high), with each having a weighting factor
affecting its overall effect upon the score of the Cluster (or Trait) it relates
to. We instantly see here a potential opening for further iterations of fuzzy
logic to be applied, as the membership of each facet is crisp, rather than
fuzzy. A given facet (an example facet of Openness is Fantasy, the tendency
to daydream) can be either low, medium or high - not 0.9 low, 0.3 medium,
0.1 high.
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The fuzzification is introduced only in the context of Traits, where each
Trait has two possible membership groups (in the case of Openness, Explorer
or Preserver), and these provide membership levels (e.g. 0.3 Explorer, 0.7
Preserver).
Lastly, Ören and Ghasem-Aghaee borrow a personality template from
Howard and Howard [36] as a method of formalising the weighting of each
facet to the importance in its related trait, its symbolic, qualitative values
and its numerical values. The model output is a vector-based surface area
producing what they refer to as the compound personality type, presumably
the surface area of the personality in each facet being proportional to some
output relating to the highest scoring membership group for that facet (the
lowest scoring group does not appear to feature in the final measurement).
2.3.3 Gershenson
Gershenson’s 1999 [33] publication on emotion modelling through multival-
ued logic provides us with a less rigorously justified model of the personality,
but one which makes noticeably better use of fuzzy logic (in terms of breadth
of application). Gershenson’s paper considers impetus-based emotion mod-
elling rather than personality modelling - arguably a more interesting area,
since it deals directly with the idea of human-agent interaction and applied
emotion shift.
He justifies the use of multidimensional logic through consideration of
the possibility it is possible to feel contradictory emotion - the example he
gives is infidelity, which can generate feelings of seething resentment and
instantaneous hatred, while not erasing feelings of love. While subjective,
the argument does bear consideration and scrutiny.
Ultimately, Gershenson generates several membership functions, each rep-
resenting two or more related emotional states, and proposes that through
consideration of these aligned membership functions it should be feasible to
model the instantaneous emotional state of a system.
This is probably the most important difference between his work and
that of Ören and Ghasem-Aghaee - while the latter concerned itself with a
whole personality model which could be used to derive emotional tendancy,
the former considers exclusively the modelling of the emotional state at any
given instant. As such, it is Gershenson’s work which bears closest analogue
to our own.
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2.3.4 Fuzzy Logic Adaptive Model of Emotions
Lastly we discuss possibly the most publicised model considered in this re-
view of prior research, that of the Fuzzy Logic Adaptive Model of Emotions
(FLAME). El-Nasr, Yen and Ioerger [31] published an extensive paper out-
lining the basis of the system. Of all the models we have considered, only
FLAME provides a multi-stage system, built upon three components - the
emotional component, the learning component and the decision-making com-
ponent. That said, from our perspective FLAME has significant shortcom-
ings in terms of its emotion model.
A system using the FLAME architecture would observe an external event.
What it perceives is then passed to both the learning component and the
emotional component, which would also receive some limited input from the
post-processed learning component, in order to generate an emotion-based
behavioural response. This behaviour is then passed on to the decision-
making component in order to determine the agent reaction.
Since FLAME concerns itself with a reactionary model, its implementa-
tion of fuzzy logic is related to a heuristic analysis of a given action’s ’im-
pact’ from the perspective of the agent, a scale running from highly positive
to highly negative. The importance of a given goal (linked to the affect a
given event has upon the possibility of reaching that goal) is also considered
in similar fashion, and used to derive the most subjective consideration, the
’desirability’ of the event from the perspective of the agent.
The system is based entirely in type-1 fuzzy logic, with rules of the type:
IF Impact(prevent starvation, food dish taken away) is HighlyNegative
AND Importance(prevent starvation) is ExtremelyImportant
THEN Desirability(food dish taken away) is HighlyUndesired
Price, et al, [15] derived the equations that FLAME bases its emotional
intensity upon in 1985. These quantitative equations were built upon a study
in which participants described in the first person perspective individual
emotional experiences. The paper concluded that there were multiplicative
interactions between the anticipation of a positive event, the anticipation of
a negative event, and overall emotional intensity.
FLAME does provide some interesting work in the concept of emotion
filtering. This is handled through motivational states, which are used to de-
termine which single emotion best enhances the agents probability of reaching
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a given goal - for example, if a given action provokes a response of both anger
and depression, and anger is more likely to prompt an action to resolve the
situation, the system will select anger as the primary emotional state.
While this might be useful in a purely control sense, it is in many ways
contrary to a psychological view of the scenario, where a human-like agent
might well experience emotions that are not conducive to resolving a situa-
tion.
Indeed, the idea of filtering out the less desirable emotions completely
does seem somewhat at odds with the idea of creating a true representation
of human emotional behaviour.
The learning component of FLAME is based upon the Q-learning al-
gorithm within reinforcement learning. The decision-making component as
described in the paper is an exhaustive series of if-then statements, linked
to the situation of the specific agent and based upon the assumption that
the agent has been programmed with a complete list of possible actions and
their desirability or at the very least has the capacity to assume any event it
is not programmed to react to is considered a neutral event.
Actual testing with FLAME was performed through user assessment,
based upon a questionnaire filled out by 21 volunteers who interacted with
the system. Little numerical information is provided beyond this, although
there is some notable discussion of the perceptions of the test subjects.
As has been noted, our work bears closest analogue with that of Ger-
shenson, as a function of parallels in our approach to representing emotional
state. The OCEAN model, being a personality model, lacks direct compa-
rability, and FLAME is, on closer inspection, a control system rather than
a psychological ’model’ of emotion. We acknowledge that authors such as
Simon [90] have described the mind in the context of an emotion-motivated
control system; our own focus, however, is to abstract emotion away from
direct control and, instead, consider solely fashions in which emotional state
can be internally represented. As such, while FLAME is of interest to us
historically, it does not relate directly with our intended goals.
2.4 Selected Models
Having discussed both the Darwinian and Wundtian schools, we have also
considered that the two are not mutually exclusive. Russell produced a
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circular model of emotions outlining the position of what he believed to be
fundamental emotions in terms of relative values of what were effectively
arousal and valence [75].
It is upon this idea of hybridised conceptual models that our work pitches
its focus. Such models permit us to consider the emotional state as an output,
or resultant, of disparate and seemingly unrelated contextual inputs. As shall
be discussed later, they permit a blend of geometry and discrete states that
plays particularly to the strength of fuzzy representation.
The focus of our attention has been directed towards two such hybridised
concepts. The first was proposed by Millenson in 1967 [53], hereafter referred
to as the Millenson Model. The second is a more recent model called the
Geneva Emotion Wheel, first presented by Scherer in 2005 [88], hereafter
referred to interchangeably as the G.E.W. and the Scherer Model.
2.4.1 Millenson
Millenson’s model of emotion, defined as a stand-alone model of emotion and
not presented with its own psychological theory, was built upon Watson’s
three-factor theory [109, 110]. Often considered the father of behaviourism
[111], Watson proposed the connection between applied and withdrawn stim-
ulus, and resultant emotional response.
Millenson’s model took this idea and derived a three-axis system that
associated certain applied and removed stimulus with different facets of emo-
tional experience. Figure 2.1 shows an interpretation of his modular struc-
ture, where S+ represents an applied positive stimulus, $+ represents a re-
moved positive stimulus, S- represents an applied negative stimulus, and $-
represents a removed negative stimulus.
Along each axis, Millenson places an emotional archetype. He associates
the x -axis with anger, the y-axis with anxiety, and the z -axis with pleasure.
He acknowledges that three emotions do not account for the sum total of
emotional experience, and compensates for this in two ways.
First, he posits that some emotions vary from each other only in terms
of their intensity. Given the structure of his model, this is a linguistically
ambiguous statement with one of two meanings. The first possible meaning
is that along a given axis, all named emotions are essentially the same emo-
tion at varying levels of intensity. The second possible meaning is semantic
inasmuch as it may be interpreted that his statement meant that emotions
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Figure 2.1: Millenson’s 3-Dimensional Model of Emotional Intensity [94]
along a particular axis are only triggered by a more intensely felt application
or removal of their associated stimulus. Both of these interpretations are
explored in later discussions regarding mathematical transliteration of the
model and subsequent implementation.
Second, he suggests that some emotions are simply complex compounds
of the basic emotions his model acknowledges. In this, his theory is consis-
tent with many subseqent works suggesting the existence of basic emotions;
that complex emotions, which might be linguistically recognised in popular
language, are complex compounds of two or more basic emotions [25].
In terms of an applied example of Millenson’s theory in the context of
compound emotional responses to stimulus, his own example was that of a
child taking a cookie from a jar [94]. In this example, there is an associated
applied positive stimulus with the action, that being to eat the cookie, and an
associated applied negative stimulus, that being the fear of being caught. We
can define this compound as guilt. We can also consider other combinations
of more dramatically conflicting stimulus, such as behaviours that arise from
neuroses.
As Figure 2.1 outlines, his nine basic emotions are divided into three
groups: those associated with the removal of positive stimulus; those associ-
ated with the application of negative stimulus; and, those associated with the
conceptual combination of applied positive stimulus and removed negative
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Table 2.5: Representation of Basic Emotions Proposed by Millenson’s Theory
Name Definition
Annoyance ‘The feeling or state of being annoyed; irritation.’
Anger ‘A strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility.’
Rage ‘Violent uncontrollable anger.’
Apprehension ‘Anxiety or fear that something bad or unpleasant
will happen.’
Anxiety ‘Feeling or showing pleasure or contentment.’
Terror ‘Feeling or showing sorrow; unhappy.’
Pleasure ‘A feeling of happy satisfaction and enjoyment.’
Elation ‘Great happiness and exhilaration.’
Ecstasy ‘An overwhelming feeling of great happiness or
joyful excitement.’
stimulus. Presenting these respectively, and subsequently in order of implied
intensity, including brief definitions drawn from the Oxford Dictionary of
English [93], these emotions are shown in table 2.5.
Looking at Millenson’s model in a process sense, fundamentally it asso-
ciates a given event with a composite of application or removal of two stimuli.
From this, it defines an emotional response associated with the event, rep-
resented by nine basic emotions. Over time, these emotional responses to
stimuli can be used to define an adaptive emotional state.
Geometry of the Millenson Model
Throughout this work we shall refer to the ’geometry’ of Millenson’s represen-
tation of emotional state, specifically in a Cartesian fashion. In this context,
we refer to the cuboid geometry of figure 2.1, which can be considered a
three-dimensional region of Cartesian space, with an origin at the zero-value
intercepts of the three experiential axes. In particular, we use the term in
the context of emotional state representing a point in the three-dimensional
space shown in the figure. We are mindful that Millenson’s theory precludes
any one of his axes directly affecting the other two, but the visualisation is
helpful when considering his model in an hollistic sense.
2.4.2 Scherer
Early Work
Much of Scherer’s early work bears analogue with the pan-cultural consid-
27
erations of Ekman; where Ekman directed his attentions on physical (par-
ticularly facial) expression, Scherer discussed the pan-culturality of vocal
expression of emotion [107, 78]. Performing his own studies in the context of
surveying multiple different explorations of this area of emotion research, he
proposed and pursued more complex studies of the topic where expression
and impression were jointly analysed, rather than independently. Later work
established correlation between emotional inferences and vocal cues across
both cultures and languages [86].
His considerations of emotions as a concept were rooted firmly in the idea
of situational appraisal and cognitive analysis [79, 81]. He asserted that an
organism constantly and subjectively assessed its environment, in the con-
text of its own well-being; emotions would then be generated as a response,
based on the importance of the environmental stimulus to an individual, and
other assessing factors, including needs and values [83, 87]. This links with
discussions regarding emotions as a facet of goal-oriented behaviour patterns
earlier in this document, although computational exploration of Scherer’s
work has been undertaken previously in the context of neural networks[77].
Scherer does not explicitly draw mutual exclusivity between ‘appraisal’
systems and cognitivistic approaches. Rather, he considers that on some level,
appraisal is a cognitive process, but not necessarily one associated with higher
level processing of environment. Indeed, he has discussed in depth the com-
ponents of emotion that can be considered explicitly cognitive [85]. This is
the view we adopt in consideration of our selected models of emotion; that
appraisal of environment is a cognitive process, not necessarily driven by
higher level assessment, informing the emotional state of an agent.
Dicussing the nature of emotions [82, 84], Scherer subscribes to an ex-
pansion of the triad view that emotions have three functional components:
physiological arousal, motor expression, and subjective feeling. In particular,
Scherer includes two additional components of emotion: behaviour prepara-
tion, and cognitive processes. From our perspective, these factors inform the
‘output’ of a system governed by the emotion models this work discusses.
We acknowledge the theoretical implications of situational reinforcement of
stimulus, that an agent whose behavioural or cognitive response to a given
emotional state may be to generate a stimulus which reinforces that emo-
tional state.
An additional aspect of prior work undertaken by Scherer which is of in-
terest to our own work revolves around the issue of emotion blends. The util-
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isation of fuzzy logic systems in the representation of emotional state must,
on some level, consider the debates surrounding the question of whether or
not it is possible for an organism to ‘feel’ multiple emotions simultaneously.
More importantly, from our perspective, we consider whether it is possible
for a given stimulus event to trigger multiple ‘basic’ emotions in response.
Like Plutchik, Scherer takes the position that emotion blends are observed
regularly within nature [80]. This supports our own view that a fuzzy logic-
based representation of emotional state can generate complex stimulus-based
responses, where multiple basic emotions are triggered by a single event, with-
out sacrificing psychological analogue.
The Geneva Emotion Wheel
Where Millenson’s model associates the stimulus of a given event with an
emotional component the Geneva Emotion Wheel adopts a more classical
approach. Following on the principles outlined by Wundt over a century
earlier, Scherer’s work associates the agent’s perceptions of its situation with
a discrete emotional component.
In his paper presenting the Geneva Emotion Wheel, Scherer discusses
a perceived relationship between specific emotions, and relative experiences
of valence and control. Through empirical analysis, informed by extensive
experimentation, Scherer postulates that a structure featuring sixteen basic
emotions might be generated, with each emotions position and intensity being
determined by a vector relationship defined by these two input factors.
Commenting on Russell’s original circumplex work [75], Scherer takes
some of the conclusions drawn and uses them to tune his model. He also
makes note of the comparable results obtained through separate empirical
experimentation. At length, the Geneva Emotion Wheel is presented in the
form shown in Figure 2.2.
While Scherer admits that previous scholars suggested that, if basic emo-
tions are the root of emotional experience, the maximum number of basic
emotions would be fourteen, his circular model includes sixteen distinct emo-
tions, each of which we may consider a basic emotion. These sixteen basic
emotions, with associated definitions taken from the Oxford Dictionary of
English [93] are presented in table 2.6.
In the interests of clarity, the Oxford Dictionary of English defines bored
as ’Feeling weary and impatient because one is unoccupied or lacks interest
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Figure 2.2: A Graphical Depiction of the Geneva Emotion Wheel [88]
in one’s current activity’. Similarly, it defines hostile as ’Showing or feeling
opposition or dislike; unfriendly’ [93].
We note that three of these basic emotions are directly comparable to the
list proposed by Millenson: anger, anxiety and elation. Indeed, these three
emotions actually form the core of Millenson’s model, as they represent the
conceptual midpoint on each axis of his system. We also note in particular
that the example of a complex emotion provided by Millenson, that of guilt,
features as a basic emotion in the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
Considering further the graphical representation we note that it also in-
dicates varying degrees of intensity, showing that as the relative magnitudes
of valence and control become greater, the emotions they engender are ex-
perienced in a more dramatic fashion. As these relative magnitudes of the
two determining factors tend towards zero, so too does the emotional impact
they generate. At the centre of the model lies an emotional white space to
reflect this.
Looking at the Geneva Emotion Wheel in a process sense, it connects
an input based upon agent perception, specifically the agent’s perception of
the valence and control it feels in a given situation. From this, it defines an
emotional response associated with the event, represented by sixteen basic
emotions. As with Millenson, we would seek to use these event-associated
emotions, over time, to present an adaptive emotional state, work initially
discussed in 2008 [9].
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Table 2.6: List of Basic Emotions Presented in the Geneva Emotion Wheel
Name Definition
‘A feeling of deep pleasure or satisfaction derived
Pride from one’s own achievements, the achievements of one’s
close associates, or from qualities or possessions
that are widely admired.’
Elation ‘Great happiness and exhilaration.’
Happiness ‘Feeling or showing pleasure or contentment.’
Satisfaction ‘Fulfilment of one’s wishes, expectations, or needs,
or the pleasure derived from this.’
Relief ‘A feeling of reassurance and relaxation following release
from anxiety or distress.’
Hope ‘A feeling of expectation and desire for a particular
thing to happen.’
Interest ‘The feeling of wanting to know or learn about
something or someone.’
Surprise ‘A feeling of mild astonishment or shock caused
by something unexpected.’
Anxiety ‘Feeling or showing pleasure or contentment.’
Sadness ‘Feeling or showing sorrow; unhappy.’
Boredom ‘The state of feeling bored.’
‘A feeling of having committed wrong or failed
Shame / in an obligation.’ / ‘A painful feeling of
Guilt humiliation or distress caused by the conscious
-ness of wrong or foolish behaviour.’
Disgust ‘A feeling of revulsion or strong disapproval aroused by
something unpleasant or offensive.’
Contempt ‘The feeling that a person or thing is worthless or
deserving scorn.’
Hostility ‘Hostile behaviour; unfriendliness or opposition.’
Anger ‘A strong feeling of annoyance, displeasure, or hostility.’
Geometry of the Geneva Emotion Wheel
Throughout this work we use the term ’geometry’ when discussing the Geneva
Emotion Wheel, applying the term in a Cartesian context. Analogous to our
application of the term in the context of Millenson’s model, when ’geometry’
is used in relation to the Geneva Emotion Wheel it specifically refers to the
geometric shape shown in figure 2.2. In particular, it is used when discussing
the relationship between given relative magnitudes of control, valence and
emotional output, as informed by the circumplex. This geometry is also re-
ferred to in discussion of our implementations of the Geneva Emotion Wheel,
where it is applied more literally.
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Chapter 3




This chapter presents the portions of our literature review regarding compu-
tational and technical aspects of the research undertaken. Initially, we provide
a brief overview of fuzzy logic, upon which our mathematical representations
and eventual implementations hinge. We firstly approach type-1 fuzzy logic,
before providing some dicourse and notation with respect to type-2 fuzzy
logic.
We next discuss the topic of developmental platforms for our work, both
in terms of hardware and software. We outline the various software platforms
that were selected for development, highlighting benefits and issues with all
concerned. Finally, we discuss considered but discounted hardware platforms.
3.2 Introduction to Fuzzy Logic
3.2.1 Type-1 Fuzzy Logic
In traditional set theory, an object k has a binary relation, defined by a
bivalent condition, with a set A. If k is a member of the set A, we denote
this
k ∈ A (3.1)
In fuzzy set theory, set A is actually represented as a pair, (A, µ) where
A is a set, and
µ : A → [0, 1] (3.2)
Membership of k in the set (A, µ) is now defined as µ(k); we call this the
membership grade of k.
k is considered excluded from the set (A, µ) if µ(k) = 0; k is considered
fully included in the set (A, µ) if µ(k) = 1; and, k is considered a fuzzy
member of (A, µ) if 0 < µ(k) < 1. For a finite set A = k1, k2, . . . , kn, we
denote the fuzzy set (A, µ) as µ(k1)/k1, µ(k2)/k2, . . . , µ(kn)/kn.
Fuzzy logic, the extension of fuzzy set theory, utilises degrees of truth to
determine the nature of a system. In particular, while mathematical variables
often take crisp, numerical values, fuzzy logic permits the use of linguistic
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Figure 3.1: Two Fuzzy Inputs leading to One Fuzzy Output
variables [126, 122, 123, 124, 125]. These variables may be associated with
qualifying terms such as short, warm or poor.
3.2.2 Type-1 Fuzzy Inferencing
In his original work regarding the application of fuzzy set theory to control
systems [49], Mamdani described in detail an experiment regarding "linguis-
tic" synthesis of a controller for a steam engine. He applied fuzzy logic to
convert heuristic control rules as stated by a human operator into an auto-
matic control strategy. His work was based on a paper published by Zadeh
in 1973 discussing complex systems and decision making [121].
The structure of a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system, or FIS, is compar-
atively simple, and built upon rules of the form
If X is ’x ’, then Y is ’y ’
Or, in mathematical form,
{IF (Premisei)THEN(Consequenti)}Ni
where x and y are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets along the ranges
X and Y . The ’if’ statement we define as the premise, or antecedent, while
the ’then’ statement is defined as the conclusion or consequent [91].
Applying fuzzy logic to these statements, we introduce the idea of gradi-
ated truth, or membership grades, of individual statements. For example, let
us consider two input ranges: X possessed of two linguistic variables, High
and Low, and Y , possessed of two linguistic variables, Good and Bad. These
two input ranges are used in the determination of an output variable Z, with
linguistic variables Poor, Middling and Fine. These are shown in Figure
3.1.
Let us generate three rules for our example system.
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Rule 1: If X is High, and Y is Good, then Z is Fine
Rule 2: If X is Low, and Y is Good, then Z is Middling
Rule 3: If X is Low, and Y is Bad, then Z is Poor
Our rules are using the And (min) operator. There are two operators we
commonly use in Mamdani fuzzy inferencing systems: And (min), and Or
(max). The axioms these functions represent are defined as follows:
Truth(A OR B) = MAX (Truth(A), Truth(B))
Truth(A AND B) = MIN (Truth(A), Truth(B))
Truth(NOT A) = 1 − Truth(A)
Where Truth in this sense is a value defining accuracy of an assertion, and
the MAX and MIN operators have their usual meanings. In a binary logic
system, Truth of a given assertion is either 1 or 0. In a fuzzy logic system,
Truth is a value between 1 and 0, informed by the membership functions that
define the inferencing system.
Our systems focus particularly upon the And case. Numerically, these are
represented through simple equations relating to the membership function of
a linguistic variable associated with an input. Let us consider the specifics
of these relations here.
Let us consider input range X, with linguistic variables High and Low.
Following on from fuzzy set theory, we formalise this as
(X,µ) = {µ(Low)/Low, µ(High)/High}
Likewise, in considering our input range Y and output Z, we formalise them
as




For any given values applied to the ranges X and Y , let us call these discrete
values X ′ and Y ′, values of m associated with specific linguistic variables are
produced and applied to the rules as follows. Let us consider Rule 1 in our
hypothetical system. Rule 1 is an And rule, meaning that the membership
of the linguistic output variable is determined by the minimum membership
of the associated linguist input variables. Thus, for any values of X and Y ,
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Rule 1 can be represented as
({µZ(Fine)/F ine} =
min{µX(High)/High, µY (Good)/Good})
In a standard Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system, each of these rules is
considered for a given input to the system. That is to say that for any
value X and Y received by the system, all three rules shall be evaluated to
determine the resultant membership grades of the linguistic variables within
Z. These membership grades determine the contribution from each linguistic
variable to the pre-defuzzified output of Z. Figure 3.2 illustrates this process
by assigning the value 0.4 to X, and the value 0.8 to Y .
Note that, as previously stated, the output shown in Figure 3.2 has not yet
been defuzzified. Indeed, it is important to realise that the fuzzy inferencing
system does not return memberships for the three linguistic variables that
define Z. Rather, the inferencing system should return to us a value within
the limits of Z by which we can define our output.
As shall be discussed in the context of the first Millenson implementation
featured within this paper, this crisp output can then be used to define
other variables, dependent upon the needs and design of the system. For the
purpose of this illustration, however, it is simply a desired, crisp value of Z.
In order to obtain this crisp output, it is required that the output shown
in Figure 3.2 be defuzzified. The most common form of defuzzification as-
sociated with the Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system is known as centroid
defuzzification.
Centroid defuzzification calculates the total area defined by the mem-
bership grades of the linguistic variables, with respect to their membership
functions. In Figure 3.2 this area is represented by the dark grey region of
the defuzzified output. Having determined the total area under the curve,
the defuzzifier then calculates the value of Z representing the centre of the
area. Explicitly, the point along the Z-axis where the area under the curve
to the left of the output value is equal to the area under the curve to the
right.
The description, in fuzzy terms, of the emotion models outlined in this
paper, and how they may be used to generate a conceptual emotion model,
is the dominant feature of Section 3 of this paper. The specifics of the
36
Figure 3.2: Fuzzy Rules Triggered by a Value X ′
construction of the models’ respective inferencing systems is covered in our
Chapter devoted to Implementation.
3.2.3 Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Overview
Type 2 fuzzy set theory is a further extension of the Type-1 Fuzzy Logic out-
lined in the previous section, the mathematical nomenclature and clarity of
which were significantly aided by Mendel and John in 2002 [51]. We denote
a type 2 fuzzy set Ã
Ã{((k, u), µÃ(k, u))|∀k ∈ K, ∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (3.3)
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where Ã is characterised by the type-2 membership function µÃ(k, u),
k ∈ K, and u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]; and where 0 ≤ µÃ(k, u) ≤ 1.
Conceptually, a type 2 fuzzy set has, for any given value of k, several
numerical membership grades which, themselves, have associated member-
ship grades [8]. Let us consider the case of k = k‘. k‘ is best envisioned as
a two-dimensional plane whose axes are u and µÃ(k, u). In mathematical
terms, we define this as
µÃ(k = k‘, u) ≡ µÃ(k‘) =
∫
u∈Jk‘
fk‘(u)/u; Jk‘ ⊆ [0, 1] (3.4)
In the context of a discrete universe, where there were n unique values of
u with associated membership grades µ, for k = k‘, this could be denoted
µÃ(k‘) = µ(u1k‘)/u1k‘ , µ(u2k′ )/u2k‘ , . . . , µ(unk‘)/unk‘ (3.5)
for any discrete value of k, k‘. Note that the above mathematics discusses
a variable with only a single type 2 fuzzy set Ã attached to it. For a vari-
able K with multiple related type 2 fuzzy sets Ã1, Ã2, . . . , Ãn, parallel like




The term x86 refers explicitly to the instruction set initially associated with
the Intel 8086 CPU first introduced in 1978. Though commonly used to de-
scribe IBM Compatible PCs, this application is erroneous. The PC itself has
countless possible configurations as a function of the wide variet of available
hardware. As such, it is impossible to list specifications in the manner of
those provided for the consoles discussed above.
We can, however, discuss briefly the context in which the PC was consid-
ered as our development platform. At the time these discussions took place,
the Intel Core 2 Duo P7450 was considered a consumer-end CPU, possessing
two cores clocked at 2.13 GHz. 32-bit Operating Systems limited systems to
utilising up to 4GB of RAM, to include both system RAM and video RAM.
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In addition, software already existed on the PC to create and manage
Fuzzy Inferencing Systems, in particular the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolkit
which shall be discussed later. Coupled with the fact that developing for the
PC required less specialist equipment, and that the XBox demonstrated that
development on the PC did not preclude compatibility with other platforms,
it was determined that for the start of the project, and potentially throughout
the project, the personal computer would be used for development.
In our specific case, the x86 personal computer used a Microsoft Win-
dows operating system, to maintain compatibility with Microsoft’s toolkits
for Xbox 360 development, should that come to fruition. The system pos-
sessed 3GB of DDR2-800E system RAM, and 1GB of GDDR2 VRAM, a
250GB local hard drive and three USB 2.0 ports for connectivity.
MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
The MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox is a graphic user interface within the
MATLAB technical computing environment designed to permit the imple-
mentation and customisation of systems based upon fuzzy logic. The toolbox
enables the user to establish multiple input and output variables, and mul-
tiple membership functions of different shapes and structures within each
variable.
When examining the potential use of the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
as a software platform for our research there were several factors to con-
sider in depth. Parallel to these considerations were also investigations into
development platform, and the one by necessity informed the other.
MATLAB providing support for both Linux and Windows systems, the
possibility of utilising the Sony PlayStation 3, through its much vaunted
support for Linux, was considered very seriously. In addition, it was also
considered that we might within our own project develop a new C++ fuzzy
inferencing toolkit through which to represent the emotion models that our
work would focus upon.
It was determined that the development of an incipient C++ fuzzy logic
interface lay outside the scope of our work, although it was felt that if the
work proved fruitful some future development of such a system might be
worthwhile. Similarly, without definitive clarification at the time these de-
cisions were taken that MATLAB would function fully on the PlayStation
3, selection of a Windows or Linux PC implementation of MATLAB was
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deemed prudent.
As has been mentioned previously, Sony’s firmware removal of Linux ca-
pability from the PlayStation 3 would have rendered the former point moot
in any case. The latter point was settled in consideration of the fact we still
desired the capacity to implement our system on a games console of some
description, should there be time within the project. That being the case, it
was determined that we would use the Windows implementation of Matlab,
with a view to potentially exploring implementations within the Xbox 360’s
toolbox for homebrew game development.
The Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox provided both desired ease of use, with
customisable flexibility through its reliance on a structure that could be
edited directly without reliance upon the Graphical User Interface (GUI).
While the nature of the membership functions was inherently limited to tri-
angular, trapezoidal and gaussian shapes, our implementations were proof of
concept, rather than statistically analysed and determined structures, and
thus the lack of truly customisable vertices was not of particular concern. In
addition, the use of more complicated membership functions would not have
been justifiable without significant psychological experimentation of our own,
determining an incipient emotion model which would have lain outside the
scope of this project - and, indeed, defied the nature of the project, which
is to explore psychologically grounded emotion models and how they might
best be represented in Fuzzy Logic.
In addition to its customisability, the fact that Fuzzy Inferencing Systems
designed using the Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox could be called and resolved
via command line within the Matlab environment was a highly desirable
feature in the context of testing and, ultimately, the Java experimentation
which is discussed towards the end of this document. Ultimately, the selection
of Matlab as a development environment, and in particular the Matlab Fuzzy
Logic Toolbox as a platform, would simplify software development while
maintaining the versatility required to explore the models presented.
De Montfort University Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
While the Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox is a highly versatile engine, it lacks
any significant capacity to represent or explore higher order Fuzzy Logic
systems. The rationale behind exploring Type 2 Fuzzy Logic in addition to
Type 1 Fuzzy Logic is explained elsewhere, but having determined to explore
Type 2 Fuzzy Logic in the context of emotion modelling, it behooved us to
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explore manners in which to computationally represent and resolve Type 2
interpretations of our chosen emotion models.
De Montfort University was already in possession of a system designed
to operate under the Matlab technical computing environment which was
capable of representing and resolving Type 2 Fuzzy Logic systems. Like the
Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox, the De Montfort University Type 2 Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox provided a graphical user interface which permitted the declaration
of multiple input and output variables. In addition, each input and out-
put variable might be assigned multiple membership functions, which were
themselves in possession of functionally symmetrical secondary membership
functions.
When we say functionally symmetrical, in this context we mean that if the
primary membership function was triangular in structure then so, too, would
the associated secondary membership functions. This operational limitation
was present in all forms of primary membership function, be they triangular,
trapezoidal or Gaussian. It should be noted that it was possible to structure
the secondary membership functions of a trapezoidal primary membership
function such that they mimicked a triangle as a function of setting both
maxima to the same value.
Again, as with the Matlab Fuzzy Logic Toolbox, the De Montfort Uni-
versity Type 2 Fuzzy Logic Toolbox was limited to three standard shapes
when defining its membership functions (both primary and, symmetrically,
secondary). Similarly to the rationale in Type 1 Fuzzy Logic, however, our
concern was centred upon proof of concept and representation of geometry,
rather than the exploration of statistics to define custom-shaped membership
functions.
Another limitation with the De Montfort University Type 2 Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox came in the form of its reliance upon the graphic user interface
to relate resultant data. While this did not cause undue problems with
the representations of Millenson, the sixteen solutions to Scherer required a
special amendment to the system to obtain, which shall be discussed later.
In conclusion, however, the De Montfort University Type 2 Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox provided a versatile and useful software platform upon which to
develop representations of our chosen emotion models.
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3.3.2 Discounted Hardware Platforms
During the inception of this project, discussions initially took place in the
context of applications within the entertainment software industry. The ra-
tionale for this was rooted primarily in the fact that as an aspect of affective
computing, the emotion model should be developed with a highly interac-
tive hardware platform in mind. At the time these decisions were taken
four potential development platforms were discussed, and while the IBM-
compatible PC was eventually selected, a summary of the three alternative
platform specifications and conclusions regarding suitability is included here
for the sake of completeness.
Nintendo Wii
The Nintendo Wii is a Seventh Generation gaming platform produced by
Nintendo Kabushiki Gaisha. While technical specifications from the manu-
facturer have never been released to the public, enthusiasts within the user
base have deconstructed the console and obtained approximate numbers for
clock speeds. As such, while the names of the processors in the subsequent
specification list are accurate, the clock speeds are inherently speculative and
have not been confirmed by Nintendo or their production partners.
• PowerPC-based "Broadway" CPU, @ 729 MHz and 2.9GFLOPS
• ATi "Hollywood" GPU, @ 243 MHz
• 24MB 1T-SRAM
• 64MB GDDR3 SDRAM
• 3MB embedded GPU frame buffer
• 512 MB NAND flash memory (Primary Storage)
• SD-Card support up to 32GB (Secondary Storage)
Designed specifically to showcase new, heightened levels of user interac-
tivity in the gaming market, the Nintendo Wii was naturally considered as
a possible development platform for our own work in affective computing.
The Wii utilises motion sensitive remote controls for user-interface (dubbed
"Wii-motes"), rather than the more traditional ergonomic double-handled
controllers.
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This has led to development of a great many titles which necessitate phys-
ical exertion to play, seeking to secure a greater level of personal investment
in the game simulation. In addition, at the time these decisions were taken,
the Nintendo Wii was outselling its competing platforms in a significant fash-
ion. As such, development with the Wii in mind would increase the potential
user base of the model when completed.
Negatively, the Nintendo Wii was designed expressly around efficient com-
puting, and utilised a single-core processor capable of 2.9GFLOPS. As shall
be subsequently discussed, this lack of ’wriggle room’ in terms of processor
cycles was of significant concern in the context of the Wii as a development
platform for our model. In addition, the lack of manufacturer’s published
specifications, and having to rely solely on third parties for information re-
garding the system’s capabilities, was problematic.
Sony PlayStation 3
The Sony PlayStation 3 is a Seventh Generation gaming platform produced
by Sony Computer Entertainment. Unlike Nintendo, Sony unveiled com-
plete technical specifications for their console at the 2006 Game Developer’s
Conference. A sample of the complete specifications is included below.
• Cell Microprocessor (CPU), one 3.2 GHz PPE and six SPEs, @ 204GFLOPS
SP, 15GFLOPS DP
• RSX ’Reality Synthesiser’ GPU, @ 550 MHz
• 256MB XDR DRAM
• 256MB GDDR3 @ 700 MHz
• 60GB 2.5" SATA HDD (Primary Storage)
• USB 2.0 Flash Drive Connectivity (Secondary Storage)
Housing one of the most advanced home user CPUs in existance at
the time of these considerations, the Sony PlayStation 3 already enjoyed
a plethora of titles boasting photorealistic graphics and high definition sur-
round audio, adopting a more traditional, but refined, approach to user in-
teractivity.
The multi-element Cell Processor granted significantly more freedom in
terms of floating point operation overhead, making the console very attractive
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from a practical, development standpoint. In addition, the console’s support
for the Linux family of operating systems provided a ready platform for
software development in terms of proof of concept.
At the time development platform was first mooted, Sony Computer En-
tertainment Europe (SCEE) proved difficult to contact, and initial informa-
tion suggested utilising the PlayStation 3 as a testbed for our research would
require significant financial outlay. Despite this, the PlayStation 3 was a
favoured possibility and very strongly considered.
In hindsight, however, the decision not to use the PlayStation 3 has been
vindicated. In April of 2010, Sony released a pushed firmware update which
removed the option for PlayStation 3 owners to use the Linux family of
operating systems. This would undoubtedly have had significant impact
on our research project, had we been using the console as a development
platform.
Microsoft Xbox 360
The Xbox 360 is a Seventh Generation gaming platform produced by the
Microsoft Corporation. Similarly to SCE, Microsoft opted to put into the
public domain the specifications of its second console offering to support its
marketing campaign. A sample of the technical specifications is included
below.
• "Xenon" PowerPC-based triple-core CPU @ 3.2 GHz, @ 96.0 GFLOPS
SP, 57.6 GFLOPS DP
• 500 MHz ATi "Xenos" GPU
• 500 MHz GPU Daughterboard
• 512 MB Shared GDDR3 @ 700 MHz
• 60 GB HDD (Removable, Primary Storage)
• Memory Cards (Removable, Secondary Storage)
The Xbox 360 enjoyed both an exceptionally powerful CPU (theoretically
half the operating speed of the PS3’s Cell Processor at single precision, but
almost four times the Cell Processor’s operating speed at double precision)
and accessibility for development from an early stage in its release (through
the Xbox Live system’s support for homebrew development). As such, it was
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considered a viable platform should our research culminate in implementation
through a game engine.
The lack of secure Primary Storage was a concern at the time these dis-
cussions took place; it was uncertain whether the removable hard disk drive
was suited for fast read-write operations, serving primarily as storage for
downloaded media and save files. That said, consideration of methods of de-
velopment for the Xbox 360 ultimately led to the selection of the PC as our
development tool, given that many of the Xbox 360’s development toolkits
were designed for the PC.
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Chapter 4





In this chapter we discuss the Type-1 Fuzzy Logic representations of our emo-
tion models, and provide an in-depth discussion of the models themselves.
Each interpretation of each model is presented in exhaustive mathematical
detail, considering both the abstract and specific numerical concepts repre-
sented therein.
We begin with discourse regarding the Millenson Model of emotions. Uni-
versally shared characteristics are presented and mathematically represented.
Subsequently, two interpretations of Millenson’s Model, built upon differing
meanings of his linguistics, are provided and illustrated for clearer under-
standing.
Finally, this chapter goes on to present a mathematical representation of
the Geneva Emotion Wheel in type-1 fuzzy logic terms. The psychology of
the model is revisited from a computational standpoint, and points of interest
are highlighted and discussed from the perspective of both fields.
4.2 Type-1 Fuzzy Logic Representations of the
Millenson Model
As discussed previously, Millenson provides connective links between stimuli
of differing valence and specific facets of emotional experience. As this link
is contextual, we must first represent each axis as a conceptual relativistic









{S+, $−}[0, 1] (4.3)
The nature of these variables, and the manner in which they are nor-
malised into quantifiable values between 0 and 1, is naturally dependent
upon the context in which they are applied and the setting in which they
are being implemented. As an example, however, let us consider a mobile
agent within a universe shared with two other objects: an item of food, and
a predator.
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Conceptually speaking, at a time t, the distance between the agent and
the food we define as rt, and the distance between the agent and the predator
we define as st. The stimulus the agent receives between time t and time t+1
may be derived through changes to these two variables.
Thus we might consider the agent to have received application of positive
stimulus (S+) if rt+1 < rt, informing the variable Z. Conversely, if rt+1 > rt,
we might consider this a removal of positive stimulus ($+), informing the
variable X.
Similarly, we might consider the application of negative stimulus (S−),
associated with the variable Y , to be influenced should st+1 < st. Likewise,
if st+1 > st we could consider this the removal of negative stimulus ($−), and
hence infer an impact on the variable Z.
Thus we define the concept of a Stimulus Event J, that being an event
which provides some form of experiential stimulus to the agent, impacting
its emotional state. Mathematically, J is a column vector of the variables X,







At this point, the manner in which we associate the stimulus event with
emotional output conceptually bifurcates, as was briefly discussed during
the psychological outline of the model. First, it is possible to infer from
Millenson’s qualifications regarding multiple emotions that the differences
between distinct emotions along a particular axis are solely defined in terms
of experiential intensity. Alternatively, we might infer that the intensity he
speaks of is explicitly the intensity of stimulus required to trigger individual
emotions.
Conceptually, and psychologically, these two interpretations each require
an alternative representation through fuzzy logic. Both shall be discussed
in this chapter, beginning with the first interpretation, published initially in
2008 [7]. Prior to this exposition, however, we are obliged to clarify in specific
terms how the emotional state shall be defined through either representation
of the Millenson Model.
Millenson’s model presents nine emotions that he describes as basic, ir-
respective of the interpretation of how they might be related to stimulus. It
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therefore stands to reason that in consideration of Millenson’s emotion model,
the emotional state include representation of all nine of these elements.
In explicit terms, this report defines the emotional state of an agent gov-














as an array of nine elements, and where µ in all cases represents the
membership grade of the named emotion the variable is associated with, and
where; x1 represents Annoyance, x2 represents Anger, and x3 represents
Rage; y1 represents Apprehension, y2 represents Anxiety, and y3 represents
Terror; z1 represents Pleasure, z2 represents Elation, and z3 represents
Ecstasy.
These relative magnitudes seek to indicate the level to which the agent
is experiencing each individual emotion at a given instant, instigated by
Stimulus Events and informed by the systems we now outline.
4.2.1 Millenson A
Let us assume a given interpretation of Millenson’s model that connects the
significance of applied and removed stimuli, of differing valence, with three





where X, Y and Z are defined in equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), respec-
tively, and their associated axes are clearly shown in Figure 2.1.
We assign variables to each of these emotional components, of the form
Anger → x
Anxiety → y
P leasure → z
Each of these emotional components possesses three associated emotions,
differing from each other in terms of the degree with which the component
is experienced. Mirroring our merging of the stimulus components into a
single variable, we define the emotional experience index eJ associated with
a discrete event J, to be a vector of these three values, and normalise them







Obtaining eJ is a conceptual problem which we will approach from the
perspective of fuzzy inferencing. Let us consider an individual component of
J, X.
As previously indicated, a given value assigned to X would be a number
between 0 and 1, conceptually representing the significance of removed pos-
itive stimulus triggered by an event. Understanding that such a quantifier
could not crisply represent the nature of stimuli affecting the system, taking
into account our earlier discussions regarding the versatility fuzzy inferencing
provides in systems using non-crisp concepts, we now look to consider the
system from a fuzzy perspective.
Thus let us define X as an input to a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing sys-
tem, with linguistic variables describing "Low Significance", "Medium Sig-
nificance" and "High Significance". Thus we define X in fuzzy terms as
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Figure 4.1 illustrates a hypothetical structure for X as the input to a
fuzzy inferencing system, which we henceforth refer to by the acronym FIS.
Millenson stipulates the correlation between stimulus and implied emo-
tional output is exclusive, meaning that only variables connected to specific
stimuli application and removal can affect a given output. Thus we de-
fine x as an output of a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system with linguistic
variables describing "Low Response", "Moderate Response" and "Extreme
Response" describing the agent’s reaction to given behavioural stimuli in






Figure 4.2 illustrates a potential interpretation of x as an output for a
fuzzy inferencing system.
Further to this, let us ascribe three simple, fuzzy rules to this system:
Rule 1: If X is Low Significance, then x is Low Response
Rule 2: If X is Medium Significance, then x is Moderate Response
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Figure 4.2: Potential Implementation of x as an Output Variable in a FIS
Rule 3: If X is High Significance, then x is Extreme Response
Following on from our earlier discussions regarding the Mamdani fuzzy
inferencing system and centroid defuzzifier, it follows that this system can
take a single, crisp variable defined as a component of J, and provide a
single, crisp variable which provides a component of eJ. Conceptually, this
principle extends to all three axes in a similar fashion, with identical rules,
thus providing all three elements of the emotional experience index eJ. The
work, however, is only half done.
It is not the purpose of the model simply to quantify in vague terms the
emotional response to stimulus. Rather, it is our intent to define an emo-
tional state that may be informed and adapted through emotional response
to environment. Having defined the emotional component of the stimulus J,
and clarified the means by which the two are connected, we determined to
connect eJ in some direct fashion with an as yet undefined emotional state.
Before this can be explored, however, we must first associate the emotional
component eJ with the nine discrete emotions posited by Millenson.
The numerical values within eJ quantify the emotional component along
the associated axis. Following Millenson’s literature, that component can
then be used to determine which emotions along that axis are triggered by
the stimulus changes presented by event J. Some have suggested that these
emotions are linguistic terms and, as such, inherently fuzzy [88, 126], but
whether or not this is the case, it is not at all assumed that a binary state of
active or inactive is inferred by the grade of the emotional component along
a given axis. Indeed, to assume such would deny the idea that emotions can
be felt to varying degrees.
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Figure 4.3: Illustrative Relationship of x with Named Emotions
Let us assume, then, that each named emotion might be represented
by a fuzzy set along its parent axis. In fuzzy set terminology, referencing
our previous example discussing the variable x in terms of a fuzzy set, this
provides a new string of fuzzy relations. The axis with which x is associated
houses three named emotions: Annoyance, Anger and Rage. If we consider







Figure 4.3 provides an illustration of what this construct might look like.
As with our interconnection of stimulus with emotional component, this
relation between emotional component and named emotions can be extrap-












It should be stressed that this is not a preamble to the application of
a second fuzzy inferencing system. Rather, the functions connecting the
various values of µ to the named, discrete emotions should be defined and
employed in a more traditional, arithmetical manner.
Millenson’s model gives us no reason to assume that the relations between
a component and its associated discrete emotions are not uniform across
individual components of equivalent scaling. Which is to say that within
his derivation there is no reason to assume that the relationship associating
x with Rage is in any way different to the relationship associating z with
Ecstasy. That being the case, we define an array of equations associating
the components of eJ with values for discrete emotions associated with their
respective axes.
µJx1 = f1(x)[0, 1] (4.12)
µJx2 = f2(x)[0, 1] (4.13)
µJx3 = f3(x)[0, 1] (4.14)
µJy1 = f1(y)[0, 1] (4.15)
µJy2 = f2(y)[0, 1] (4.16)
µJy3 = f3(y)[0, 1] (4.17)
µJz1 = f1(z)[0, 1] (4.18)
µJz2 = f2(z)[0, 1] (4.19)
µJz3 = f3(z)[0, 1] (4.20)
where µJ represents explicitly the membership grade associated with the
specified emotion for a given stimulus event J, and where x1, x2 etceteras
have the same meanings as outlined in equation 4.5. For the sake of suc-
cinctness, this relationship array condenses down to a single equation,
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(4.21)
µJji = fi(j)[0, 1] forj = x, y, z
i = 1, 2, 3
Let us collect these nine membership grades into a single vector. We














The distinction between EJ and EM is conceptually fundamental. EM
is the emotional state of the agent. EJ is the emotional impact of a given
stimulus event J; as such, EJ informs EM, but the two are not equivalent,
as the distinctions in their notation emphasise. At this stage, the system
can now inform the emotional state of the agent. How this emotional state
is informed depends specifically upon the level of emotional memory it is
desired that the agent experience; that meaning, how strongly the current
emotional state mutes the impact of the stimulus event J.
Let us return to the emotional state EM as defined by equation 4.5. In
merging EM(t) with EJ, to obtain EM(t + 1), the simplest operator would




















However, this notation is inherently limiting and precludes study into the
area of emotional memory and its impact on learning systems. As such, it is





where u and v are constants introduced at the point of implementation,
permitting the application designer to adjust the weightings of import be-
tween a new event and an established emotional state. Those wishing to
investigate systems where emotional memory makes up a large component
have the freedom to do so with this notation, as do those who wish to study
systems with a limited memory component where emotional state is based
predominantly upon instantaneous stimulus.
4.2.2 Millenson B
Having outlined the first consideration of Millenson’s theory in this work, it
is appropriate to discuss another. From a psychological standpoint, let us
consider the alternative interpretation of Millenson’s intensity statement. If
one chooses to interpret it in the context of a more intense stimulus leads
to a different triggered emotion along an axis, then one already has the
fundamental basis for a complete fuzzy inferencing system without the use
of the two-stage process shown previously, as shall now be outlined.
Consider the stimulus event J in the context of its three components X,
Y and Z. The previous section discussed these in terms of significance - the
importance of the applied or withdrawn stimulus - and derived from this the
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Figure 4.4: Potential Structure of X as a Gauge of Stimulus Intensity
intensity of the emotional response.
If we linguistically define stimulus in terms of intensity, however, rather
than context, the shape of the problem shifts somewhat. The intensity Mil-
lenson discussed in an emotional context might not specifically interconnect
his basic emotions with each other, but rather define their connections with





As before, we consider this an input to a fuzzy system. Let us define its
linguistic variables as "No Intensity", "Low Intensity", "Medium Intensity",
and "High Intensity". Thus, linguistically, our model particularly considers








Figure 4.4 illustrates a potential structure of X in this context.
Further to that, if stimulus intensity is, as is implied by Millenson [94],
the determining factor in which emotions are triggered along a particular
axis, this system would require a redefinition of the previous interpretation’s
definition of x as a fuzzy set.
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Figure 4.5: Potential Structure of x1 as an Output for a FIS
Rather than discussing degrees of x, we shall instead consider x to sim-
ply be a geometric scalar indicating the relationship between three named
emotions, Annoyance, Anger and Rage, and the removal of positive stimulus
(represented through X).
Thus, instead of associating X with a single output variable, we asso-
ciate X with three output variables, each with their own linguistic defini-
tions outlining the level to which they are triggered. The first, representing







Figure 4.5 outlines this potential makeup for x1, for illustrative purposes.
Using comparable linguistic variables, we can define the other two output














This alternative architecture, connecting multiple outputs to a single in-
puts, calls for rules which are significantly more complex, even as the system
itself is markedly simplified. In the case of X, we propose a list of rules of
the form:
Rule 1: If X is No Intensity, then x1 is Slightly Annoyed, and x2 is Not
Angry, and x3 is Not Enraged
Rule 2: If X is Low Intensity, then x1 is Very Annoyed, and x2 is Slightly
Angry, and x3 is Not Enraged
Rule 3: If X is Medium Intensity, then x1 is Annoyed, and x2 is Very Angry,
and x3 is Slightly Enraged
Rule 4: If X is High Intensity, then x1 is Slightly Annoyed, and x2 is Angry,
and x3 is Very Enraged
It should be clarified that these linguistic terms defining the level of the
named emotions refer specifically to its level relative to the other emotions.
One might say, for example, that to be Enraged one must be Very Angry
by definition, but that would be considering the wrong context. Rather,
when the agent is Very Enraged, but only Angry rather than Very Angry,
this is because Anger and Rage are treated as two distinct basic emotions by
Millenson, and the system is experiencing Rage to a greater degree than it
is experiencing Anger.
As we have with all other numerical variables, we apply limits of [0,1] to
x1, x2 and x3. That is to say that upon the conclusion of centroid defuzzifica-
tion, as discussed in a previous section, the crisp output associated with each
of the three named emotions shall be a value between 0 and 1. We explicitly
label these outputs as µx1, µx2, and µx3 explicitly as, for our purposes, they
define membership of their associated emotion within the emotional output
associated with the stimulus vector J, EJ.
Expanding this system to include the other two input variables, and their
associated six basic emotions, permits us to generate a Mamdani fuzzy in-
ferencing system which will absorb the numerical contents of the stimulus
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vector J and produce a value, between 0 and 1, for each of the nine named
emotions in Millenson’s model.
As these nine values represent the experiential level of the individual
emotions, they are considered analogous to the emotional state generated
by the previous implementation of Millenson’s model, and thus we define
a vector formed with these nine elements, generated as a function of the














At this stage, the system can now inform the emotional state of the
agent. We have kept our notation and vector structure consistent throughout
both interpretations of the Millenson model. As such, the manner in which
the emotional state is informed, with respect to the emotional state EM, is
analogous with that discussed in the previous subsection.
4.3 Type-1 Fuzzy Logic Representation of the
Geneva Emotion Wheel
Scherer himself described emotions, and their surrounding linguistic conven-
tions, in terms of fuzziness [88]. Indeed, were our interest entirely fixed on
the implementation of a singular, emotionally-informed cognitive engine, his
work alone might provide a suitable basis for in-depth explanation. As the
terms of this project reflect a broader topic, however, we are compelled to
focus our interest upon specific aspects of his work.
A significant contrast between the Geneva Emotion Wheel and the Mil-
lenson model is Scherer’s inherent geometricalisation. Within the Millenson
model, geometry was, to an extent, immaterial. This was primarily due to
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the independent nature of the variables. Within the Geneva Emotion Wheel,
however, specific geometry and positional relativity enjoy significantly more
prominence. Put simply, Millenson considered three aspects of stimulus, each
of which could only affect three associated emotions; Scherer considers two
aspects of experience, with each of his sixteen associated emotions being
impacted by both.
Description of the Geneva Emotion Wheel as a concept was largely cov-
ered in Chapter Two; here we consider the wheel as a geometric construct
and circumplex.
Scherer provides us with two conceptual axes: the level of control experi-
enced by the agent, ranging from ’High’ to ’Low’, and the valence (positivity
or negativity) of the experience. Defined by these axes are two matters: the
specific experienced emotion of the agent, and its intensity.
In Scherer’s conceptual prototype, upon which our own prototyping is
based, each named emotion had four represented degrees of intensity. In
addition, each named emotion had a crisply defined occupational region in
terms of relative magnitudes of control and valence. These are shown in
Figure 2.2.
Each of the named emotions in Scherer’s prototype might be described
in terms of a ratio of the control and experience magnitudes, irrespective
of specific emotional intensity (though that is obviously important to our
considerations). That is to say that one might assume a ’prideful’ emotional
state for any situation where the values of control and valence were positive,
and the ratio of control to valence was significantly weighted in favour of
control. Conceptually, this raised interesting questions regarding how best
to represent the Geneva Emotion Wheel in fuzzy terms.
In our preamble discussing the nature of fuzzy sets and systems, we ac-
knowledged that one of fuzzy logic’s strengths was the capacity to represent
linguistic variables. As has been outlined previously, we consider the level to
which a given, named emotion is experienced as fuzzy.
When considering a fuzzy system relating to the Geneva Emotion Wheel,
therefore, Scherer has already provided us with two ’fuzzy’ concepts. First,
magnitudes of control and valence, and second, the intensity of resultant
named emotions.
The question comes in the manner in which we conceptually fuzzify these
factors, and in order to clarify that we must first define the inputs received
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by a system utilising the Scherer model of emotions, and the outputs our
implementation of that system should provide. The inputs Scherer provides
are the concepts of Control and Valence. We name these xJ and yJ for a given














where uiJ is an element of the agent’s environment which impacts its
sense of valence, of which there are nu for any given xJ, and whose individual
impact is defined by an associated function fui ; and, viJ is an element of the
agent’s environment which impacts its sense of control, of which there are
nv for any given yJ, and whose individual impact is defined by an associated
function fvi ; and, where the sums are normalised to a value between -1 and
1, to reflect the juxtapositions they represent.
Usage of J with respect to Scherer is analogous to usage of the variable
with respect to Millenson, up to a point. Whereas Millenson permitted the
explicit association of stimulus events with J, Scherer’s model requires a more
esoteric interpretation. Rather than an event, in this context J represents
the agent’s perception of its situation at a given instant, in the context of





As previously stated, the output of any system covered within this work
should be that of a discrete emotional state, defining at any given instant
the emotional state of the agent in the context of experienced magnitudes
of a given number of named emotions. Scherer’s model presents sixteen
named emotions, thus the desired output of any implementation is defined
as a vector which indicates the relative magnitudes of each of these sixteen























where e represents the relative level with which a given emotion is be-
ing experienced, with that given emotion identified in explicit terms by its
subscript.
Having defined the generalist input and desired output of the system,
one must now consider the best way to approach it from a fuzzy perspective.
That is to say, whether to approach it from a fuzzified geometric perspective,
or to approach it from a linguistic perspective.
It should be clarified that by ’linguistic perspective’, we mean description
of inputs linguistically, rather than geometrically. For example, one could
connect the concept of a ’steep’ relationship between Valence and Control,
and an intense experience, with a ’high’ relative magnitude of Pride. The
issue with such a system, however, is the inherently geometrical nature of
Scherer’s model.
While it might be possible to devise a multitude of adjectives to describe
experienced level of Valence or Control, and thus map them in fuzzy terms,
ultimately such linguistic variables would simply be geometric place-holders,
not having any particular linguistic meaning, and thus defeating the purpose
of their inclusion.
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We are mindful that the Geneva Emotion Wheel contains fuzzy, linguis-
tic components within its structure. The emotions themselves, particularly
in relation to their conceptual intensities, are one fuzzy aspect. Another is
the fashion in which the emotions themselves relate to specific ratios of con-
trol to valence, although this is largely a reciprocal relationship. As these are
fuzzified in the method now outlined, it is felt the application of fuzzy logic
is still wholly justified in this context.
Shown in Figure 2.2, the Geneva Emotion Wheel can be viewed from
a geometric perspective. This means that rather than interpret inputs in
the context of linguistic variables such as "Low", "Medium" or "High", we
instead consider the inputs geometric coordinates, and fuzzify the emotions
they represent.
As with the Millenson model, it is possible to dissect this emotion rep-
resentation in the context of its axes, and associate each axis with one of
the variables defined in J. Let us consider first the axis associated with the
variable x, that of Valence.
Considering the model geometrically in the context of the x-axis, it is
evident that all discrete regions therein can be conceptually represented
by thirty-three unique sets. We say thirty-three, rather than the sixty-five
unique regions indicated on the model, because the model is a geometrical
mirror of itself, with only the thirty-third unique set crossing the intersection.




. . . ,
µ(x31)/x31, µ(x32)/x32, µ(x33)/x33}
These sets are described as unique, but it should be noted that many of
the sets share elements; that is to say that many discrete values of x are
found in more than one set. Figure 4.6 illustrates such a structure.
It is necessary that the values assigned to these sets be geometrically con-
sistent with the model, or the psychology upon which it is ground ceases to
have meaning. The explicit limits that were defined for our particular imple-
mentation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel are included in the Implementation
section.
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Figure 4.6: Possible Fuzzy Structure of Variable x
Consequently, it was reasoned that these sets should be defined such
that their maxima coincide with the geometrically crisp regions defined by
Scherer’s prototype at their widest points. The ranges defining alternative
non-trivial memberships vary, dependent upon how broadly the implemen-
tation seeks to fuzzify the emotions. In our own interpretation, however,
the non-maximal, non-trivial bands remain proportionally consistent across
different grades of the same emotion, thereby maintaining the ratio-based
relationship that psychologically associates the conceptual inputs with the
named emotions.
Let us now consider the variable y, which we previously paired with the
concept of control. As one compares the structure of y to the structure of
x the identical, if tangential, nature of their relationship coincides with the
ideals of a circumplex representation. Again, each discrete grade of a named
emotion can be represented by a single function, and thirty-three functions
can be applied to represent the entire circumplex. As a fuzzy construct, we




. . . ,
µ(y31)/y31, µ(y32)/y32, µ(y33)/y33}
where the meanings are comparable with those espoused in the represen-
tation of x, and consistent with fuzzy principles as outlined in the preamble.
It should be noted that, while linguistic variables are not employed in
this case, the very nature of what each fuzzy function within the variables
represents is inherently fuzzy, as shall become evident as the links between
the input and output variables are explicitly clarified.
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Figure 4.7: Possible Fuzzy Structure of Output eSatisfaction
Let us consider the output structure of a system informed by these two
fuzzy input variables. As stipulated in the psychological outline of the Geneva
Emotion Wheel, this system represents the intensity of sixteen named emo-
tions, as a function of the variables we have defined as x and y. The output
of such a system, then, should be a relative intensity of each of these sixteen
emotions, individually. It should be assumed that, geometrically, there shall
often be trivial results from emotions that lie on the opposite end of the
spectrum when the system experiences extreme inputs.
Let us consider a single emotion, Satisfaction, as a fuzzy construct, with
its structure informed by the Geneva Emotion Wheel. We define Satisfaction,








Figure 4.7 illustrates such a structure visually.
Further to this, let us introduce such a structure to the remaining discrete
emotions, and thus define our system output. The links between input and
output, however, have not yet been clarified. Let us return to our fuzzy
construct (eSatisfaction, µ). The structure of (eSatisfaction, µ) is drawn from the
geometric model, with a null membership function ascribed to the central
emotional whitespace, and gradiated emotional intensities based upon the
four discrete intensities shown in figure 2.2. Hence we may consider the
fuzzy system rules which connect membership functions of our inputs to all
of (eSatisfaction, µ)’s membership functions.
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Such rules would be of the form:
Rule 1: If x is x33, and y is y33, then eSatisfaction is Null Intensity
Rule 2: If x is x17, and y is y24, then eSatisfaction is Low Intensity
Rule 3: If x is x18, and y is y27, then eSatisfaction is Mid Intensity
Rule 4: If x is x19, and y is y30, then eSatisfaction is High Intensity
Rule 5: If x is x20, and y is y32, then eSatisfaction is Extreme Intensity
Following the principles outlined in our preamble discussing the processes
of the Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system, the minimum membership grade
of each doublet of input-related fuzzy sets is projected onto their associated
emotional grade. The centroid of all of these grades, for a given named
emotion, determined its numerical output, between 0 and 1. In the case of
eSatisfaction, we call this discrete value e′Satisfaction
Thus the structure of a geometrically conceptualised, fuzzy representation
of the Geneva Emotion Wheel becomes clear. Any given values for x and y
obtain membership grades for the thirty-three fuzzy functions that constitute
their makeup, and such memberships are compared to rules explicitly con-
necting combinations of these inputs with grades of specific output emotions.
This will provide discrete values for the sixteen emotional outputs, between 0























As discussed in the context of the Millenson representation, the instan-
taneous result of the fuzzy inferencing system informs the emotional state;
that is to say, in this context, E′S informs ES. Let us consider ES at time t
and time t + 1, where the interval represents the time taken for the system
to obtain a value for E′S.
As both ES and E′S are vectors of the same structure, the method of








where u and v are constants introduced at the point of implementation,
permitting the system to adjust the weightings of import between the newly-
calculated emotional component E′S and the established emotional state ES.
Again, those wishing to investigate systems where emotional memory has
significant influence on decision-making have the freedom to do so with this
notation. Similarly, those who wish to study systems with a limited memory
component where emotional state is based predominantly newly obtained
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environment-driven emotional components can make alternative weightings.
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Chapter 5





In this chapter we discuss the Type-2 Fuzzy Logic representations of our
emotion models, and provide an in-depth discussion of the models themselves.
Prior to discussing specific representations, however, we discuss the rationale
for our exploration of Type-2 Fuzzy Emotion Modelling. It is not enough
to simply declare this as a numerical extension of the previously covered
work. Rather, we must discuss the key differences, from the perspective of
psychological context, and their justifications.
Both of the psychological theories we have pursued share key aspects.
They espouse a geometrical relationship between named, basic emotions,
with axes declared in the context of abstracted, environmental concepts.
The application of Type 1 Fuzzy Logic in this instance is intuitive. Ekman
himself acknowledges that basic emotions are experienced with differing in-
tensities [25], and while he does not believe the boundaries between those
basic emotions are fuzzy, he makes no argument that perceptibly identical
stimuli will trigger exactly the same emotion in one individual as they will in
the next. Nor is there any justification for the view that a given, contextual
event should have absolutely identical impact, on any of the abstracted input
variables proposed, from one individual to the next.
Within our Type-1 representations, we attempt to represent this issue by
virtue of fuzzifying the outputs to our system in such a fashion that a given
event provides membership in several emotions simultaneously, of differing
degree. This should not be taken to mean that our system is exclusively
reliant upon the idea that basic emotions are compounded, although that is
one possible application of our representations. Instead, it can equally be
assumed that our models function as raw, fuzzy controllers, indicating that a
given stimulus J can be associated with those named emotions that provide
non-trivial resultants. Nevertheless, this representation is limited in terms of
dimensionality of uncertainty.
Type-2 Fuzzy Logic provides an additional level of fuzzification which
permits us to both represent the inherent uncertainty in triggered emotions,
and the uncertainty in defining the nature of our abstracted inputs. It is in
this light with which we pursue the subject, with a view to comparing the
effectiveness of Type-1 with Type-2 from a numerical standpoint.
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5.2 Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Representations of the
Millenson Model
As in our previous Chapter, we divide this section into considerations of our
dual interpretations of Millenson’s linguistic definitions. The definitions of J
and EM remain consistent across the two differing orders of fuzzy logic. This
permits us to draw direct comparisons between results, while maintaining
psychological analogue with Millenson’s theory.
5.2.1 Millenson A
As in the prior chapter, let us assume a given interpretation of Millenson’s
model that connects the significance of applied and removed stimuli, of dif-
fering valence, with three emotional components. Let us explicitly define




where X, Y and Z are defined in equations (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3), respec-
tively, and their associated axes are clearly shown in Figure 2.1.
We assign variables to each of these emotional components, of the form
Anger → x
Anxiety → y
P leasure → z
Each of these emotional components possesses three associated emotions,
differing from each other in terms of the degree with which the component
is experienced. Mirroring our merging of the stimulus components into a
single variable, we define the emotional experience index eJ associated with
a discrete event J, to be a vector of these three values, and normalise them








As before, eJ is approached from the perspective of fuzzy inferencing. Let
us consider an individual component of J, X.
A given value assigned to X is a number between 0 and 1, conceptually
representing the significance of removed positive stimulus from the system.
Understanding that such a quantifier cannot crisply represent the nature of
stimuli affecting the system, the strengths of Type-2 Fuzzy Logic in manage-
ment of linguistic variables are appropriate in their application [51].
We define X as an input to a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system. The
input X is associated with three type 2 fuzzy sets, assigned linguistic vari-
ables describing "Low Significance", "Medium Significance" and "High Sig-
nificance". Let us consider the type 2 fuzzy set, "Low Significance", and
designate it X̃1. Mathematically, we define this type 2 fuzzy set X̃1 as
X̃1{((k, u), µX̃1(k, u))|∀k ∈ X,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.2)
Let us similarly define "Medium Significance" in terms of X̃2, and "High
Significance" in terms of X̃3
X̃2{((k, u), µX̃2(k, u))|∀k ∈ X,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.3)
X̃3{((k, u), µX̃3(k, u))|∀k ∈ X,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.4)
Thus we can define variable X, in type-2 fuzzy terms, as being represented
by
X̃i{((k, u), µX̃i(k, u))|∀k ∈ X,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.5)
for i = 1, 2, 3. We define each of the variables X, Y and Z to be of the
same form, represented by mirrored type-2 fuzzy sets. Thus Y and Z are
written
Ỹi{((l, u), µỸi(l, u))|∀l ∈ Y, ∀u ∈ Jl ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.6)
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Figure 5.1: Potential Implementation of X as an Input Variable of a Type 2
FIS
Z̃i{((m,u), µZ̃i(m,u))|∀m ∈ Z, ∀u ∈ Jm ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.7)
for i = 1, 2, 3. Figure 5.1 illustrates a hypothetical structure for X as
the input to a type 2 fuzzy inferencing system (FIS), utilising trapezoidal
primary and secondary membership functions.
We define x as an output of a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system. x is
associated with three linguistic variables describing "Low Response", "Mod-
erate Response" and "Extreme Response"; these variables are each repre-
sented by a type 2 fuzzy set describing the agent’s reaction to given be-
havioural stimuli in emotional terms. Let us consider the linguistic variable
"Low Response", which we assign to x̃1
x̃1{((k, u), µx̃1(k, u))|∀k ∈ x,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.8)
This is similarly expanded, associating x̃2 with "Moderate Response" and
x̃3 with "Extreme Response"; and projected across the three output variables
x, y and z, producing mathematical definitions of them in terms of
x̃i{((k, u), µx̃i(k, u))|∀k ∈ x,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.9)
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Figure 5.2: Potential Implementation of x as an Output Variable in a Type
2 FIS
ỹi{((l, u), µỹi(l, u))|∀l ∈ y, ∀u ∈ Jl ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.10)
z̃i{((m,u), µz̃i(m,u))|∀m ∈ z, ∀u ∈ Jm ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.11)
for i = 1, 2, 3. Figure 5.2 illustrates a potential interpretation of x as an
output for a fuzzy inferencing system, using triangular primary and secondary
membership functions. The true nature of the type 2 fuzzy sets is illustrated
comparatively well in terms of vertical slices in this figure, where the tips of
each triangular slice represent a secondary membership grade of unity.
Let us ascribe three simple, fuzzy rules to this system:
Rule 1: If X is Low Significance, then x is Low Response
Rule 2: If X is Medium Significance, then x is Moderate Response
Rule 3: If X is High Significance, then x is Extreme Response
These rules maintain psychological analogue with the intent of Millen-
son’s model, associating the variable X, which represents a quantification of
removed positive stimulus $+, with the variable x, which is connected to the
emotions Annoyance, Anger and Rage. Through the application of a type 2
fuzzy inferencing system informed by these rules, a discrete value assigned
to X provides a discrete value of x; and, expanding upon these rules across
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Figure 5.3: Illustrative Relationship of x with Named Emotions
the other two variables, we show how the vector J is be used to generate the
vector eJ.
Continuing with our analogue to the type-1 representation of our first
interpretation of Millenson, we must now associate eJ with the nine basic
emotions associated with Millenson’s theory. Each named emotion shall be
represented by a fuzzy set along its parent axis. As with type-1, the axis
with which x is associated houses three named emotions: Annoyance, Anger
and Rage. If we consider these emotions as linguistic variables, we define






Figure 5.3 provides an illustration of what this construct might look like.
This relation between named emotions and emotional component is pro-












It should be noted, as with the type-1 representation, that this relation-
ship is that of a type 1 fuzzy set, rather than the creation of a second type-2
fuzzy inferencing system. The functions connecting the various values of µ
to the named discrete emotions are defined and employed arithmetically.
Following the precedent set in the previous chapter, we define an array
of equations associating the discrete, numeric components of eJ with values
for discrete emotions associated with their respective axes.
µJx1 = f1(x)[0, 1] (5.15)
µJx2 = f2(x)[0, 1] (5.16)
µJx3 = f3(x)[0, 1] (5.17)
µJy1 = f1(y)[0, 1] (5.18)
µJy2 = f2(y)[0, 1] (5.19)
µJy3 = f3(y)[0, 1] (5.20)
µJz1 = f1(z)[0, 1] (5.21)
µJz2 = f2(z)[0, 1] (5.22)
µJz3 = f3(z)[0, 1] (5.23)
where µJ represents explicitly the membership grade associated with the
specified emotion for a given stimulus event J, and where x1, x2 etceteras
have meanings analogous with those in equation 4.5. Let us collect these
nine membership grades into a single vector. We define this vector EJ, the















At this stage, the system can now inform the emotional state of the agent.
How this emotional state is informed depends specifically upon the level of
emotional memory that is desired, or how strongly the current emotional
state mutes the impact of the stimulus event J.
Returning to the emotional state EM as defined by equation 4.5, it is
possible to merge EM(t) with EJ to obtain EM(t + 1). Once again, we use





where u and v serve the same purposes outlined in the previous chapter
in the context of favouring one over the other, depending upon the nature
and intent of the implementation.
5.2.2 Millenson B
Having considered our initial interpretation of Millenson from both a type-1
and type-2 context, we now move on to discuss the representation of the
alternative Millenson interpretation from the perspective of the latter.




As before, we consider this an input to a fuzzy system. Let us define its
linguistic variables as "No Intensity", "Low Intensity", "Medium Intensity",
and "High Intensity". Linguistically, therefore, our model particularly con-
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siders the idea of stimulus intensity and its impact on emotional reaction. In
terms of a type 2 fuzzy representation, let us consider the linguistic variable
"No Intensity", to which we assign the variable X̃0. This we define as
X̃0{((k, u), µX̃0(k, u))|∀k ∈ X,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.27)
We expand this across the remaining three variables, associating "Low
Intensity" with X̃1, "Medium Intensity" with X̃2 and "High Intensity" with
X̃3. Thus we summarise the type 2 fuzzy sets associated with variable X as
X̃i{((k, u), µX̃i(k, u))|∀k ∈ X,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.28)
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Figure 5.4 illustrates a potential structure of X in this
context, formed from trapezoidal type 2 fuzzy sets.
Further to that, as before, we define x as a fuzzy construct. Rather than
discussing degrees of x, we instead consider x to simply be a geometric con-
struct indicating the relationship between three named emotions (Annoyance,
Anger and Rage) and the contextual removal of positive stimulus (X).
Thus, instead of associating X with a single output variable, we associate
X with three output variables, each with their own linguistic definitions out-
lining the level to which they are triggered. The first, representing Annoy-
ance, is defined as x1, with linguistic variables of "Not Annoyed", "Slightly
Annoyed", "Annoyed" and "Very Annoyed". Let us assign the linguistic
variable "Not Annoyed" the designation x̃10 and describe it in type 2 fuzzy
terms as
x̃10{((k, u), µx̃10 (k, u))|∀k ∈ x1,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.29)
Let us expand this relation to include all four type 2 fuzzy sets associated
with the output variable x1. In doing so, "Slightly Annoyed" is assigned
identifier x̃11 , "Annoyed" x̃12 , and "Very Annoyed" x̃13 . Thus the type 2
fuzzy sets associated with the output variable x1 can be consolidated thus,
x̃1i{((k, u), µx̃1i (k, u))|∀k ∈ x1,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.30)
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Figure 5.5 outlines this potential makeup for x1, utilising
triangular membership functions, for illustrative purposes only.
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Figure 5.4: Potential Structure of X as a Gauge of Stimulus Intensity through
Type 2 Fuzzy Sets
This structure is extended and applied to the other output variables as-
sociated with the X input, such that they can be written in the form
x̃2i{((k, u), µx̃2i (k, u))|∀k ∈ x2,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.31)
x̃3i{((k, u), µx̃3i (k, u))|∀k ∈ x3,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.32)
for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. This in turn can be consolidated to represent all discrete
emotions associated with X, with the form
x̃ji{((k, u), µx̃ji (k, u))|∀k ∈ xj,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.33)
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Figure 5.5: Potential Structure of x1 as an Output for a Type 2 FIS
where i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3. This is naturally extended to the other
two output axes, y and z, which are like represented
ỹji{((k, u), µỹji (k, u))|∀k ∈ yj,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.34)
z̃ji{((k, u), µz̃ji (k, u))|∀k ∈ zj, ∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.35)
where, again, i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3.
This architecture demands rules equivalent to those discussed in our ear-
lier type-1 deliberations. In the case of X, we create a list of rules of the form:
Rule 1: If X is "No Intensity", then x1 is "Slightly Annoyed", and x2 is
"Not Angry", and x3 is "Not Enraged"
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Rule 2: If X is "Some Intensity", then x1 is "Very Annoyed", and x2 is
"Slightly Angry", and x3 is "Not Enraged"
Rule 3: If X is "Particular Intensity", then x1 is "Annoyed", and x2 is "Very
Angry", and x3 is "Slightly Enraged"
Rule 4: If X is "Extreme Intensity", then x1 is "Slightly Annoyed", and x2
is "Angry", and x3 is "Very Enraged"
We apply limits of [0,1] to x1, x2 and x3, as we have previously. We
identify these outputs as µx1, µx2, and µx3. As with type-1, these elements
define membership of their associated emotion within the emotional output
associated with the stimulus vector J, EJ.
Expanding this system to include the other two input variables, and their
associated six basic emotions, permits us to generate a type 2 fuzzy inferenc-
ing system which will absorb the numerical contents of the stimulus vector J
and produce a value, between 0 and 1, for each of the nine named emotions
in Millenson’s model.
As these nine values represent the experiential level of the individual
emotions, they are considered analogous to the emotional state generated by
all other representations of the Millenson model. Thus we define a vector
formed with these nine elements, generated as a function of the stimulus














At this stage, the system can now inform the emotional state of the agent.
As we have kept our notation and vector structure consistent throughout both
interpretations of the Millenson model, the manner in which it does this, with
respect to the emotional state EM is identical to that discussed previously.
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5.3 Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Representation of the
Geneva Emotion Wheel
We have previously acknowledged that one of fuzzy logic’s strengths was the
capacity to represent linguistic variables, particularly within type 2 fuzzy
logic. In subsequent discussion of the emotion models themselves, it becomes
evident that the level to which an emotion is triggered by a specific impetus
cannot be crisply defined.
As has been discussed, the inputs Scherer provides are the concepts of
Control and Valence. We name these xJ and yJ for a given situation, and













where uiJ is an element of the agent’s environment which impacts its
perception of situational valence, of which there are nu for any given xJ, and
whose individual impact is defined by an associated function fui ; and, viJ is
an element of the agent’s environment which affects its sense of control, of
which there are nv for any given yJ, and whose individual impact is defined
by an associated function fvi ; and, where the sums are normalised to a value
between -1 and 1.
In this context J represents the agent’s perception of its situation at a






It should be noted that the event/situational association is purely sub-
jective. It is entirely feasible to associate events with valence and control,
and environment with the application and removal of stimuli, making both
models mutually versatile. It is conceded, however, that there is a greater
level of abstraction required in the representation of Scherer’s associated in-
puts being as they are inherently abstract concepts, and making them highly
suited to a type-2 approach.
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Irrespective of the type of logic employed, the emotional state ES which





















where e represents the relative level with which a given emotion is be-
ing experienced, with that given emotion identified in explicit terms by its
subscript.
In terms of the general geometry of the model, the format as outlined
for type-1 provides a suitable framework, that being a model represented by
thirty-three unique type-2 fuzzy sets. Let us consider the first of these type
2 fuzzy sets, x̃1, which is defined
x̃1{((k, u), µx̃1(k, u))|∀k ∈ x, ∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.41)
In order to represent the variable x in the context of all thirty-three of
its unique type 2 fuzzy sets, we adopt this consolidation
x̃i{((k, u), µx̃i(k, u))|∀k ∈ x,∀u ∈ Jk ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.42)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 33. These sets are described as unique, but it should be
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Figure 5.6: Possible Type 2 Fuzzy Structure of Variable x
noted that many of the sets share elements; that is to say that many discrete
values of x have non-trivial membership in more than one set. Figure 5.6
illustrates such a structure and its inherent complexity.
Again, the explicit limits that were defined for our theoretical type-2
implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel are included in subsequent
chapters.
Again, it was reasoned that these sets should be defined such that their
maxima coincide with the geometrically crisp regions defined by Scherer’s
prototype at their widest points. The borders defining the secondary mem-
bership function should also be determined in a fashion suitable to this over-
arching geometry.
Let consider the variable y, which we pair with the concept of control. As
with type-1, the numerical structure of the sets defining x and y is identical,
merely tangential. As a fuzzy construct, we summarily define the type 2 sets
within y in terms of
ỹi{((l, u), µỹi(l, u))|∀l ∈ y, ∀u ∈ Jl ⊆ [0, 1]} (5.43)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 33, where the meanings are comparable with those es-
poused in the representation of x, and consistent with fuzzy principles as
outlined in the preamble.
We shall discuss the specific links between emotional intensities and mem-
bership of sets relating to x and y within our discussions on particular im-
plementation, but the general relationship is geometrical in nature. Let us
instead give overview to the output structure of a system informed by these
two fuzzy input variables. The input variables we have outlined as x and
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y, while the output of the system should be an associated fuzzy emotional
state, based upon the Geneva Emotion Wheel’s psychology. The output of
such a system, then, should be a relative intensity of each of these sixteen
emotions, individually.
As we did in type-1, let us consider Satisfaction as a fuzzy construct with
its structure informed by the Geneva Emotion Wheel. We define Satisfaction,
in this context, as eSatisfaction, and declare it to contain five type 2 fuzzy sets,
associated with the linguistic variables "Null Intensity", "Low Intensity",
"Middle Intensity", "High Intensity" and "Extreme Intensity". Psychologi-
cally, the first of these is associated with the central emotional white space,
and the other four are associated with the four gradiated levels of intensity
shown in Figure 2.2.
Considering explicitly the "Null Intensity" type 2 fuzzy set, which is
designated ẽSatisfaction0 , let us define it in the form
ẽSatisfaction0{((m,u), µẽSatisfaction0 (m,u))} (5.44)
∀m ∈ z, and ∀u ∈ Jm ⊆ [0, 1]. Expanding this to all five type 2
fuzzy sets associated with variable eSatisfaction, associating "Low Intensity"
with ẽSatisfaction1 , "Middle Intensity" with ẽSatisfaction2 , "High Intensity" with
ẽSatisfaction3 , and "Extreme Intensity" with ẽSatisfaction4 , the following consoli-
dation of the type 2 fuzzy constituents of eSatisfaction is defined
ẽSatisfactioni{((m,u), µẽSatisfactioni (m,u))} (5.45)
∀m ∈ z, and ∀u ∈ Jm ⊆ [0, 1], and for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. Figure 5.7 ab-
stractly illustrates the vertices and footprint of uncertainty of such a struc-
ture.
Let us introduce such a structure to the remaining discrete emotions,
defining the elements of our system output, and discuss the conceptual links
between input and output. Returning to our fuzzy construct (eSatisfaction, µ),
the structure of (eSatisfaction, µ) is drawn from the geometric model, with a
null membership function ascribed to the central emotional whitespace and
gradiated emotional intensities based upon the four discrete intensities shown
in figure 2.2. Thus let us consider the fuzzy system rules which connect
membership functions of our inputs to all of (eSatisfaction, µ)’s membership
functions.
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Figure 5.7: Possible Fuzzy Structure of Output eSatisfaction
Such rules would be of the form,
Rule 1: If x is x̃33, and y is ỹ33, then eSatisfaction is ẽSatisfaction0
Rule 2: If x is x̃17, and y is ỹ24, then eSatisfaction is ẽSatisfaction1
Rule 3: If x is x̃18, and y is ỹ27, then eSatisfaction is ẽSatisfaction2
Rule 4: If x is x̃19, and y is ỹ30, then eSatisfaction is ẽSatisfaction3
Rule 5: If x is x̃20, and y is ỹ32, then eSatisfaction is ẽSatisfaction4
The defuzzified crisp output of all associated rules, for a given named
emotion, determines its final membership between 0 and 1. In the case of
eSatisfaction, we call this discrete value e′Satisfaction.
The structure defined, the process becomes one of obtaining secondary
membership grades of the sixteen discrete emotions, based upon the values of
the inputs, which are further defuzzified to provide crisp membership grades.
This provides discrete values for the sixteen emotional outputs, between 0






















The process by which this instantaneous emotional state can be used to
determine an ongoing and evolving emotional state is discussed in-depth in
the context of the type-1 fuzzy representation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel







In this chapter we discuss the technical implementations of each model that
were constructed over the course of this project. In all, there were five suc-
cessful implementations, these being: Type-1 Millenson A; Type-1 Millenson
B; Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel; Type-2 Millenson A; and, Type-2 Mil-
lenson B.
The implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel in type-2 fuzzy logic
encountered practical problems in terms of the selected development plat-
form. These will be discussed in detail in the specific section relating to
its implementation. The section discussing the manner in which it was im-
plemented remains a part of this document as the geometry and rule base
formed part of the wider research topic.
This chapter begins with an outline of the type-1 implementations of
the selected models. All three of these implementations, as mentioned in
the discussions regarding development platform, utilised the Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox within the MATLAB Technical Computing Environment. The raw
code defining the fuzzy inferencing systems for the type-1 implementations
is included as an appendix to this work.
Following presentation of the type-1 implementations, the chapter con-
tinues into the type-2 systems. The type-2 implementations discussed were
similarly implemented in the MATLAB Technical Computing Environment,
using the De Montfort University Fuzzy Logic Toolkit.
6.2 Type-1 Fuzzy Logic Implementations of the
Millenson Model
6.2.1 Millenson A in MATLAB
Within MATLAB’s Fuzzy Logic Toolbox, a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing sys-
tem was generated, three inputs to three outputs. This fuzzy inferencing
system utilised the minimum ’And’ operator as discussed in Chapter Three,
and the centroid method of defuzzification. This structure is illustrated by
Figure 6.1.
As indicated in Chapter Four, these inputs were declared so as to repre-
sent the elements of a stimulus event, J, which was previously declared
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Figure 6.1: Millenson A: FIS Structure
Table 6.1: Millenson A: Input MFs
Low-Sig – 0.0 0.5
Med-Sig 0.2 0.5 0.8

















The symbols have previously declared contextual meanings. Each of the
input elements X, Y and Z were, as a fuzzy construct, defined as having
three associate fuzzy membership functions representing quantified levels of
associated stimulus in the context of significance to the agent. Within this
implementation, those fuzzy membership functions were represented as tri-
angular functions, with their geometric vertices given by table 6.1.
The reason triangular membership functions were selected to represent
the Millenson theory came from Millenson’s geometry as presented in Figure
2.1. In that figure, we see named emotions declared as points along a slid-
ing scale; maintaining analogue with this, we determined the most readily
justifiable shape was a triangular membership function which, by its very
nature, possesses but a single point of maximum membership. Figure 6.2
illustrates the membership functions described by Table 6.1, as applied to
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Figure 6.2: Millenson A: MFs of Input Variable Z
Table 6.2: Millenson A: Output MFs
Low-Resp – 0.0 0.5
Mod-Resp 0.2 0.5 0.8
Ext-Resp 0.5 1 –
Figure 6.3: Millenson A: MFs of Output Variable z
input variable Z. These structures were deemed to be conceptually uniform
across all three axes and were applied thus.
The output variables of the fuzzy inferencing system, x, y and z, were
described and outlined in Chapter Four as having three intrinsic membership
functions. These were, explicitly, Low Response, Moderate Response and
High Response. Millenson’s model gives rise to direct equivalency across the
input and output variables; thus it was determined there should be equiv-
alency in their description as triangular fuzzy membership functions. The
geometric vertices of these three membership functions were applied uni-
formly across all three output variables. These are given in 6.2 and their
application to the output variable z is illustrated by Figure 6.3.
Fuzzy Inferencing Rules as outlined in Chapter Four in the context of
input variable X and output variable x were defined and implemented across
all three variable pairings. The internal structure of the fuzzy inferencing
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Figure 6.4: Millenson A: MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox Rules Screen
system was constructed such that any vector J, within the limits of the







Figure 6.4 illustrates MATLAB’s internal results calculation mechanism
included within the Fuzzy Inferencing System Environment (hence FISE).
It should be noted, however, that the actual testing environment utilised
MATLAB’s command line functions, and the figure is included for the sake
of completion only.
The process by which the vector eJ was used to generate the desired
output EJ associated with a given stimulus J required additional analysis to
implement.
As a function of the usage of centroid defuzzification applied in this rep-
resentation, coupled with the specific representation of the triangular mem-
bership functions, ensured that the minimum value for any output was 0.163.
Conversely, the maximum output value for any output was 0.837.
Returning to Millenson’s geometry, it was required that we suitably scale
the named emotions along a given axis in accordance with his structure.
That is to say that, along the axis, the maximum for the lowest grade would
appear at 20%, the next highest grade at 60%, and the highest grade at
100%. Thus it was determined to scale these grades to fit the value range
granted by the fuzzy inferencing system, when defining the fuzzy functions
linking the output variables to the specific emotions they influenced.
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Table 6.3: Millenson A: Discrete Emotions Associated with z
Pleasure 0.1630 0.2978 0.5674
Elation 0.4326 0.5674 0.8370
Ecstasy 0.7022 0.8370 –
Figure 6.5: Millenson A: Discrete Emotions Associated with z
While the calculations that processed the individual outputs x, y and z
into discrete grades of the nine named emotions were explicitly not a second
fuzzy inferencing system, the nature of the associative functions was inher-
ently fuzzy in nature. These functions were likewise triangular in structure,
so as to maintain internal consistency within representations, though not
symmetrical. Their vertices are presented in the context of output variable
z in Table 6.3, which is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
These relations between a variable and its associated discrete emotions
were applied uniformly. For each vector eJ, a simple MATLAB M-file used
these fuzzy relations to determine membership grades for each discrete emo-
tion, producing the desired output for a given iteration, EJ.
6.2.2 Millenson B in MATLAB
A Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system was generated using the MATLAB
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox, three inputs to nine outputs. This fuzzy inferencing
system utilised the minimum ’And’ operator as discussed in Chapter Three,
and the centroid method of defuzzification. This structure is illustrated by
Figure 6.6.
Implementation of this alternative representation of Millenson’s model
through MATLAB was a simpler process than that of Millenson A, primarily
due to the removal of the intermediary layer of calculation associated with
eJ. The structure of the input vector remained consistent, that being the
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Figure 6.6: Millenson B: FIS Structure
Table 6.4: Millenson B: Input MFs
No Intensity – 0.0 0.3
Low Intensity 0.0 0.3 0.6
Medium Intensity 0.4 0.7 1.0
High Intensity 0.7 1.0 –
Figure 6.7: Millenson B: MFs of Input Variable X
stimulus event J, although its context differs, as described earlier.
Each of the input elements X, Y and Z were, as a fuzzy construct, defined
as having four associate fuzzy membership functions, representing quantified
levels of associated stimulus in the context of intensity with which the agent
felt the stimulus. Within this implementation, those fuzzy membership func-
tions were represented as triangular functions, with their geometric vertices
given by Table 6.4. These are illustrated in the context of variable X in
Figure 6.7.
These membership functions were applied uniformly to the three input
variables X, Y and Z. The nine output variables, mathematically denoted
as x1−3, y1−3, and z1−3, were each associated with four membership func-
tions as outlined in Chapter Four. In implementing them, these membership
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Table 6.5: Millenson B: Output MFs
Not Annoyed – 0.0 0.33
Slightly Annoyed 0.0 0.33 0.67
Annoyed 0.33 0.67 1.0
Very Annoyed 0.67 1.0 –
Figure 6.8: Millenson B: MFs of Output Variable x1 - Annoyance
functions were represented as triangular functions; their vertices are given in
Table 6.5, in the context of the output x1, or the ’Annoyed’ emotion. They
are illustrated, again in the context of output x1, in Figure 6.8.
These membership functions were applied uniformly across all nine out-
put emotions to maintain consistency across the target resultant, vector EJ,
elements.
Rules were input into the system as outlined in Chapter Four, where the
mathematics of this model were discussed in depth. The rules were applied
uniformly across input variables, connecting them each with their three as-
sociated output variables. An M-File obtained the nine discrete values, one
for each output, and combined them into the desired iterative output vector
EJ, representing the instantaneous emotional state.
6.3 Type-1 Fuzzy Logic Implementation of the
Geneva Emotion Wheel
Implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel through Matlab proved to be
a complex endeavour, both in terms of the geometric analysis required in
order to maintain psychological analogue, and in terms of limitations of the
MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox.
Within MATLAB, a Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system was generated,
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Figure 6.9: Scherer: FIS Structure
two inputs leading to sixteen outputs. This fuzzy inferencing system utilised
the minimum ’And’ operator as discussed in Chapter Three, and the centroid
method of defuzzification. This structure is illustrated by Figure 6.9.
As outlined in Chapter Four, the input vector to this system, J, is defined





where x and y represent a quantified determination of valence and control,
respectively, within the value ranges of -1 to 1. As fuzzy constructs, it has
already been determined that each of these input variables has thirty-three
fuzzy functions associated with it; the matter of the implementation is to
calculate in discrete terms and so encode the thirty-three functions and their
associated rules.
In this implementation, the nature of the fuzzy functions faced applied
constraints. Firstly, that the fuzzy functions would be trapezoidal. Secondly,
that the maxima of these trapezia would, along either axis, coincide with the
diameter of each discrete geometrical region determined by Scherer’s proto-
type. Thirdly, that each shoulder of a trapezium would be equal in width
along its axis to the width of its maximum. Finally, that the absolute values
of -1 and 1 along each axis would be determined by the edge of the maximum
of the first and thirty-second membership functions for that axis (mindful
that the thirty-third occurs out of sequence, and functionally occupies the
origin of the circumplex).
Following these constraints, and applying geometrical analysis to four sig-
nificant figures of accuracy, Table 6.6 was constructed to indicate the vertices
of each trapezoidal membership function. As the x and y axes on Scherer’s
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Table 6.6: Type-1 Scherer: Input MFs
1 -1.240 -1.000 -0.760 -0.520
2 -1.111 -0.871 -0.631 -0.391
3 -0.933 -0.742 -0.551 -0.360
4 -0.867 -0.627 -0.387 -0.147
5 -0.835 -0.644 -0.453 -0.262
6 -0.649 -0.458 -0.267 -0.076
7 -0.645 -0.516 -0.387 -0.258
8 -0.578 -0.449 -0.320 -0.191
9 -0.547 -0.307 -0.067 0.173
10 -0.449 -0.320 -0.191 -0.062
11 -0.444 -0.351 -0.258 -0.165
12 -0.418 -0.227 -0.036 0.155
13 -0.400 -0.307 -0.214 -0.121
14 -0.315 -0.222 -0.129 -0.036
15 -0.285 -0.156 -0.027 0.102
16 -0.200 -0.107 -0.014 0.079
17 -0.173 0.067 0.307 0.547
18 -0.155 0.036 0.227 0.418
19 -0.102 0.027 0.156 0.285
20 -0.079 0.014 0.107 0.200
21 0.036 0.129 0.222 0.315
22 0.062 0.191 0.320 0.449
23 0.076 0.267 0.458 0.649
24 0.121 0.214 0.307 0.400
25 0.147 0.387 0.627 0.867
26 0.165 0.258 0.351 0.444
27 0.191 0.320 0.449 0.578
28 0.258 0.387 0.516 0.645
29 0.262 0.453 0.644 0.835
30 0.360 0.551 0.742 0.933
31 0.391 0.631 0.871 1.111
32 0.520 0.760 1.000 1.240
33 -0.360 -0.120 0.120 0.360
prototype mirrored each other, this table presents the membership functions
of both the x and y variables, numericised according to the value of their first
coordinate. It should be noted that coordinates that fall outside of the input
value range are included for the sake of completeness; likewise it should be
noted that membership function 33 occurs out of sequence, as it is a special
case.
These functions are naturally applied uniformly across both x and y. A
graphic representation of these membership functions as applied to the x in-
put variable is included as Figure 6.10. It should be clarified that trapezoidal
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Figure 6.10: Type-1 Scherer: MFs of Input Variable x
membership functions were selected to represent the regions of the Geneva
Emotion Wheel for reasons analogous to the selection of triangular member-
ship functions representing the Millenson Theory. By selecting membership
functions that possessed regions of maximal membership, rather than points,
it was felt the geometry of the Geneva Emotion Wheel as shown in Figure
2.2 would be more accurately represented.
Each of the sixteen outputs as described in Chapter Four is required
to have five membership functions describing its relative magnitude. These
were described as Null Intensity, Low Intensity, Middle Intensity, High
Intensity and Extreme Intensity. The idea, as explained, was to map
individual couplets of input membership functions to a specific grade of an
individual output variable. Experimentation, however, revealed a weakness
in the application of the centroid defuzzification mechanism.
In this system, there were naturally instances where individual outputs
would have membership of 0; in situations where Extreme Pride was trig-
gered, for example, Anxiety would have no membership output. In such
situations, Matlab’s implementation of centroid defuzzification returns the
median value of the output range. As such, in the above example eAnxiety
would return membership of 0.5.
The solution to this problem was to introduce a sixth output membership
function. This function had a discernible membership area of 5×10−5 units2,
and would be the default state for all outputs unless one of their other rules
was triggered. Regrettably, this introduced a potential error margin within
obtained outputs. This error margin is factored in to results obtained from
this implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel, as discussed in Chapters
Seven and Eight.
As a result of this, the mathematical construct describing the emotion of
satisfaction with respect to µ, eSatisfaction, given in Chapter Four was amended
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Table 6.7: Type-1 Scherer: Output MFs
No Intensity – – – 0.0001
Null Intensity – 0.00 0.10 0.20
Low Intensity 0.05 0.15 0.30 0.40
Middle Intensity 0.30 0.40 0.55 0.65
High Intensity 0.55 0.65 0.80 0.90
Extreme Intensity 0.80 0.90 – –









Where Null Intensity represented an emotional state occupying the cen-
tral zone of the circumplex, No Intensity represented instead situations where
an emotion was definitively not triggered by a given input pairing. Each of
these fuzzy terms is represented by a trapezoidal membership function, the
coordinates of which are given in Table 6.7. This table is illustrated by Figure
6.11 in the context of the output eSatisfacton.
Whereas the rules required to represent both interpretations of the Millen-
son Model were self-explanatory in the context in which they were presented,
the geometric representation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel is not so. Each
rule in the implementation associated one membership function from each
input variable with a specific membership function of one of sixteen output
variables. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 explicitly outline in terms of xi, yj and grade
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Table 6.8: Scherer: Rules
ePride , Low x20 y26
ePride , Middle x19 y28
ePride , High x18 y30
ePride , Extreme x17 y32
eElation , Low x21 y24
eElation , Middle x22 y27
eElation , High x23 y29
eElation , Extreme x25 y31
eHappiness , Low x24 y21
eHappiness , Middle x27 y22
eHappiness , High x29 y23
eHappiness , Extreme x31 y25
eSatisfaction , Low x26 y20
eSatisfaction , Middle x28 y19
eSatisfaction , High x30 y18
eSatisfaction , Extreme x32 y17
eRelief , Low x26 y16
eRelief , Middle x28 y15
eRelief , High x30 y12
eRelief , Extreme x32 y9
eHope , Low x24 y14
eHope , Middle x27 y10
eHope , High x29 y6
eHope , Extreme x31 y4
eInterest , Low x21 y13
eInterest , Middle x22 y8
eInterest , High x23 y5
eInterest , Extreme x25 y2
eSurprise , Low x20 y11
eSurprise , Middle x19 y7
eSurprise , High x18 y3
eSurprise , Extreme x17 y1
of ek, what these rules were.
Note that the rules outlined in tables 6.8 and 6.9 indicate the explicit
connections. An additional rule exists associating all outputs’ "Null" mem-
bership functions to x33 and y33, as has been suggested previously. Also, by
necessity, all of the above couplets are also associated with the "No Inten-
sity" error-correction membership function for all output emotions to which
they are not explicitly connected.
Figure 6.12 illustrates an excerpt of Matlab’s internal results calculation
mechanism included within the FISE. It should be noted, however, that the
101
Table 6.9: Scherer: Rules, Continued
eAnxiety , Low x16 y11
eAnxiety , Middle x15 y7
eAnxiety , High x12 y3
eAnxiety , Extreme x9 y1
eSadness , Low x14 y13
eSadness , Middle x10 y8
eSadness , High x6 y5
eSadness , Extreme x4 y2
eBoredom , Low x13 y14
eBoredom , Middle x8 y10
eBoredom , High x5 y6
eBoredom , Extreme x2 y4
eShame/Guilt , Low x11 y16
eShame/Guilt , Middle x7 y15
eShame/Guilt , High x3 y12
eShame/Guilt , Extreme x1 y9
eDisgust , Low x11 y20
eDisgust , Middle x7 y19
eDisgust , High x3 y18
eDisgust , Extreme x1 y17
eContempt , Low x13 y21
eContempt , Middle x8 y22
eContempt , High x5 y23
eContempt , Extreme x2 y25
eHostility , Low x14 y24
eHostility , Middle x10 y27
eHostility , High x6 y29
eHostility , Extreme x4 y31
eAnger , Low x16 y26
eAnger , Middle x15 y28
eAnger , High x12 y30
eAnger , Extreme x9 y32
actual testing environment utilised Matlab’s command line functions, and
the diagram is included for the sake of completion only. It should also be
noted that this is only a portion of the triggered ruleset.
A simple M-File was used to generate the desired output vector E′S from
the sixteen discrete numerical values generated by the fuzzy inferencing sys-
tem outputs.
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Figure 6.12: Type-1 Scherer: Matlab Rules Screen Example
6.4 Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Implementations of the
Millenson Model
6.4.1 Millenson A in the Type 2 Fuzzy Controller
Using the Type 2 Fuzzy Controller software developed by De Montfort Uni-
versity, a type 2 Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system was generated, connect-
ing three inputs to three outputs. This inferencing system utilised centroid
defuzzification in both the obtaining of the resultant ’slice’ of a type 2 set,
and then subsequently in the solution of that slice. Contextually speaking,
figure 6.1 also illustrates the connections of this type 2 implementation.
As with the type 1 implementations, the inputs corresponded to the three
facets of a given stimulus event J in the context Millenson provides. Similarly,
the type 2 fuzzy sets are informed by the sets defined in type 1, but with a
given level of applied uncertainty.
The sets themselves were triangular, as in the type 1 case and for the
justifications outlined in the context of the type 1 implementations, with
the secondary membership functions for any given slice similarly triangular.
Figure 6.15 illustrates the structure of variable Z. Table 6.10 illustrates the
geometric vertices of the type 2 membership function, with the meaning of
each vertex explained below.
The first vertex defines the lower bound of the secondary membership
function, meaning the lower value at which zero secondary membership was
guaranteed. The second vertex identifies the lower point of maximal sec-
ondary membership grade, or the lower point along zero primary member-
ship where secondary membership would be 1. The third vertex is the upper
minimum for secondary membership value, with respect to the lower point
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Table 6.10: Type-2 Millenson A: Vertices of Membership Functions Associ-
ated with Input Variables
Low-Sig 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.55
Med-Sig 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.80 0.85
Hi-Sig 0.45 0.50 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
of the triangle. The fourth vertex represents the maximum point of primary
membership for a given triangle. The fifth point represents the lower bound
of zero secondary membership for the upper point of the triangle. The sixth
represents the maximal secondary membership grade for the upper point
of the triangle. Lastly, the seventh represents the uppermost bound of zero
secondary membership for the upper point of the triangle.
These definitions remain uniform for all triangular type 2 membership
functions implemented through the De Montfort University Type 2 Fuzzy
Logic Toolbox, for the type 2 implementations of both Millenson A and Mil-
lenson B. These structures were deemed to be conceptually uniform across
all three axes and were applied in that fashion.
To illustrate this structure further, figure 6.13 shows a membership func-
tion generated using the vertices 0.00, 0.10, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80. These
are labelled A, B, C, D, E, F and G, respectively. A three dimensional repre-
sentation of the membership function the toolbox generates related to figure
6.13 is included as figure 6.14. From a software perspective, the Toolbox will
only utilise the vertices A, C, D, E and G, however.
This is due to the fact that the Toolbox automatically assigns the vertex
B to be equidistant between A and C, and assigns F to be equidistant be-
tween E and G. An additional value can be input into the Toolbox to inform
the lower boundary of the maximum membership at vertex D; unlike ver-
tices A, C, E and G, this defines a triangle in the vertical plane rather than
the horizontal, as shown in figure 6.14. The triangular membership function
structure described here is relevant to the vertices shown in tables 6.10, 6.11,
6.13 and 6.14.
The three output variables of the fuzzy inferencing system have been ex-
tensively clarified and further reiteration here serves no purpose. As with
the type-1 system, these variables were linked to their associate input vari-
able. The output variable z is shown in figure 6.16, while the vertices of the
secondary membership maxima can be found in table 6.11, their meanings
being the same as those outlined explicitly with respect to table 6.10.
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Figure 6.13: Illustrative Type-2 Triangular Membership Function
Figure 6.14: Illustrative Type-2 Triangular Membership Function in 3D
Table 6.11: Type-2 Millenson A: Vertices of Membership Functions Associ-
ated with Output Variables
Low-Sig 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.50 0.55
Med-Sig 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.80 0.85
Hi-Sig 0.45 0.50 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Rules identical to those used in the type 1 implementation, as outlined
previously, were implemented in the system. Figure 6.17 illustrates the rules
declaration system within the Type 2 Fuzzy Controller, while Figure 6.18
gives an overview of the toolkit structure.
It should be noted that, as opposed to the Type 1 implementation, it is
impossible to call the De Montfort University Type-2 Fuzzy Toolbox from the
command line. As such, the graphic user interface was relied upon exclusively
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Figure 6.15: Type-2 Millenson A: Membership Functions of Input Variable
Z
Figure 6.16: Type-2 Millenson A: Membership Functions of Output Variable
z
in testing.
The usage of centroid defuzzification applied in this representation, cou-
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Figure 6.17: Declaring Rules in the Type 2 Fuzzy Controller
Figure 6.18: Overview of the Type 2 Fuzzy Controller Interface
pled with the specific representation of the triangular membership functions,
ensured that the minimum value for any output was 0.258. Conversely, the
maximum output value for any output was 0.742.
Returning to Millenson’s geometry, it was required that we suitably scale
the named emotions along a given axis in accordance with his structure.
Once again, the maximum for the lowest grade would appear at 20%, the
next highest grade at 60%, and the highest grade at 100%. .
As with type-1, while the calculations that processed the individual out-
puts into discrete grades of the nine named emotions were explicitly not a
second fuzzy inferencing system, the nature of the associative functions was
inherently fuzzy. These functions were likewise triangular in structure so as
to maintain internal consistency within representations, though not symmet-
rical, in line with Millenson’s own weightings of proportionality (although
these are inferred from the scaling of his diagram, rather than explicitly
stated numerically). Their vertices are presented in the context of output
variable z in Table 6.12, which is illustrated in Figure 6.19.
These relations between variable and its associated discrete emotions were
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Table 6.12: Type 2 Millenson A: Discrete Emotions Associated with z
Pleasure 0.2580 0.3548 0.5484
Elation 0.4516 0.5484 0.7420
Ecstasy 0.6452 0.7420 –
Figure 6.19: Type 2 Millenson A: Discrete Emotions Associated with z
applied uniformly. For each vector eJ, these fuzzy relations were manually
triggered to determine membership grades for each discrete emotion, produc-
ing the desired output for a given iteration, EJ.
6.4.2 Millenson B in the Type-2 Fuzzy Controller
Turning once again to the Type-2 Fuzzy Controller software developed by
De Montfort University, a type-2 Mamdani fuzzy inferencing system was
generated, connecting three inputs to nine outputs. This inferencing system
utilised centroid defuzzification in both the obtaining of the resultant ’slice’
of a type-2 set and the solution of that slice.
Contextually speaking, figure 6.6 also illustrates the connections of this
type-2 implementation. As with type-1, the implementation of this variation
on Millenson was simpler due to the removal of the intermediary step con-
necting the defuzzified outputs with named emotions. As with Millenson A,
the structure of Millenson B in type-2 is analogous to its type-1 counterpart
Each of the input elements X, Y and Z was, as a type-2 fuzzy construct,
defined as having four associate fuzzy membership functions, representing
quantified levels of associated stimulus in the context of intensity with which
the agent felt said stimulus.
The sets were triangular, as in the type-1 case, with the secondary mem-
bership functions for any given slice also triangular. Figure 6.20 illustrates
the structure of variable Z. Table 6.13 illustrates the geometric vertices of
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Table 6.13: Type-2 Millenson B: Vertices of Input Membership Functions
No Intensity 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.30 0.35
Low Intensity -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.30 0.55 0.60 0.65
Medium Intensity 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.70 0.95 1.00 1.05
High Intensity 0.65 0.70 0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Figure 6.20: Type 2 Millenson B: MFs of Input Variable X
the maximal secondary membership functions, the elements serving the same
purpose as those discussed with respect to table 6.10. These structures were
deemed to be conceptually uniform across all three axes.
These membership functions were applied uniformly to the three input
variables X, Y and Z. The nine output variables, x1−3, y1−3, and z1−3, were
each associated with four membership functions as outlined previously.
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Table 6.14: Type-2 Millenson B: Vertices of Output Membership Functions
Not Pleased 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.33 0.38
Slightly Pleased. -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.62 0.67 0.72
Pleased 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.67 0.95 1.00 1.05
Very Pleased. 0.62 0.67 0.72 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Figure 6.21: Type-2 Millenson B: Output Variable z1 - Pleasure
These output variables, as with the type-1 system, are represented by
triangular membership functions, with the secondary membership functions
also being triangular in nature. The output variable z1 is shown in figure 6.21,
while the vertices of the type-2 membership functions are found in table 6.14.
These membership functions were applied uniformly across all nine out-
put emotions to maintain consistency across the target resultant, vector EJ,
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elements.
Rules were input into the system reflecting those outlined previously,
where the mathematics of this model were discussed in depth. The rules
were applied uniformly across input variables, connecting them each with
their three associated output variables. Nine discrete values, one for each
output, were obtained manually and combined to generate the desired itera-
tive output vector EJ.
6.5 Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Implementation of the
Geneva Emotion Wheel
Implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel in type-2 fuzzy logic was
a more taxing exercise than the implementation of either interpretation of
Millenson. Through the Type-2 Fuzzy Controller software, a type-2 Mamdani
fuzzy inferencing system was generated, connecting two inputs to sixteen
outputs. This inferencing system utilised centroid defuzzification in both the
obtaining of the resultant ’slice’ of a type-2 set, and then subsequently in the
solution of that slice.
Figure 6.9 illustrates the conceptual structure of this fuzzy inferencing
system. As with our previous expansions from Type-1 into Type-2, we chose
to maintain the causal connections between input and output variables in
order to retain consistency of comparison.
The membership functions within the Type-2 Geneva Emotion Wheel
were far more complicated than those in Type-1. In addition, there was a
limitation within the De Montfort University Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
(hence DMU T-2 FLT) which prevented the vertices of the membership func-
tions being as accurately represented as they were in Type-1. Specifically,
the De Montfort Univerity Type 2 Fuzzy Logic Toolbox limited the accuracy
of vertices to three significant figures, wheras the vertices utilised in the Type
1 representation were accurate to five significant figures.
In addition to this, while the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox accepted
raw numerical inputs, the DMU T-2 FLT only accepted inputs as proportion-
alities between 1 and 0, with numbers above 1 and below zero, while capable
of being inputted, could play no role in the system’s calculations. While this
made no difference in our implementations of Millenson, it made significant
difference when implementing the Geneva Emotion Wheel due to its -1 to 1
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range.
These two factors combined to require a moderate re-geometricalisation
of the Geneva Emotion Wheel, which we undertook with the following de-
sign paradigms. Firstly, that maintaining symmetry across both axes was of
paramount importance, as it was that symmetry which defined the propor-
tional connections between the two inputs and any given basic emotion. Sec-
ondly, that proportionality between the magnitude of the trapezoidal max-
ima and the trailing edges should be maintained; and, associatedly, that
the difference between the lowermost and uppermost boundaries of the sec-
ondary membership functions should equal the length of the maximum of the
primary membership function. And, lastly, that the coordinates should as
closely match those used in type-1 Scherer as possible, within the constraints
of the above.
To that end, we determined the vertices of our type-2 fuzzy sets, included
in table 6.15. In this table, the first four coordinates indicate the lowermost
secondary membership boundary of a given type-2 fuzzy set’s lower bound,
the lower maximum of that lower bound, the upper maximum of that lower
bound, and the uppermost secondary membership boundary of that lower
bound, respectively. The fifth and sixth coordinates indicate the lower and
upper maxima, respectively, of the primary membership trapezoid. The sev-
enth through tenth coordinates mirror the first through fourth, but define
the upper bound of the type-2 fuzzy set.
In addition to this, the user interface of the DMU T-2 FLT required the
inclusion of values to represent the division of the trapezoidal, vertical slices
of the secondary membership region. The system automatically determined
the upper bounds of the secondary membership region to be 1 for the duration
of the primary membership function’s upper boundary. We opted to set the
other boundaries at 0.8, 0.7, and 0.5, these being the upper maximum, lower
maximum, and lower boundary, respectively.
Having defined the actual input data, we converted that input data back
into de-facto coordinates from the perspective of the type-1 Scherer imple-
mentation, in order to facilitate more straightfoward comparison. These
conversions are included in table 6.16.
Considering input variable x, the boundaries of the type-2 membership
functions associated with Valence are shown in figure 6.22. This is included
to provide the reader with a better understanding of the significantly in-
creased complexity necessary in the representation of the Geneva Emotion
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Table 6.15: Type 2 Scherer: Actual Vertices of Input MFs
1 -0.18 -0.14 -0.10 -0.06 0.00 0.12 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.30
2 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.36
3 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.13 0.22 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.37
4 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.31 0.37 0.41 0.45 0.49
5 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.42
6 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.52
7 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.40
8 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.43
9 0.17 0.21 0.25 0.29 0.35 0.47 0.53 0.57 0.61 0.65
10 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.41 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.50
11 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.44
12 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.34 0.39 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.60 0.63
13 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.46
14 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.50
15 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.42 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58
16 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.55 0.56
17 0.35 0.39 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.65 0.71 0.75 0.79 0.83
18 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.52 0.61 0.66 0.69 0.73 0.76
19 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.51 0.58 0.61 0.63 0.65 0.67
20 0.44 0.45 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.62
21 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.68
22 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.75
23 0.48 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.63 0.73 0.78 0.81 0.85 0.88
24 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.72
25 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.63 0.69 0.81 0.87 0.91 0.95 0.99
26 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.74
27 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.82
28 0.60 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.69 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.85
29 0.58 0.61 0.65 0.68 0.73 0.82 0.87 0.90 0.94 0.97
30 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.95 0.99 1.02
31 0.64 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.82 0.94 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.12
32 0.70 0.74 0.78 0.82 0.88 1.00 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.18
33 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.44 0.56 0.62 0.66 0.70 0.74
Wheel in type-2 fuzzy logic. A more readily comprehensible example of a
single input type-2 membership function, defining x33, included as figure
6.23. It is a reasonable representation of what a given function would look
like, scaling notwithstanding, and should hopefully allow the reader a clearer
mental image of the overall structure of the input membership functions as
a whole.
Having implemented the inputs, we move on to discussion of how we
implemented the outputs. Each of the sixteen outputs was geometrically
identical to its fellows. One benefit the DMU T-2 FLT had over the MATLAB
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Table 6.16: Type 2 Scherer: Effective Vertices of Input MFs
1 -1.36 -1.28 -1.2 -1.12 -1.00 -0.76 -0.64 -0.56 -0.48 -0.40
2 -1.24 -1.16 -1.08 -1.00 -0.88 -0.64 -0.52 -0.44 -0.36 -0.28
3 -1.04 -0.98 -0.90 -0.84 -0.74 -0.56 -0.46 -0.40 -0.32 -0.26
4 -0.98 -0.90 -0.82 -0.74 -0.62 -0.38 -0.26 -0.18 -0.10 -0.02
5 -0.94 -0.88 -0.80 -0.74 -0.64 -0.46 -0.36 -0.30 -0.22 -0.16
6 -0.76 -0.70 -0.62 -0.56 -0.46 -0.26 -0.16 -0.10 -0.02 0.04
7 -0.70 -0.66 -0.62 -0.58 -0.52 -0.38 -0.32 -0.28 -0.24 -0.20
8 -0.64 -0.60 -0.56 -0.52 -0.46 -0.32 -0.26 -0.22 -0.18 -0.14
9 -0.66 -0.58 -0.50 -0.42 -0.30 -0.06 0.06 0.14 0.22 0.30
10 -0.50 -0.46 -0.42 -0.38 -0.32 -0.18 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.00
11 -0.48 -0.46 -0.42 -0.40 -0.34 -0.26 -0.20 -0.18 -0.14 -0.12
12 -0.52 -0.46 -0.38 -0.32 -0.22 -0.04 0.06 0.12 0.20 0.26
13 -0.44 -0.42 -0.38 -0.36 -0.30 -0.22 -0.16 -0.14 -0.10 -0.08
14 -0.36 -0.34 -0.30 -0.28 -0.22 -0.14 -0.08 -0.06 -0.02 0.00
15 -0.34 -0.30 -0.26 -0.22 -0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16
16 -0.24 -0.22 -0.18 -0.16 -0.10 -0.02 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.12
17 -0.30 -0.22 -0.14 -0.06 0.06 0.30 0.42 0.50 0.58 0.66
18 -0.26 -0.20 -0.12 -0.06 0.04 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.46 0.52
19 -0.16 -0.12 -0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.16 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.34
20 -0.12 -0.10 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.24
21 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.36
22 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.50
23 -0.04 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.26 0.46 0.56 0.62 0.70 0.76
24 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.36 0.38 0.42 0.44
25 0.02 0.10 0.18 0.26 0.38 0.62 0.74 0.82 0.90 0.98
26 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.26 0.34 0.40 0.42 0.46 0.48
27 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.32 0.46 0.52 0.56 0.60 0.64
28 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.38 0.52 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.70
29 0.16 0.22 0.30 0.36 0.46 0.64 0.74 0.80 0.88 0.94
30 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.46 0.56 0.74 0.84 0.90 0.98 1.04
31 0.28 0.36 0.44 0.52 0.64 0.88 1.00 1.08 1.16 1.24
32 0.40 0.48 0.56 0.64 0.76 1.00 1.12 1.2 1.28 1.36
33 -0.48 -0.40 -0.32 -0.24 -0.12 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.48
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox was its ability to return zero memberships for rules
providing null surface area. As such, there was no requirement to include
the ’corrective’ level of intensity that we discussed earlier in this chapter as
regards the type-1 implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
Let us consider the output variable eHappiness. Geometric analogue in the
context of output variables with respect to the type-1 implementation was
easier to maintain, due to their boundaries matching the intrinsic boundaries
of the DMU T-2 FLT user interface. The vertices of eHappiness, and by ex-
tension those of all sixteen output variables, are given in table 6.17. Figures
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Figure 6.22: Type 2 Scherer: Membership Functions Associated with Valence
Figure 6.23: Type 2 Scherer: Membership Function Associated with x33, the
Central Region
Table 6.17: Type-2 Scherer: Output MFs
Null Int 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23
Low Int 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.15 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.41 0.43
Mid Int 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.40 0.55 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68
High Int 0.52 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.65 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.91 0.93
Ext Int 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
6.24 and 6.25 give a clearer view as to the graphical format generated from
table 6.17.
The rules base for this implementation remained consistant with that
listed in tables 6.8 and 6.9, in order to maintain consistency with the psy-
chological model and, again, to facilitate more direct comparison between
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Figure 6.24: Type 2 Scherer: Membership Functions Associated with Hap-
piness
Figure 6.25: Type 2 Scherer: Detailed Membership Functions Associated
with Happiness
type-1 and type-2 implementations of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
As was mentioned at the start of this chapter, the implementation de-
scribed here was never successfully tested. This was due to an issue with
a GUI-based limitation of the DMU T-2 FLT, and the fact that the system
was not initially designed to serve the sixteen outputs required by the Geneva
Emotion Wheel. When testing of the implementation began, it became clear
that it would be impossible to obtain the necessary data from the system,
as only three or four of the output memberships would be displayed, often
those returning 0 membership. We shall discuss the impact this had upon






The chapter first presents, in the context of each psychological theory, the
specific testing its implementations underwent. This begins with Millenson,
discussing the comparable testing applied to all implementations, both type-1
and type-2, then progresses into discussion of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
Subsequent to this, each individual implementation is analysed in the con-
text of the testing results. Type-1 Millenson implementations are discussed
first, followed by both type-2 Millenson systems. The type-1 Geneva Emo-
tion Wheel implementation is then discussed in light of its testing results.
While notable results are highlighted in the sections that follow, exhaustive
compilations of experimental results are included in the appendices.
7.2 Testing Overview
All testing discussed in this Chapter, relating to both type-1 and type-2 fuzzy
logic implementations, took place within the MATLAB Technical Computing
Environment.
For the testing of type-1 Millenson A, type-1 Millenson B and type-1
Scherer, M-files were written to automate the process of data acquisition.
These M-files are included in Appendix A. All of these tests were repeated
three times in order to ensure consistency and veracity of numerical outputs.
These results were then verified manually, using the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic
Toolbox user interface.
For the testing of type-2 Millenson A and type-2 Millenson B, automation
was impossible and, as such, all experiments had to be performed manually.
Each set of experiments was repeated three times for the same reasons as
those indicated above, with a fourth iteration of manual testing being used
for verification purposes. All manual tests used the De Montfort University
Type-2 Fuzzy Logic Toolbox’s graphical user interface within the MATLAB
Technical Computing Environment.
We divided our testing into several forms. While the specifics of each are
outlined in their respective sections, we present a brief overview here by way
of introduction. The first form of testing was initial defect testing, as defined
by Sommerville [92], designed to determine at the most basic level whether
the implementations accepted data within their specified ranges. This could
be considered analogous to an aspect of Black Box Testing called Boundary
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Value Analysis [39].
The second form of testing was a White Box defect test, whereby a very
wide range of potential inputs within the accepted ranges of each implemen-
tation were utilised to obtain a database of emotional states. The purpose of
this testing was to ensure that the data provided by each implementation was
meaningful in a broader, psychological context, undertaken in consideration
of the functional workings of the system [39].
The final set of tests selected specific, test case inputs analysed in the
second set of experiments and used them to examine the behaviour of each
implementation in terms of chained events, in the Black Box context of pure
functionality [39]. Further to this, these tests would form the basis of cross-
implementation comparison and, as such, were required to focus upon con-
ceptually uniform features shared by both psychological theories. These tests
were the most complex to design and require the greatest level of preface here.
Millenson’s nine basic emotions were clearly defined for implementations
using his theory; but there was not significant overlap between his list of
basic emotions and those of Scherer. Indeed, the two theories only share
three common ’basic’ emotions: Elation, Anxiety and Anger. Importantly,
however, each of these three represented a different axis with respect to
Millenson. By extension, in the context of Millenson A, they represented
to a degree all nine of Millenson’s basic emotions (following on from our
discussions regarding the linguistic use of ’intensity’ in prior Chapters).
Thus it was determined that our contextual testing would revolve around
these three basic emotions, and combinations thereof, in a manner explicitly
defined in the following sections.
7.3 Testing Methodologies
In this section we outline in explicit terms the testing methodologies applied
to the five implementations that were analysed over the course of this work,
divided by the psychological theories that spawned them.
7.3.1 Millenson Testing
Due to the uniformity of the nature of our four implementations of Millenson’s
emotion theory, divided as they are into two interpretations of his linguistics,
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their modes of testing are theoretically consistent. As such, these can be
addressed simultaneously, limiting the need for repetition.
Where necessary, differences are highlighted. Numerical data is used spar-
ingly in this section, as it is more rightfully featured later in this Chapter
and in Chapter Eight as each implementation’s testing results are individually
analysed. Where numerical data is included, it applies to all four implemen-
tations of Millenson’s theory.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing
This testing was designed to examine the reliability of each software imple-
mentation from a technical, rather than psychological, standpoint.
It was determined that testing both within and without the accepted
range of data should be performed on type-1 systems, and testing only within
the accepted range with type-2 systems, the DMU T-2 FLT being unable to
input values outside of the specified limits. Sommerville tells us that wherever
possible, where user input is required, a system should be tested with both
correct and incorrect input [92].
For all implementations of Millenson, acceptable input and output values
ranged from 0 to 1. It was determined that increments of 10 percent of the
system’s range should be utilised, this being 0.1 in all cases. It was further
asserted that each axis of each implementation should be tested indepen-
dently, in order to confirm correlation between associated input and output
variables, and to establish independence of unassociated input and output
variables.
For each input variable of each implementation, thirteen incremental val-
ues were tested using an automated M-File. Given the implementation input
lower boundary was stipulated to be 0, and the upper boundary was stip-
ulated to be 1, the following list of input values was applied to each of the
three input variables, for each implementation: -0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4,
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1.
Each input value was tested for each axis three times, for a total of 117
autonomous experiments per type-1 implementation, and 117 manual exper-
iments per type-2 implementation. A further 39 manual experiments per
implementation were performed to ensure consistency of the data, for a total
of 624 tests across the four Millenson implementations. Each test obtained a
resultant value of EJ, the analyses of which are discussed in Chapter Eight.
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Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
This testing was designed to obtain a list of emotional states generated by
the four implementations of Millenson’s psychological theory, for discussion
in a meaningful, psychological context. Sommerville reminds us that a truly
"exhaustive" test is impossible [92], thus this test sought to provide a broad
view of the capacities of the system, and not an exhaustive view.
This should not be taken to mean that the analysis of each result shall
be discussed in this work, but rather that results that were inconsistent with
the intent of the model shall be highlighted and discussed individually during
our analysis section. Lack of such shall also be discussed in a similar fashion.
The view was maintained that increments of 10 percent would provide
an acceptable overview of trends within all four systems. The testing here
being psychological in nature, testing beyond the boundaries of the system
would not yield useful results. It was determined to run every combination
and permutation of possible increments for the three input variables within
that 10 percent limitation, for all four implementations.
The crisp input values were defined as: 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7,
0.8, 0.9, 1.0.
This experimentation generated 1331 potential inputs for the systems,
leading to 1331 discrete outputs of EJ for each. The experimentation was
repeated three times, autonomously, for each type-1 implementation, and
manually for each type-2 implementation. A final manual test was performed
across all implementations to ensure veracity of the results, for a total of
21,296 experiments in all.
Exhaustive results of the experimental results are included as an ap-
pendix, though we omit duplicated experiments in this document except
where it highlights some error in the system, whereby it would be discussed
in the Analysis sections of this Chapter and in Chapter Eight.
Black Box Test Cases
As discussed previously, the conceptual testing within this work was designed
to provide a platform of comparison between the five implementations dis-
cussed in this Chapter, as well as facilitate a better understanding of the
’real-world’ behaviours of those implementations.
To that end, three values of J were selected that represented the mem-
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bership maxima of Elation, Anger and Anxiety, respectively. The limitations
upon their selection were:
• That they represented values of J that possessed the lowest numerical
values of the associated axis at which obtaining maximum membership
of the named emotion was possible.
• That they represented values of J that minimised membership of all
other emotions as far as possible.
These three articles of testing data were obtained for each implementation
of the Millenson theory, and represented half of the testing data required for
our considerations.
Further to this, three additional values of J were selected to represent
hybrid-pairs of named emotions, these being Elation-Anger, Anger-Anxiety,
and Anxiety-Elation. The limitations upon their selection were:
• That they represented values of J that generated the highest member-
ship of both emotions within the hybrid-pair that it was possible to
obtain within the system.
• That, aside from restrictions placed by the above condition, they rep-
resented values of J that minimised the membership of any emotions
not named in their pairing.
In total, this provided six testing data for each implementation of Mil-
lenson. In determining our testing data we referred to the results obtained
over the course of the exhaustive testing for each implementation.
Having obtained testing data for each implementation, the testing process
itself was uniform. Each testing datum was determined to represent a stimu-
lus that defined its associated emotion, or hybrid-pair of emotions, from the
perspective of the agent. Each was applied to its associated implementation
of the Millenson model and used to generate, respectively, six values of EJ.
These values of EJ were mapped to EM to define six starting states.
Each starting state was exposed to one of the values of EJ ten times,
using the unweighted mean method to determine resultant EM at t + 1.
These results were recorded over time. That starting state would then be
exposed to another of the EJ values ten times; and so on, until it had been
exposed to all five other testing data.
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Where these experiments related to type-1 implementations of Millenson’s
theory, they were largely automated for three runs each, with one subsequent
manual run for sake of veracity. Where they related to type-2 implementa-
tions, all three runs of experiments were performed manually, as well as a
fourth control run. This provided a total of 480 experiments.
7.3.2 Geneva Emotion Wheel Testing
Where the previous section outlines the testing for four of the fuzzy-logic
based emotion models presented in this work, this section covers only the
testing specific to our type-1 implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
In the interests of meaningful comparison, these tests were designed to mirror
those performed upon our implementations of Millenson’s theory, but the
structure of the models is different enough to warrant seperate discussion
with respect to the specifics of the testing.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing
As before, this testing was designed purely around the basis of determining
reliability of the software from a computational perspective. Maintaining
analogue with the tests upon the Millenson implementations, it was deter-
mined that testing both within and without the accepted range of data should
be performed. It was decided that each axis of the implementation should
be tested independently, with the tangential axis being set at its lowermost
boundary of -1. It was determined that increments of 5 percent of the sys-
tem’s range should be utilised.
This differed from the 10 percent used in Millenson for two reasons.
Firstly, with significantly greater number of membership functions, and a
higher number of total emotions, divided between fewer inputs, it was hy-
pothesised that the type-1 Scherer implementation would be more susceptible
to smaller incremental changes than either Millenson model. Secondly, the
Scherer model’s circumplexial nature spread its range of data in both positive
and negative directions, allowing numerical consistency to be maintained if
relative magnitude were amended.
Twenty-three input values were applied to each axis, twenty-one within
the boundaries, and two without. These were: -1.1, -1.0, -0.9, -0.8, -0.7, -0.6,
-0.5, -0.4, -0.3, -0.2, -0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1
Both axes were tested, and the tests were performed three times using
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an autonomous M-file, for a total of 138 experiments. The results of these
experiments are included in Appendix B, and are discussed in the Analysis
section of this Chapter and in the subsequent Chapter.
Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
For the White Box defect testing segment with respect to the Geneva Emo-
tion Wheel, we maintained the view that increments of 5 percent would
provide an acceptable overview of trends within the comapratively delicate
and sensitive system. In addition, it was determined to run every combina-
tion and permutation of possible increments for the input variables x and y
within that 5 percent limitation, for a total of 441 values of input vector J,
producing 441 distinct resultants for E′S.
The purpose of this testing was to assess the implementation for consis-
tency with the Geneva Emotion Wheel’s psychology. The analysis performed
upon the results is discussed in Chapter Eight. Again, not all resultant E′S
vectors are explicitly analysed within this work, but all are included within
Appendix B and were reviewed as a matter of course.
These experiments were performed autonomously three times to ensure
veracity and numerical consistency of the results. A final run was performed
manually to confirm that consistency, for a total of 1,764 experiments.
Black Box Test Cases
As with Millenson, the case testing of our Geneva Emotion Wheel implemen-
tation was designed to analyse the behaviour of an emotional state informed
by the model over the course of time. Some consideration was given while de-
vising these tests as to what they ought to seek to generate, meaning, should
the tests be designed to give an overview of the Scherer implementation’s
performance in its own right, or should they instead be designed to facili-
tate ease of comparison between this implementation and the four Millenson
implementations.
After considering attempts to define equivalence between additional dis-
crete emotions within the two models, it was determined instead that con-
textual testing would revolve entirely around the three shared emotions, and
the appropriate hybrid-pairs of those emotions. Explicitly: Elation, Anger,
Anxiety, Elation-Anger, Anger-Anxiety, and Anxiety-Elation.
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That being decided, three values of J were selected that represented the
membership maxima of Elation, Anger and Anxiety, respectively. The limi-
tations upon their selection were:
• That they represented values of J that possessed the lowest numerical
values of the associated axis at which obtaining maximum membership
of the named emotion was possible.
• That they represented values of J that minimised membership of all
other emotions as far as possible.
Analogous with Millenson, a further two values of J were selected for the
hybrid pairs Anger-Anxiety and Anger-Elation. The limitations upon their
selection were:
• That they represented values of J that generated the highest summed
membership of both emotions within the hybrid-pair that it was pos-
sible to obtain within the system, with neither having membership of
zero. In such situations as two J vectors provide equal summed mem-
berships, arbitrarily we give priority to the named emotions alphabet-
ically.
• That, aside from restrictions placed by the above condition, they rep-
resented values of J that minimised the membership of any emotions
not named in their pairing.
These limitations had greater meaning for the Geneva Emotion Wheel
implementation than they did for any interpretation of Millenson, primarily
due to the codependant nature of Scherer’s axes. As such, it was a very real
possibility that the highest point of both emotions within a pair would occur
at a value of J that provided an even higher membership of an emotion not
included within the pairing. Such situations are described in detail in the
subsequent analysis section of this Chapter and in Chapter Eight.
The sixth testing datum provided by our implementation of the Scherer
model is truly contextual. We recall that Millenson equated the concept of
an Anxiety-Elation axial pairing with Guilt [94], as discussed in Chapter 2,
while not including it as one of his nine basic emotions. The Geneva Emotion
Wheel, by contrast, includes Shame/Guilt as a discrete emotion referenced
both in our mathematical representation and subsequent implementation. As
such, rather than choosing a value of J which nominally includes non-zero
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membership grades of Anxiety and Elation, we instead opt to select the value
of J which yields the highest resultant value of eShame/Guilt, within the limits
listed above in the context of the individual emotions Anger, Anxiety and
Elation.
All of the experimental data was drawn from the results of the previous
exhaustive testing.
Having obtained six testing data values of J, each was applied to the
Geneva Emotion Wheel implementation, obtaining six values for E′S. From
here, the experimentation was analogous to that performed using the Mil-
lenson contextual testing data, with each value of E′S being exposed to the
other five ten times in order to observe behaviour of the emotional state
under reinforcement of a new environmental input.
The experiments were largely automated for the initial three runs, with a
fourth run being performed manually for the sake of veracity of information.
This led to a total of 120 experiments. These experiments are included within
the appendices and notable results are discussed in-depth in the Analysis
section, and in the context of comparisons between models.
7.4 Analysis
In this section we present key results of the tests outlined earlier in the
Chapter. Excerpts from the testing results are included, where appropriate,
to illustrate this analysis but in order to conserve space the bulk of the test
results form Appendix B, accompanying this report.
In order, we first assess the performance of the type-1 implementation of
Millenson A, followed by the type-1 implementation of Millenson B. Subse-
quent to this, we analyse the testing results of the type-2 implementation of
Millenson A and the type-2 implementation of Millenson B. Lastly, we anal-
yse the results of the type-1 implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
Comparisons of the performance of these implementations, along with
analysis specifically of the contextual testing, is featured in Chapter Eight,
rather than being explicitly discussed in this section.
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Table 7.1: Type-1 Millenson A: Boundary Value Analysis Test Results
Input $+ S- S+$-
-0.1 Error Error Error
0.0 Success Success Success
0.1 Success Success Success
0.2 Success Success Success
0.3 Success Success Success
0.4 Success Success Success
0.5 Success Success Success
0.6 Success Success Success
0.7 Success Success Success
0.8 Success Success Success
0.9 Success Success Success
1.0 Success Success Success
1.1 Error Error Error
7.4.1 Type-1 Millenson A
We shall first discuss the results of the software engineering testing with
respect to this implementation. Following that shall be discourse on the
exhaustive tests and, subsequently, the contextual tests.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing Results
When performing these tests, our criteria for success were simple and di-
rect; numerical results that did not include an error, whatever their meaning
psychologically, constituted success; the exception being that any numerical
result prompted in an axis not associated with the input axis being tested
would also be considered an error. It was anticipated that intentionally ap-
plied inputs that fell outside the acceptable range of the system would return
errors. The experiments were performed as outlined in the previous testing
and, as anticipated, all repetitions yielded identical results.
Table 7.1 presents the results of this testing, across all three axes of the
implementation. It should be noted that while inputs outside the accepted
range of the system did produce numerical results, those results were prefaced
by error warnings. As is evident from the table, these tests yielded successful
results. The specific numerical results are discussed in context as a function
of subsequent exhaustive testing.
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Figure 7.1: Type-1 Millenson A: Emotion Membership over S+$- Value
Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
The White Box testing of this implementation of Millenson A confirmed
several anticipated properties of the system that simplified analysis of the
results considerably. The most important of these was identical and inde-
pendant behaviour of the system across axes.
Let us consider a given numeric value n, input as the variable Z in J
yielding specific membership values of z1, z2, and z3. Were that value n
applied to the variable Y , experimentation confirmed that the same specific
membership values would be yielded as results for y1, y2, and y3; and that
the same pattern repeated for X.
As such, when analysing the behaviour of the system as a whole, we
can consider solely a single input-output relationship, and extrapolate it
across all three input-output relationships. That aside, this extrapolation
was confirmed through careful analysis of the resultant data.
Let us consider the variable Z, associated as it is with the concepts S+$−.
Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between named emotional outputs and the
input value of Z between 0 and 1. Table 7.2 provides this information in
numerical terms.
For this axis of the model to function such that its behaviour matched
our perceptions of the psychological theory upon which it is built, several
features were required to be observed. Firstly, that at low, non-zero values
of Z, µz1 should be higher than µz2 or µz3. Secondly, that at around 60%, or
0.6, in accordance with the extrapolated geometry from Millenson’s diagram,
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Table 7.2: Type-1 Millenson A: White Box Test Results, S+$- Variable
S+$- µz1 µz2 µz3
0.0 0.0024481 0.0000000 0.0000000
0.1 0.0470330 0.0000000 0.0000000
0.2 0.1487400 0.0000000 0.0000000
0.3 0.7841200 0.0000000 0.0000000
0.4 0.4650200 0.0699550 0.0000000
0.5 0.2500000 0.5000000 0.0000000
0.6 0.0349780 0.9300400 0.0000000
0.7 0.0000000 0.7158800 0.0000000
0.8 0.0000000 0.0743690 0.8512600
0.9 0.0000000 0.0235160 0.9529700
1.0 0.0000000 0.0012240 0.9975500
µz2 should be greater than µz1 or µz3. Thirdly, that as Z tends towards 1,
µz3 should be greater than µz1 or µz2.
These experiments demonstrated that for all values within the accepted
system boundaries, the above three conditions were met. Furthermore, they
were intrinsically assumed to be true for the other two axes, and explicitly
verified to be so.
Psychologically, figure 7.1 demonstrates that for an agent whose emo-
tional state is governed by this implementation, the addition of positive stim-
ulus and removal of negative stimulus shall lead to greater levels of pleasure,
and/or elation, and/or ecstasy. By extension, and through the manifold data
provided in the appendices, this testing also demonstrates that for this im-
plementation of Millenson A: the application of negative stimulus will lead to
the agent’s emotional state presenting higher levels of apprehension, anxiety,
and/or terror; and, the removal of positive stimulus will lead to the agent’s
emotional state presenting higher levels of annoyance, anger and/or rage. In
this, it demonstrates adherence to the psychology behind Millenson’s theory.
Analysis of Test Cases
From our exhaustive tests, we determined appropriate values of J to meet
the criteria presented earlier in the Chapter. These are presented in table
7.3, where the table includes: the associated emotion or hybrid-pairing, the
J vector, and the associative emotional output, EJ. We are reminded, from
equation 4.22, that EJ is a column vector of nine elements, each between 0
and 1 in magnitude. The third column in table 7.3 presents these raw val-
ues as a horizontal vector of nine elements, for formatting reasons. The first
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three selected emotional input vectors, J, represent the points which gener-
ated maximum achievable values of Anger, Anxiety and Elation, respectively.
The last three represent the points at which maximum achievable values of
the pairings of Anger with Anxiety, Anger with Elation, and Anxiety with
Elation, respectively, were obtained.
While tables are included within the appendices that record all of the
contextual experimentation outlined in the previous section, for the purposes
of this report we discuss solely the case of an agent beginning a scenario in
a state of Anger. This agent then experiences stimuli that reinforce the
Anxiety-Elation pairing which Millenson defines as representing Guilt [94].
In calculating EM from EJ, we take a mean value of the summed emo-
tion memberships. We justify this in consideration of Ekman’s assertion that,
except in cases of complex emotional plots, emotions are brief and do not
linger [25]. By giving a new emotional stimulus the same importance as
the previous emotional state, we ensure that the system evolves with each
iteration. Further to this, while we discuss iterations in terms of t, t itself
has no discrete unit beyond cycles of the system. The nature of t, and any
conclusions drawn regarding it, shall be discussed during the Critical Review.
Figure 7.2 presents the values of EM generated by the type-1 implemen-
tation of Millenson’s theory when an agent in an angered state is serially
exposed to stimulus events prompting an Anxiety-Elation pairing response.
Importantly, this illustrates the compound nature of emotional outputs we
expect to be generated by representations of Millenson’s psychological the-
ory. We recall in particular that Millenson described ‘Guilt’ as a complex
emotion including both elation and anxiety components; the emotional state
of the system is similarly complex in its output. The experiment covered ten
iterations, and only emotions possessing non-zero memberships are shown.
Table 7.4 presents the numerical values creating figure 7.2, considering only
non-trivial memberships; the exhaustive list upon which this figure is based
is included within the appendices.
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Figure 7.2: Type-1 Millenson A: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
Table 7.4: Type-1 Millenson A: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
t µx1 µx2 µy1 µy2 µz1 µz2
0 0.035 0.930 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.018 0.465 0.018 0.465 0.018 0.465
2 0.009 0.233 0.027 0.698 0.027 0.698
3 0.005 0.117 0.031 0.814 0.031 0.814
4 0.003 0.059 0.033 0.872 0.033 0.872
5 0.002 0.030 0.034 0.901 0.034 0.901
6 0.001 0.015 0.035 0.916 0.035 0.916
7 0.001 0.008 0.035 0.923 0.035 0.923
8 0.001 0.004 0.035 0.927 0.035 0.927
9 0.001 0.002 0.035 0.929 0.035 0.929
10 0.001 0.001 0.035 0.930 0.035 0.930
Examining figure 7.2, we see that by the second iteration, as is expected,
the reinforced stimulus event J has caused Anger and Annoyance to decrease
below the intensity of Apprehension, Anxiety, Pleasure and Elation. The
exponential relationships shown in figure 7.2 are to be expected, given the
arithmetic upon which they are based (explained more fully in Chapter Four).
That said, the purpose of these tests is to place the outputs generated by
this implementation into context as an evolving model of emotions, which
these results demonstrate is thoroughly feasible.
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Table 7.5: Type-1 Millenson B: Boundary Value Analysis Test Results
Input $+ S- S+$-
-0.1 Error Error Error
0.0 Success Success Success
0.1 Success Success Success
0.2 Success Success Success
0.3 Success Success Success
0.4 Success Success Success
0.5 Success Success Success
0.6 Success Success Success
0.7 Success Success Success
0.8 Success Success Success
0.9 Success Success Success
1.0 Success Success Success
1.1 Error Error Error
7.4.2 Type-1 Millenson B
We shall initially address the results of the software engineering testing ap-
plied to this implementation. After that shall be consideration of the ex-
haustive testing results and, subsequently, the contextual tests.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing Results
The same success criteria as were applied to the previous implementation’s
Black Box defect testing also applied here. For all inputs within the specified
operational range of the system, a numerical return was considered a success.
An error was defined as an input that prompted an error message in the
MATLAB Technical Computing Environment, or an input that prompted
numerical changes in outputs to which it was not causally associated. Error
results were anticipated for all inputs outside the specified operational range
of the system.
The experiments were performed on all three axes as outlined previously
within this Chapter, and as anticipated all repetitions yielded identical re-
sults. The results themselves are included in table 7.5.
Again, it should be noted that while inputs outside the specified range of
the system produced numerical outputs, these were prefaced by error warn-
ings. The implementation performed as anticipated, successfully functioning
within the limits of its range. The specific numerical results are included as
part of the exhaustive testing section of the appendices, and where appro-
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Figure 7.3: Type-1 Millenson B: Emotion Membership over S+$- Value
Table 7.6: Type-1 Millenson B: White Box Test Results, S+$- Variable
S+$- Pleasure Elation Ecstasy
0.0 0.33333 0.10667 0.10667
0.1 0.45999 0.2571 0.11644
0.2 0.57938 0.3147 0.11644
0.3 0.89333 0.33333 0.10667
0.4 0.88356 0.3336 0.11644
0.5 0.69501 0.5109 0.30499
0.6 0.6664 0.88356 0.3336
0.7 0.66667 0.89333 0.33333
0.8 0.54577 0.7429 0.45999
0.9 0.45423 0.6853 0.57938
1.0 0.33333 0.66667 0.89333
priate are discussed in the subsequent analysis.
Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
As should be inferred from our discussion of the Type-1 implementation of
Millenson A, the independence of the three axes permits us to discuss the
performance of the system in the context of a single axis and project that onto
the other three. Of course, all analysis we include is borne out by discrete
examination of the results obtained for all three variables. This independence
has been explicitly clarified in Section 2.1.2.
Let us consider the variable Z. Figure 7.3 shows the relationship between
membership of named emotional outputs and the input value of Z between
0 and 1. Table 7.6 provides this information in numerical terms.
It is clear from the initial data that, importantly, there are no points
133
within operational range of the system where all three named emotions do
not provide non-zero results. This is a marked change with respect to the
Millenson A interpretation, which assumed that there were no input stimuli
in which both Pleasure and Ecstasy might be provoked simultaneously (al-
though, as is discussed in the Critical Review section, this does not preclude
the agent’s emotional state at any given instant from containing non-zero
memberships of both).
For this axis of the model to function such that its behaviour matched our
perceptions of the psychological theory upon which it is built, as was the case
with Millenson A, several criteria had to be met by the test results. Firstly,
that at low, non-zero values of Z, µz1 should be higher than µz2 or µz3.
Secondly, that at around 60%, or 0.6, in accordance with the extrapolated
geometry from Millenson’s diagram, µz2 should be greater than µz1 or µz3.
Thirdly, that as Z tends towards 1, µz3 should be greater than µz1 or µz2.
This testing demonstrated that for all tested input values between the
stipulated operational limits of the system, the above criteria were met. As
such, we infer that for any given acceptable input, the implementation func-
tioned in accordance with Millenson’s theory of emotions. Explicit compari-
son of this implementation and our other implementations is included later,
and discusses in-depth different perspectives regarding the manner in which
the psychology is obeyed.
Analysis of Test Cases
Our exhaustive testing permitted us to determine appropriate values of J in
accordance with the criteria stipulated earlier in the Chapter. We present
these in table 7.7. The table includes the associated emotion or hybrid-
pairing, the J vector, and the respective emotional output vector of each,
EJ. Again, we are reminded that the structure of EJ, as defined in equation
4.22, is that of a nine element vector with values between 0 and 1. As was the
case with Millenson A, the selected vectors J were those which generated the
values of EJ representing maximum membership of the emotions or emotion
pairings they were intended to trigger.
As with the type-1 implementation of Millenson A, we consider for the
purposes of this report the scenario of an agent beginning the simulation in
a state defined by our testing data as Angry. It is then subject to reinforced
stimulus prompting a reaction defined by our testing data as a hybrid of
Anxiety and Elation, which we have previously described as analogous to
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Figure 7.4: Type-1 Millenson B: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
Guilt. This stimulus is applied for 10 iterations, using the unweighted mean
approach as described in Chapter Four. Figure 7.4 provides a graphical
representation of the change in basic emotion membership over the course
of the simulation, while table 7.8 provides, for clarity, the numerical values
upon which the figure is based. Again, we are mindful of the complex nature
of the emotional output shown in figure 7.4, conveying as it does the appli-
cation of a complex emotion to stimulate changes to a model defined by nine
basic emotions.
The figure demonstrates, as expected, an exponential decrease in the
three emotions associated with $+. By the second iteration, the initially
dominant emotion of Anger has only marginally greater membership than
the lowermost Anxiety- and Elation-related basic emotions. Interestingly,
the loss in membership of Anger occurs at a far steeper angle than the loss
in membership of Annoyance. While this is naturally a function of the lower
bounds of the membership grades, as seen in the previous exhaustive testing,
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Table 7.8: Type-1 Millenson B: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
t µx1 µx2 µx3 µy1 µy2 µy3 µz1 µz2 µz3
0 0.667 0.893 0.334 0.333 0.107 0.107 0.333 0.107 0.107
1 0.500 0.500 0.221 0.500 0.500 0.221 0.500 0.500 0.221
2 0.417 0.304 0.164 0.584 0.697 0.278 0.584 0.697 0.278
3 0.375 0.206 0.136 0.626 0.795 0.306 0.626 0.795 0.306
4 0.354 0.157 0.122 0.647 0.844 0.321 0.647 0.844 0.321
5 0.344 0.132 0.115 0.657 0.869 0.328 0.657 0.869 0.328
6 0.339 0.120 0.111 0.662 0.881 0.331 0.662 0.881 0.331
7 0.336 0.114 0.109 0.665 0.887 0.333 0.665 0.887 0.333
8 0.335 0.111 0.108 0.666 0.890 0.334 0.666 0.890 0.334
9 0.334 0.109 0.108 0.667 0.892 0.334 0.667 0.892 0.334
10 0.334 0.108 0.108 0.667 0.893 0.334 0.667 0.893 0.334
this has the interesting psychological consequence that higher order emotions
trail off quicker than those of a lower order.
In the context of our simulation, while the agent’s anger subsides as it
begins to feel ’Guilt’, it still feels a given level of Annoyance at its situation
ultimately equal to its experience of Terror and Ecstasy. In addition, by the
end of the simulation the emotions with the lowest membership are Rage,
which began as the third highest, and Anger, which began as the highest.
The above clarified, this contextual testing demonstrates adherence to the
psychology of the model it is built upon. In addition, this implementation
makes solid use of the features of fuzzy logic, providing non-zero membership
grades for all emotions at all times, without dampening the psychological
grounding of the model. As in all cases, while we have directed our attentions
to a single facet of the contextual experimentation, exhaustive results are
included within the appendices.
7.4.3 Type-2 Millenson A
Firstly we shall address the results of the software engineering testing applied
to this implementation. After that shall be consideration of the exhaustive
testing results and, subsequently, the contextual tests.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing Results
Given that it was impossible to input a value to this implementation that lay
outside of its accepted limits, Black Box defect testing was limited to ensuring
that inputs within the limits provided a numerical return. The criteria given
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Table 7.9: Type-2 Millenson A: Boundary Value Analysis Test Results
Input $+ S- S+$-
0.0 Success Success Success
0.1 Success Success Success
0.2 Success Success Success
0.3 Success Success Success
0.4 Success Success Success
0.5 Success Success Success
0.6 Success Success Success
0.7 Success Success Success
0.8 Success Success Success
0.9 Success Success Success
1.0 Success Success Success
for success were that a numerical result would constitute a success, unless it
were prefaced by an error.
Within this type-2 implementation, each axis was processed completely
independently. As such, it was impossible, for any reason, for the results of
one axis to impinge upon the other two. This simplified the testing criteria
significantly. Table 7.9 presents the results of this testing. As evidenced
therein, the tests yielded successful results. Discourse of the numerical values
of these results forms part of the analysis of Exhaustive Testing.
Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
As per previous discussions of Millenson testing, we explicitly present re-
sults for only one variable in this section, though the exhaustive results are
included within the appendices and bear out the analysis we now outline.
Figure 7.5 provides a graphical representation of the memberships of the
named emotions Pleasure, Elation and Ecstasy, with respect to increasing
value of the variable Z, defining the S + $− stimulus. Table 7.10 outlines
figure 7.5 in numerical terms.
Our success criteria for the type-2 implementation of Millenson A were
consistent with those of the type-1 implementation. In the context of the
Z variable, the model would maintain psychological consistency if at 20% of
range, z1, or Pleasure, was the dominant emotion; if at 60% of range, z2, or
Elation, was the dominant emotion; and if, at 100% of range, Ecstasy was
the dominant emotion.
All of these criteria are demonstrably met in the above results, and those
results were mirrored across all three input variables. Psychologically speak-
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Figure 7.5: Type-2 Millenson A: Emotion Membership over S+$- Value
Table 7.10: Type-2 Millenson A: White Box Defect Test Results, S+$- Vari-
able
S+$- Pleasure Elation Ecstasy
0.0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1 0.1860 0.0000 0.0000
0.2 0.7748 0.0000 0.0000
0.3 0.4050 0.1901 0.0000
0.4 0.4205 0.1591 0.0000
0.5 0.2293 0.5413 0.0000
0.6 0.0795 0.8409 0.0000
0.7 0.0950 0.8099 0.0000
0.8 0.0000 0.3874 0.2252
0.9 0.0000 0.0981 0.8037
1.0 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ing, however, there are more features to consider in our analysis of these
results.
Importantly, the trends of increasing and decreasing membership of emo-
tion are not ubiquitous across the model. If we consider the membership of
z1, Pleasure, at Z values of 0.3 and 0.4, respectively, we see a reversal of
the downward trend following the main peak at 0.2, with µz1 being slightly
increased. This trend-reversal is repeated for Pleasure between Z values of
0.6 and 0.7. It is also present for Elation, in an inverted form, between the
Z values of 0.3 and 0.4, whereby the initial increase in Elation as Z increases
is stymied, temporarily, before resuming.
While this might run contrary to an obvious, causal approach to the in-
terpretation of Z, it should be recognised that the inclusion of type-2 systems
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was explicitly to increase uncertainty with respect to how an agent would re-
act, emotionally, to given stimuli. The fact that our hypothetical agent might
react with lower Elation to higher levels of positive stimulus, for example,
could be considered a function of stimulus context and, albeit unexception-
ally, agent reaction thereof. As should be expected, these interesting features
of the implementation’s behaviour were mirrored across all three axes.
Analysis of Test Cases
From the results obtained in our exhaustive testing, table 7.11 was obtained,
listing the six testing data which best matched the criteria of selection. Table
7.11 presents the associated emotion or hybrid-pairing, the input vector J,
and the emotional output vector EJ. We recall the structure of EJ from
equation 4.22 as being a nine element vector of values ranging from 0 to 1,
this structure remaining true in both the type 1 and type 2 fuzzy logic cases.
As with the type 1 cases, the selected values of J presented in table 7.11 are
those which demonstrated the highest membership of their associated named
emotion or pairing of named emotions.
Uniform with previous explorations of this contextual testing, this report
directs its attention to a single scenario. Within this scenario, an agent
governed by the type-2 implementation of Millenson A begins its existance
in a state of Anger. It is exposed to a stimulus event J defined in table 7.11
as ’Anx-Ela’, or the Anxiety-Elation hybrid pairing, previously defined as
’Guilt’. This event is serially applied to the agent for ten system cycles or
iterations.
Figure 7.6 shows in graphical terms the effect upon basic emotion mem-
bership caused by each iteration of this experiment, while table 7.12 provides
the raw numerical data. Once again, this demonstrates the interactions of a
complex emotion, comprised by definition of multiple basic emotions, upon a
model defined by nine basic emotions. The impact on overall emotional state
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Figure 7.6: Type-2 Millenson A: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
Table 7.12: Type-2 Millenson A: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
t µx1 µx2 µy1 µy2 µz1 µz2
0 0.080 0.841 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1 0.040 0.421 0.040 0.421 0.040 0.421
2 0.020 0.211 0.060 0.631 0.060 0.631
3 0.010 0.106 0.070 0.736 0.070 0.736
4 0.005 0.053 0.075 0.789 0.075 0.789
5 0.003 0.027 0.078 0.815 0.078 0.815
6 0.002 0.014 0.079 0.828 0.079 0.828
7 0.001 0.007 0.080 0.835 0.080 0.835
8 0.001 0.004 0.080 0.838 0.080 0.838
9 0.001 0.002 0.080 0.840 0.080 0.840
10 0.001 0.001 0.080 0.841 0.080 0.841
is more pronounced when stimulated in complex fashion, as it affects multi-
ple axes simultaneously. Note that neither include basic emotions unaffected
by this experiment (those whose membership grades do not exceed 0 at any
point during the test) for the sake of clarity. The exhaustive data, including
trivial results, is included within the appendices.
As anticipated as a function of our averaging method, using unweighted
means as outlined in Chapter Four, Anger has ceased to be the dominant
emotion by the second iteration of the system. The membership values of
Anxiety and Elation rise in tandem as a pair of exponents whose maxima
naturally lie at 0.841, the membership that the stimulus event J being applied
associates with them.
The lower order emotions Apprehension and Pleasure rise in like fashion,
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Table 7.13: Type-2 Millenson B: Boundary Value Analysis Test Results
Input $+ S- S+$-
0.0 Success Success Success
0.1 Success Success Success
0.2 Success Success Success
0.3 Success Success Success
0.4 Success Success Success
0.5 Success Success Success
0.6 Success Success Success
0.7 Success Success Success
0.8 Success Success Success
0.9 Success Success Success
1.0 Success Success Success
while their gradient is mirrored by the descent of Annoyance. Annoyance
and Anger possess the lowest non-zero memberships within the system by
the fourth iteration, both tending towards zero as the simulation ends. Psy-
chologically, this represents a pure application of Millenson’s theory of emo-
tion, whereby specific stimulus events lead to their associated emotions, and
reinforcement of those events reinforces the emotional state.
7.4.4 Type-2 Millenson B
Here we present analysis of the testing performed upon the type-2 fuzzy
logic implementation of the Millenson Model’s second interpretation, which
we dub Millenson B. We begin with analysis of the software engineering
testing applied to the system, followed by discussion of results obtained in
exhaustive testing and, subsequently, contextual testing of the system.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing
As with the type-2 implementation of Millenson A, it proved impossible to
apply inputs to this implementation which fell outside its acceptable ranges.
That being the case, in these tests success was defined as the return of a
numerical result for a given input that was not preceded by an error. Table
7.13 provides the results of this testing.
By the success criteria, the system demonstrated absolute mechanical
functionality. The numerical results themselves, and their psychological con-
text, are discussed subsequently.
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Figure 7.7: Type-2 Millenson B: Emotion Membership over S+$- Value
Table 7.14: Type-2 Millenson B: White Box Defect Test Results, S+$- Vari-
able
S+$- Pleasure Elation Ecstasy
0.0 0.416 0.269 0.252
0.1 0.455 0.347 0.196
0.2 0.531 0.377 0.200
0.3 0.746 0.340 0.171
0.4 0.754 0.369 0.246
0.5 0.605 0.492 0.395
0.6 0.653 0.576 0.346
0.7 0.636 0.791 0.361
0.8 0.539 0.641 0.460
0.9 0.459 0.625 0.533
1.0 0.411 0.658 0.623
Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
As previously in the context of Millenson, we explicitly present results for
only one variable in this section, though the results bear out the analysis
we now outline and are included within the appendices. Figure 7.7 provides
a graphical representation of the memberships of the named emotions Plea-
sure, Elation and Ecstasy, with respect to increasing value of the variable Z,
defining the S + $− stimulus, while table 7.14 outlines these results numeri-
cally.
Our success criteria for the type-2 implementation of Millenson B were
consistent with those of the type-1 implementation. As regards the Z variable
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considered here, the model would maintain psychological consistency if at
20% of range, z1, or Pleasure, was the dominant emotion; if at 60% of range,
z2, or Elation, was the dominant emotion; and if, at 100% of range, Ecstasy
was the dominant emotion.
This implementation failed to meet two of the above criteria. At 60%,
Pleasure, and not Elation, was the dominant experienced emotion. At 100%,
Elation, and not Ecstasy, was the dominant emotion. This pattern was re-
peated across all three axes, with the model always favouring lower order
emotions, and the highest order emotion on any given axis never achieving
dominance. In this sense, the implementation lost psychological analogue
with Millenson’s theory as presented. Potential solutions to this issue are
discussed later. It was not felt that this failure should preclude this imple-
mentation from being subject to contextual testing and critical review.
Analysis of Test Cases
Six data were identified that satisfied our selection criteria for testing data.
These are included in table 7.15. The table identifies the associated emotion
or hybrid-pair, the input vector J and the emotional output EJ. Again, we
are mindful of the definition of EJ from equation 4.22 , which is suitably rep-
resented by the elements provided in the third column of table 7.15. Again,
these values of J were selected in accordance with the stipulated criteria, rep-
resenting the maximum obtained memberships of their associated emotions
or pairs of emotions.
As with other implementations, while all proposed contextual experi-
ments were performed and their results are included within the appendices,
we direct our attentions in this report to a specific scenario. An agent gov-
erned by the type-2 implementation of Millenson B exists in a state defined
by the stimulus event J identified as ’Anger’ in table 7.15. It is subject to
reinforcement of a ’Guilt’ stimulus, represented by the Anxiety-Elation pair-
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Figure 7.8: Type-2 Millenson B: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
Table 7.16: Type-2 Millenson B: Emotion Membership over t Iterations
t µx1 µx2 µx3 µy1 µy2 µy3 µz1 µz2 µz3
0 0.636 0.791 0.361 0.416 0.269 0.252 0.416 0.269 0.252
1 0.526 0.530 0.307 0.526 0.530 0.307 0.526 0.530 0.307
2 0.471 0.400 0.280 0.581 0.661 0.334 0.581 0.661 0.334
3 0.444 0.335 0.266 0.609 0.726 0.348 0.609 0.726 0.348
4 0.430 0.302 0.259 0.623 0.759 0.355 0.623 0.759 0.355
5 0.423 0.286 0.256 0.630 0.775 0.358 0.630 0.775 0.358
6 0.420 0.278 0.254 0.633 0.783 0.360 0.633 0.783 0.360
7 0.418 0.274 0.253 0.635 0.787 0.361 0.635 0.787 0.361
8 0.417 0.272 0.253 0.636 0.789 0.361 0.636 0.789 0.361
9 0.417 0.270 0.253 0.636 0.790 0.361 0.636 0.790 0.361
10 0.417 0.270 0.253 0.636 0.791 0.361 0.636 0.791 0.361
ing defined in the same table. For the purposes of our test, exposure lasts
for ten system cycles or iterations.
Figure 7.8 graphically indicates the changes to basic emotion membership
for each iteration of the experiment. Table 7.16 provides this data numeri-
cally for clarity.
The simulation begins with Anger as the dominant emotion, with An-
noyance the next highest, and Pleasure and Apprehension sharing the third
highest membership. Anger trails off with the steepest negative gradient,
while Anxiety and Elation both increase with a mirrored positive gradient.
Annoyance trails off with a shallower gradient, mirroring the rise in Appre-
hension and Pleasure.
By the second iteration, the membership of Anger only exceeds the mem-
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berships of Rage, Terror and Ecstasy, while Annoyance begins to plateau as
the fifth highest membership. By the third iteration, Anger’s membership
has descended to the point where it only exceeds that of Rage. At the end
of the simulation, both Elation and Anxiety have reached a plateau tending
towards the maximum membership associated with the Anxiety-Elation J
stimulus event.
By the final iteration, Annoyance possesses the highest membership of
the emotions associated with the $+ axis. This indicates that under these
constraints, higher order emotions trail off quicker than lower order emotions.
While this is obviously a side-effect of the model’s geometry combined with
our method of obtaining EM, it is interesting, psychologically. It suggests a
situation where, while our agent is primarily experiencing Anxiety and Ela-
tion, and their lower-order associated emotions Apprehension and Pleasure,
the Anger it felt previously has been replaced by simple annoyance at its
situation.
7.4.5 Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel
In this subsection we present analysis of results obtained in our testing of
the type-1 fuzzy logic implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel. We
begin with analysis of the software engineering testing results. Subsequently,
we address the exhaustive testing applied to the implementation, followed by
discourse regarding the contextual testing.
Boundary Value Analysis Testing
By necessity, the success criteria for the implementation of the Geneva Emo-
tion Wheel were different to those applied to the Millenson implementations.
Primarily, those differences lay in error definition as a function of the code-
pendence present between the GEW’s axes. We defined the criteria for suc-
cess as follows: for any input values within the operational input range of
the implementation, a numerical return was considered a success, saving in
cases where it accompanied an error return in the MATLAB Technical Com-
puting Environment. Error results were anticipated for all inputs outside the
specified operational range of the system.
We recall that only one input variable was adjusted for each run of tests,
the other being fixed at -1 for all experimental iterations. Table 7.17 presents
the results of these tests under the header of the adjusted variable.
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Table 7.17: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Boundary Value Analysis Test
Results
























Of the 46 software engineering tests, 4 results returned unanticipated er-
rors. These were present when the system was in a state of extremis, with one
input at absolute minimum, and the variable input near or at absolute max-
imum or absolute minimum. Investigation revealed these to be a weakness
in the implementation brought about by the manner in which the circum-
plexial geometry was represented in coordinates of x and y, coupled with the
method the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox handled inputs that provided no
membership return.
While a significant weakness in the implementation, it was determined to
proceed with exhaustive testing in order to determine the extent to which
these anomalous results permeated the system. This flaw is considered both
in the discussion of contextual testing results, and in the subsequent Critical
Review.
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Analysis of White Box Defect Testing
The list of results generated by the type-1 implementation of the Geneva
Emotion Wheel is impractical to present in print format, far moreso than
is the case with any implementation of the Millenson model. Indeed, even
the representative ease with which an abridged version of Millenson can be
presented is not manifest in the context of the Geneva Emotion Wheel. As
such, discussion of these results will be more targeted and less abstract than
in the prior cases. As always, an exhaustive list of results is provided within
the appendices.
The first important result of experimentation with our implementation of
the Geneva Emotion Wheel was the revelation of its weakness in cases of ex-
tremis. Specifically, 16 cases of the 441 tested input cases within operational
limits of the system returned error results and a value of 0.5 membership
for all sixteen basic emotions. This provided an inherent error probability
of 3.6% in scenarios where the probability distribution of input values was
uniform across the range. The list of J values at which this error occured
is included as table 7.18. These results are included in the appendices, but
not discussed further in our assessment of the psychological soundness of the
implementation.
These aberrations aside, the fuzzy geometry used in the representation of
the Geneva Emotion Wheel demonstrated interesting behaviour when con-
147
Figure 7.9: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Cross-Section vs. Control, Va-
lence Fixed @ 0.8
sidered across a range of named emotions with similar ratios of Valence to
Control. Rather than discuss exhaustive results in the context of each named
emotion, as is possible with Millenson, instead we focus upon four cross-
sections and the implications of the non-trivial results each presents. In each
case, the figures represent membership grades for the named emotions at the
input values presented, with one input value remaining static while the other
varies across the range.
Figure 7.9 presents an example where Valence is fixed at 0.8, and Control
varied from -1.0 to 1.0. Figure 7.10 presents its corrollary, Control fixed at
0.8 while Valence varies from -1.0 to 1.0. In an effort to provide additional
evidence of the implementation’s behaviour, figure 7.11 presents emotion
memberships where Valence is fixed at 0.5, with Control varied across the
range of inputs. Similarly, figure 7.12 presents the corrollary, with Control
fixed at 0.5 and Valence varied from -1.0 to 1.0.
The purpose of these figures is to demonstrate two things. Firstly, that
the Scherer geometry is obeyed within the constraints of the model, and
within the context in which the implementation is presented. Secondly, that
the geometry is consistent inasmuch as behaviour is maintained across the
operational region. Let us first consider figure 7.9.
Figure 7.9 presents a case where Valence is both positive and of high
magnitude. That being the case, referring back to Figure 2.2, and taking
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Figure 7.10: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Cross-Section vs. Valence,
Control Fixed @ 0.8
Figure 7.11: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Cross-Section vs. Control,
Valence Fixed @ 0.5
into account the trailing edges of our fuzzy geometry, we should expect the
emotions triggered by a variance in Control across the range to be Elation,
Happiness, Satisfaction, Relief, Hope and Interest. Figure 7.9 confirms that
to be the case.
A quick examination of figure 7.9 confirms several key features. Firstly,
that the emotions triggered follow the Geneva Emotion Wheel geometry in
abstract terms. That is to say, Interest, being the emotion in the above
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Figure 7.12: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Cross-Section vs. Valence,
Control Fixed @ 0.5
list associated with the lowest relative Control, is triggered at lower levels
of Control than any other. Similarly, the order of triggering follows the
geometry of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
Secondly, figure 7.9 demonstrates symmetrical membership relationships
for emotions across the midpoint of the Control range. This is important
from a consistency perspective. The Geneva Emotion Wheel is a circumplex
and, as such, any attempt to represent it geometrically must adhere to the
symmetry inherent in its structure.
Lastly, the application of fuzzy logic, and the nature and structure of
our particular implementation, should give rise to situations where multiple
emotions have non-zero memberships simultaneously. Note that unlike Mil-
lenson, Scherer does not include as a function of the Geneva Emotion Wheel’s
structure an intrinsic property of compound emotions. Rather, in this case,
it is the fuzziness associated with environmental perception which gives rise
to these complex solutions. Figure 7.9 demonstrates that the implementation
provides such results, with over 80% of samples providing non-zero results
for two or more named emotions.
Considering figure 7.10, the important features are predominantly shared
with figure 7.9, save that figure 7.10 demonstrates through it’s complete con-
sistency with figure 7.9 that the symmetrical consistency is observed across
both variables at the values presented. Once again, the named emotions
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triggered remain consistent with the structure outlined in figure 2.2, as is the
order in which they are triggered.
Moving on to consider figure 7.11, we present the case where Valence is
both positive and of middling magnitude. In this case, we would anticipate
across the range of Control values, all eight emotions associated with positive
Valence to be triggered to a certain degree, which is to say Pride, Elation,
Happiness, Satisfaction, Relief, Hope, Interest and Surprise. Figure 7.11
confirm this to be the case.
Setting Valence as 0.5 prevents the prima facae analysis possible with
figures 7.9 and 7.10 in terms of which emotions should be triggered at the
highest intensity. As is shown when considering Surprise and Interest, it is
Interest which enjoys a higher, earlier peak. This makes sense, however, when
one considers the geometry of figure 2.2, whereby Interest more closely relates
to a point of middling, positive Valence and extreme, negative Control.
Of particular interest are the membership spikes in Satisfaction and Re-
lief, which occur when the point of input moves outside the third fuzzy region
of each, while remaining within the extremes of the fourth, triggering a brief,
sharp increase in membership. This is, again, a function of the squared
membership functions that lie at the root of the aberrations discussed at the
beginning of this subsection.
That aside, figure 7.11 behaves much as we would expect. Unlike the
case in figure 7.9, there are no positions within figure 7.11 which provide
less than two emotions non-zero memberships at any given time. This is a
result supported by the structure of the Geneva Emotion Wheel’s geometry,
which demonstrates greater concentration of like emotions as input magni-
tude decreases. Similarly, in accordance with the geometry, membership of
the named emotions behaves symmetrically about the Control midpoint.
Figure 7.12, as with figure 7.10, provides useful information in the context
that it supports all of the previous assertions regarding figure 7.11, while at
the same time verifying that the symmetry of behaviour remains consistent
across both input variables. Again, this is important as it demonstrates
geometrical consistency with the Geneva Emotion Wheel upon which our
implementation is based.
Exhaustive results are included within the appendices, and they bear out
our assertion that barring the 3.6% of cases where abberant results are pro-
duced, our implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel pays due deference
to the psychological theory upon which it is built, and behaves as one would
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Table 7.19: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Contextual Testing Data
– Anger Anxiety Elation Ang-Anx Ang-Ela Guilt
x -0.2 -0.2 0.6 -0.2 0.1 -1
y 1.0 -1.0 0.9 0.3 0.7 -0.1
µePride 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.786 0.000
µeElation 0.000 0.000 0.923 0.091 0.725 0.000
µeHappiness 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeSatisfaction 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeRelief 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeHope 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeInterest 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeSurprise 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeAnxiety 0.000 0.925 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeSadness 0.000 0.908 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeBoredom 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000
µeShame/Guilt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.925
µeDisgust 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.910
µeContempt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.234 0.000 0.000
µeHostility 0.908 0.000 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000
µeAnger 0.925 0.000 0.000 0.353 0.789 0.000
expect a representation of that theory to so do.
Analysis of Test Cases
In terms of this contextual testing, erroneous results discussed above were not
considered when determining values of J which best satisfied the selection
criteria. The six selected J vectors are outlined in table 7.19. The table
includes the name of the emotion or hybrid-pairing represented, the x and
y components of J, and the individual membership grades of the emotions
that make up E′S. We are mindful of the definition of E′S, as presented in
equation 4.39, being a column vector with sixteen elements, each with values
ranging from 0 to 1. Table 7.19 presents each element of E′S explicitly, for
the sake of clarity.
While all proposed permutations of contextual testing were performed, we
direct our attentions to a single experiment for the purposes of this report.
Complete numerical results of other contextual tests are included within the
appendices.
The scenario we focus upon is that of an agent, whose emotional state is
modelled by the type-1 implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel, begin-
ning the simulation in an emotional state defined by the vector J identified
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Figure 7.13: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Emotion Membership over t
Iterations
Table 7.20: Type-1 Geneva Emotion Wheel: Emotion Membership over t
Iterations
t µeShame/Guilt µeDisgust µeHostility µeAnger
0 0.000 0.000 0.908 0.925
1 0.463 0.455 0.454 0.463
2 0.694 0.683 0.227 0.232
3 0.810 0.797 0.114 0.116
4 0.868 0.854 0.057 0.058
5 0.897 0.882 0.029 0.029
6 0.911 0.896 0.015 0.015
7 0.918 0.903 0.008 0.008
8 0.922 0.907 0.004 0.004
9 0.924 0.909 0.002 0.002
10 0.925 0.910 0.001 0.001
with Anger in table 7.19. This agent is serially exposed to environmental
events defined by the input vector associated with ’Guilt’ in the same ta-
ble. The simulation continues for 10 system cycles, or iterations, using the
unweighted mean method of determining ES presented in Chapter Four.
Figure 7.13 provides a visual representation of non-trival elements of ES
(those elements with non-zero memberships), while table 7.20 provides this
data in numerical form for clarity. The exhaustive values of ES obtained
during this experiment, including trivial memberships, are included within
the appendices.
When the simulation begins, Anger possesses the highest membership
grade within the system, narrowly superior to Hostility. Both Shame/Guilt
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and Disgust have zero membership. Within two iterations, Anger and Hostil-
ity have been overtaken by Shame/Guilt and Disgust, as should be expected
from the method we use to determine ES. While Anger is initially of higher
membership than Hostility, their memberships begin to descend along an
identical gradient from the fifth iteration onwards. Conversely, the gap be-
tween Shame/Guilt and Disgust has widened by this point, there being a
clear distinction between them despite the small difference in their member-
ship grades.
This trend continues to the end of the simulation, with Shame/Guilt
narrowly exceeding the membership of Disgust, and both Anger and Hostility
tending towards zero. Psychologically, this provides an interesting insight
into the application of the Geneva Emotion Wheel from a computational
control perspective.
While other implementations discussed in this work generate axial fam-
ilies of emotions, our implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel does
not; and, indeed, the Geneva Emotion Wheel’s own geometry is designed
such that axial families as a concept are anathema to its makeup. Instead,
our implementation through fuzzy logic, requiring as it does the fuzzification
of the boundaries of the individual emotions and their intensity markers,
establishes a pattern of sympathetic emotional triggering.
This is particularly evident at mid-range values, as discussed in the ex-
haustive testing section of this work, but also as regards the contextual
testing outlined here. An event that marks highest possible membership
of Shame/Guilt shall also trigger a Disgust response. Psychologically, we
could argue that this might represent disgust at the environmental situation
that has prompted the agent to feel guilt, or indeed self-disgust on the part







In this chapter we compare and contrast the type-1 implementations of the
Millenson Theory and Geneva Emotion Wheel, with the type-2 implementa-
tions of the Millenson Theory. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of
each, both computationally and psychologically, in the context of the others.
In so doing, we seek to draw conclusions about the work we have undertaken,
and set direction for the future of this and similar efforts.
Considering the Millenson theory on its own for the time being, we first
consider the behaviour of the implementations of Millenson A with the im-
plementations of Millenson B. Subsequently, we discuss the differences in
performance between the type-1 and type-2 implementations, and consider
whether the addition of the layer of uncertainty provided by type-2 fuzzy
logic benefited its implementations.
8.2 Comparison of Millenson A with Millenson
B
First, let us consider the type-1 implementation of Millenson A. We are
reminded of figure 7.1, defined by the elements of table 7.2. We are further
reminded that the memberships provided may be projected across all three
axes of the Millenson theory.
The relative surface areas beneath the three named emotions along an
axis were calculated based on the area beneath the curve. This information
is useful in determining the relative membership magnitudinal probabilities
of the three emotions, which is to say how ’strongly’ they are represented
within the boundaries of the system.
In such terms, we choose to recognise the area under the Pleasure emotion,
as calculated using the geometry of figure 7.1, as representing Unity. The
justification for this assertion is to facilitate ease of comparison between the
three named emotions, in the context of their relative membership densities.
By assigning the value Unity to the area under the Pleasure emotion, we are
able to draw comparison with the Elation and Ecstasy emotions in the con-
text of the membership density they possess across the operational breadth
of the system. The Elation emotion has a surface area, then, equal to 1.337
times Unity. The Ecstasy emotion, similarly, has a surface area equal to 1.330
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times Unity.
In terms of chance of firing for random data input, however, we must
instead consider range of non-zero values. Again, we choose to recognise the
operational range of the Pleasure emotion as shown in figure 7.1 to signify
Unity. In this case, the Elation emotion’s active range is equal to Unity, while
the Ecstasy emotion’s active range is equal to 0.429 of Unity.
Taking both into consideration, the central emotion, Elation, which Mil-
lenson uses to describe the entire axis, is the most strongly represented for
any given random input. By contrast Ecstasy, which is considered the ex-
tremis emotion, while having very great membership when fired is the least
likely to be so for any random input.
The general shapes of the graphs display trends we anticipated on the
basis of the two-tier nature of the Millenson A representation. In accordance
with the limitations we sought to place upon the structure, lower-level emo-
tions trail into higher-level emotions in terms of membership. That is to say
that an Elation-response is more likely to trigger residual Pleasure than a
Pleasure response is likely to trigger residual Elation.
Next, let us consider the type-1 implementation of Millenson B. Again,
we first determine the relative surface area beneath the curve. Taking the
area under the Pleasure curve as Unity, for the same reasons as outlined
previously, we can determine the area under the Elation curve to be 0.865 of
Unity, and the area under the Ecstasy curve to be 0.480 of Unity. There can
be no comparison of range of relevance when considering the results provided
by the Millenson B implementation as non-zero results are provided for all
three named emotions across the entire operational range of the system.
Looking at the membership area, however, it is clear that the Millenson B
implementation weights in favour of the lower-level emotions over the higher.
In terms of trailing edges, this is visually apparent in the system when con-
sidering the length of the trailing edge of Pleasure relative to the leading
edge of Ecstasy. It is also visible when comparing the descending trends of
Elation with the ascending trends of Elation.
In order to permit a clearer comparison of the two type-1 implementations
of the Millenson theory, figure 8.1 demonstrates a superposition of figures 7.1
and 7.3.
Moving to the type-2 representations of Millenson, let us first consider
Millenson A. Considering the area under the membership curves, if we again
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Figure 8.1: Type-1 Millenson A & B Membership of S+$−-related Emotions
for Increasing Z
define the area under the Pleasure curve as Unity, then Elation possesses an
area equal to 1.382 of Unity, while the membership area of Ecstasy is 0.698
of Unity. Considering once again the operational input range of the imple-
mentation, defining the operational range of Pleasure as Unity, we see that
the operational range of Elation is similarly Unity, and that the operational
range of Ecstasy is 0.375 of Unity. In these aspects, the type-2 implementation
of Millenson A adopts a similar shape to the type-1 implementation, to be
expected given their shared two-tier nature.
Let us next consider the type-2 implementation of Millenson B. Taking
the area under its Pleasure curve as Unity, then the membership area of Ela-
tion becomes 0.890 of Unity, and the membership area of Ecstasy becomes
0.649 of Unity. As a function of its shared characteristics with the type-1
implementation, comparison of active surface area is meaningless since non-
zero results are provided for membership grades of all emotions associated
with a given input. For ease of comparison, figure 8.2 is provided as a visual
aid.
In overall terms, when comparing the behaviours of the two intepreta-
tions of Millenson’s theory, it is appropriate that we consider their structural
differences, in particular their rules structure. The key differences between
the models come in two parts, rule structure and tier structure.
In the Millenson A implementations, each rule in the fuzzy inferencing
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Figure 8.2: Type-2 Millenson A & B Membership of S+$−-related Emotions
for Increasing Z
system makes a connection between a single input and a single output. That
is to say association is drawn between a specific input membership function,
and a specific output membership function. In the Millenson B implementa-
tions, by contrast, each rule in the fuzzy inferencing system connects a spe-
cific input to three associated outputs, meaning that a connection is drawn
between a specific input membership function and three output membership
functions.
Similarly, while the Millenson B fuzzy inferencing system has an output
for every named emotion, Millenson A produces instead a three-part vec-
tor which is then converted, geometrically, to generate values for the nine
named emotions. This is the role of its second tier. Taking these differences
into consideration, the magnitude of variation in the results should not be
considered surprising.
A key and instantly discernable difference lies in the variety of compound
emotional results presented by each implementation. While Millenson A
never provides non-zero results for more than two named emotions, Millenson
B provides non-zero results for all three named emotions at all times.
Connected to this are the differences in membership surface area between
the two models. Summing the membership surface area of all three named
emotions, and defining the summed surface area of the type-1 implementa-
tion of Millenson A results as Unity, the summed surface area of the type-1
Millenson B results would equate to 2.281 of Unity. Similarly for type-2, if the
summed areas under the curves defined by type-2 Millenson A were defined
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as Unity, then the summed areas of the type-2 Millenson B results would
equate to 2.120 of Unity.
This enables us to say that in average terms, for both modes of fuzzy logic,
implementations of Millenson B shall return a higher summed membership
across the three named emotions for a given input value.
Taking the global view, while both interpretations have justification in
Millenson’s theory, the broader-brush approach of Millenson B provides a
greater variety in its psychological blend of emotions for a given stimulus
event J. That said, the type-2 implementation of Millenson B failed to
remain true to the criteria we set to determine adherence to the psychological
theory. Millenson A, on the other hand, provides a narrower view as a
function of a structure that minimises cases where all nine emotions fire, but
both implementations met the criteria set for adherence to the psychological
theory.
It could be argued, therefore, that both implementations of Millenson A
would be suited to applications where knowledge of the dominant emotion
generated by a stimulus event is the key aspect. As such, Millenson A might
serve suitably as a governor for a finite state machine desirous of including an
emotional component. Conversely, the type-1 implementation of Millenson
B might be suitable for exploration of the effect of blends of emotions upon
control of an agent’s behaviour; indeed, this is explored in our subsequent
chapter concerning prototyping.
8.3 Comparison of Type-1 and Type-2 Imple-
mentations
In consideration of the differing behaviours of our type-1 and type-2 systems,
irrespective of their interpretation of Millenson’s psychological theory, we
return first to discussion of their membership areas. Rather than speaking
in general terms of Unity, where Unity is defined by the implementation
in question, however, we instead consider the raw numerical values of their
summed membership areas. Table 8.1 provides this information in a relative
scale, in the context of emotions associated with the S+$− axis, which may
be projected onto both alternative axes. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 provide the
comparative resultant memberships visually.
From these figures, we determine that despite the increased level of fuzzi-
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Table 8.1: Membership Areas for Type-1 and Type-2 Implementations of the
Millenson Theory
Emotion Type-1 A Type-1 B Type-2 A Type-2 B
Pleasure 1.7311 6.1777 2.1901 5.7965
Elation 2.3143 5.3414 3.0268 5.1565
Ecstasy 2.3030 2.9644 1.5289 3.3475
Total 6.3485 14.4835 6.7458 14.3005
Figure 8.3: Type-1 and Type-2 Millenson A Membership of S + $−-related
Emotions for Increasing Z
Figure 8.4: Type-1 and Type-2 Millenson B Membership of S + $−-related
Emotions for Increasing Z
fication type-2 enjoys over type-1 fuzzy logic, application of type-2 fuzzy logic
only prompts a 6.26% increase in membership area in the context of Millen-
son A, and prompts a 1.26% reduction in membership area in the context
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of Millenson B. This should not be surprising, however, as the application
of type-2 fuzzy logic inherently reduces membership peaks as a function of
the nature of secondary membership functions, peaking as they do somewhat
below the primary membership grade Unity.
First let us draw comparisons in the context of Millenson A. The most
marked difference achieved by the implementation of type-2 fuzzy logic comes
in the stepped ascents and descents of membership grade. Whereas in type-1
Millenson A, membership increases to peak, and decreases from peak, de-
pendant upon input value, in type-2 the gradiant changes sign on multiple
occasions over the course of the input range. Another difference comes in
the location of the peak of Pleasure, which occurs at a higher input value
for the type-2 implementation of Millenson A than it does for the type-1
implementation.
There are, however, marked similarities between the two implementa-
tions. The uppermost peaks of Elation and Ecstasy remain consistant. The
membership areas do not deviate significantly, and the general ’form’ of the
output graph is consistent.
Let us move on to compare the type-1 implementation of Millenson B
with the type-2 implementation. Here, again, the most noticeable differences
revolve around the commonality with which the gradiant of membership
grade changes sign over the course of the input range.
The key difference, however, is the failure of the Ecstasy membership
grade to exceed the Elation membership grade at any point across the input
range. In this, increased fuzzification has not necessarily let to greater psy-
chological analogue as was hypothesised. Instead, in this instance, it has had
the opposite effect.
In terms of similarities, there are several. The locations of the peaks of
the three output emotions are consistent across models. The general shape
of the graph remains consistent, and the membership areas are constant to
within 1.26%.
In general comparison between type-1 and type-2 fuzzy logic as we have
applied them in the field of emotion modelling, the additional layer of com-
plexity provided by type-2 has not demonstrated significant difference in the
performance of the implementations. This is not to say type-2 does not have
a place in future work, however, and it is entirely feasible that a more fo-
cussed attempt to implement a type-2 emotion model in an affective agent,
undertaken as some form of future work, could yield significantly positive
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results.
We are also mindful that only fuzzy logic of second order, or higher, can
represent true uncertainty. And it should be noted that while the type-1
systems based upon Millenson’s theory showed general consistency in trends
associating input with emotion membership, type-2 demonstrated in its al-
terations of gradiant the uncertain fashion in which an agent might react to
a stimulus that a quantifying algorithm might define as ’lesser’ or ’greater’.
8.4 Comparing Millenson with the Geneva Emo-
tion Wheel
Direct, numerical comparison between our implementations of these two
models being impossible to render consistent and rigorous, we instead con-
sider the observational differences and similarities between the behaviour of
our type-1 implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel, and behaviours of
our implementations of the Millenson theory.
Firstly, let us consider the behaviours of the type-1 implementation of
the GEW across a range of inputs. As was observed in our implementations
of type-2 fuzzy logic, the cross-sections we present and discuss with respect
to the Geneva Emotion Wheel include scenarios where the gradient of an
emotion’s membership alters, seemingly irrationally. In addition, where the
highest number of non-zero memberships obtained by any Millenson imple-
mentation is nine, the Geneva Emotion Wheel can return significantly more
than that, as shown in our exhaustive testing results within the appendices.
Computationally, our implementation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel is
more complex than that of the type-1 Millenson implementations. And,
conceptually, the inputs associated with the Geneva Emotion Wheel are far
more abstract by nature, and thus more complex to quantify.
That said, the Geneva Emotion Wheel produces more varied outputs,
psychologically speaking, and as such associates a greater number of discrete
emotions to a given experiential event than any implementation of Millenson
could. Further to this, whereas Millenson’s model generates three families
of associated emotions, Scherer’s provides sixteen distinct emotions to blend
and contrast as one attempts to define the emotional impact of an event.
To that end, in view of our numerical experimentation, it would be sug-
gested that further computational explorations of Scherer be targetted at
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human-like agents, where the subtle context of the model might have greater
impact. In contrast, implementations of Millenson are rugged and robust
and, as such, can be made suitable for most control tasks seeking an emo-






It was reasoned that some application prototyping to demonstrate potential
implementations of the systems discussed and researched over the course
of this project was desirable. To that end, the type-1 implementation of
Millenson B, presented in Chapter Six, was utilised to govern navigation of
an agent existing in a predator-prey scenario. This implementation was se-
lected for several reasons. Firstly, that as a type-1 implementation it was
capable of being called from command line, which would be essential for its
application in a real-time system. Secondly, the Millenson Model, as has been
discussed previously, is conceptually simpler to integrate with a simple preda-
tor-prey scenario than the Geneva Emotion Wheel, the latter using inputs
that require more subjective analysis to quantify than the former. Lastly, the
type-1 implementation of Millenson B was a single-stage process, where the
type-1 implementation of Millenson A was a dual-stage process, making the
technical aspects of the integration of Millenson B more straightforward.
The brief in this case was that MATLAB would be used to process re-
altime updates to the emotional state of an agent within a Java game envi-
ronment. This implementation was developed in association with Université
du Havre, France, utilising a predator-agent-prey simulator created by re-
searchers within their department, with this project’s contribution being, as
is proper, limited to the provision of the emotion model, and mutual deter-
mination of how the model should guide the agent’s behaviour.
The chapter first presents the role of the emotion model in the structure
of the control system for the agent. Next, the Java game environment itself
is outlined for the purposes of clarity. Finally, two simulations are presented
and the agent behaviours discussed from a psychological perspective.
9.2 The Role of MATLAB and the Emotion
Model
An M-File was written which periodically obtained values for X, Y and Z,
defined as they are in Chapter Four, from a delimited text file "Input.txt"
generated by the Java predator-agent-prey simulator, and passed them to the
emotion model within MATLAB. At the same time, the model obtained the
previous emotional state, EM from a delimited text file "Output.txt" that
the M-File maintained and updated with each iteration.
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These discrete values were processed by the fuzzy inferencing system,
following the processes outlined in Chapter Six, to generate a resultant vector
EJ. The mean of this vector EJ and EM was then calculated, and saved to
the delimited text file "Output.txt". The agent simulation programme then
used the nine elements contained in "Output.txt" to amend its behaviour,
before generating a new set of values saved to "Input.txt".
The Millenson Model was selected for this prototyping effort because it
was, as has been discussed previously, the model requiring least abstraction
in its representation. From a psychological standpoint, the following assump-
tions were made:
• That a reduction in the distance between the agent and food (a prey
individual) was considered the application of positive stimulus.
• That an increase in the distance between the agent and food (a prey
individual) was considered the removal of positive stimulus.
• That a reduction in the distance between the agent and danger (a
predator individual) was considered the application of negative stimu-
lus.
• That an increase in the distance between the agent and danger (a preda-
tor individual) was considered the removal of negative stimulus.
Recollecting our definitions of the variables X, Y and Z in the context
of Millenson’s model of emotion, these four assumptions provide us with
absolute quantifications of all three as contextual concepts. The fashion in
which the Java Implementation quantified these in specific terms is outlined
later in this Chapter.
From the perspective of the MATLAB implementation, the defining fea-
ture was that these elements were presented as single precision floating point
values between 0 and 1, that they could be utilised to generate a new emo-
tional output, which subsequently formed a constituent of an updated emo-
tional state for the agent.
9.3 The Java-Based Agent Environment
The Java Simulation itself followed four basic principles consistent with the
Predator-Agent-Prey environment:
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Figure 9.1: Java Environment, Developed in its Entirety by Karim Mahboub
• That the agent should die if caught by a predator.
• That the internal energy level of the agent should diminish over time.
• That the consumption of prey would replenish a portion of the agent’s
internal energy level.
• That the agent should die if its internal energy level reduced to zero at
any point over the course of the simulation.
Figure 9.1 shows the three-dimensional nature of the environment, and
is included for illustrative purposes. Within the environment, the agent is
represented by a red triangle, the prey by smaller yellow triangles, and the
predators by large, black triangles.
The environment itself, and all Java-related programming undertaken
during this prototyping, was produced by Karim Mahboub and we claim no
credit for it. For the purposes of this work, our focus is upon the practical
application of the Type-1 fuzzy logic implementation of Millenson B, rather
than the Java Environment. Such technical descriptions of the environment
as are present are included solely to faciliate better understanding of the
scenario.
The prey are simulated as boids [73]. As such, they move around the
environment and have a tendency to maintain their trajectory. They move
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as a flock, or school, wherever possible and flee at the appearance of their
predator, the agent. The Predators of the agent, who ignore the boids, follow
a random path around the environment until they detect the agent. Whilst
a predator detects the agent, it shall give chase.
All three species within the simulation had two methods of detection,
represented as sight and hearing. Sight had a limited viewing angle, but
high range. Hearing functioned at all angles, but with a lower range. This
represented any given species’ capacity to sense objects behind it.
Within the environment, the Millenson-governed agent was required to
determine its reaction to a given situation in the context of the types of agent
which surrounded it and, as a consequence of the modes of detection, their
trajectories. To do so, first was read the "output.txt" file which provided the
vector EJ as produced by the MATLAB module, in terms of the nine output
variables x1−3, y1−3, and z1−3.
In relating these nine distinct emotions to behaviour, the system asso-
ciated each triplet of emotions with a facet of behaviour. Let us consider
x1−3, or, in explicit terms, Annoyance, Anger and Rage. In this prototype,
following from Millenson’s psychology, these three emotions were linked with
the removal of positive stimulus. As such, we associated these three emo-
tions with the increasing desire of the agent to obtain food. As these distinct
emotions represented differing intensities of removed positive stimulus, the
fashion in which they were applied weighted each emotion differently, and
with increasing magnitude in line with increasing numeric identifier. Thus
the weighting of Anger was greater than the weighting of Annoyance, and
the weighting of Rage was greater than that of Anger.
These concepts were then merged into an overall weighting value that
was applied to the agent’s attraction to prey. This weighting value, Xe, was
determined by the weighting values of each distinct emotion w1−3. Thus Xe
was explicitly defined
Xe =
w1x1 + w2x2 + w3x3









This representation was projected across all nine distinct emotions in


















Be was a concept devised specifically for this prototype. As this new vec-
tor represented the behavioural impact of the new emotional state coming
from the MATLAB module, it was used as a weighting value for the agent
displacement. Agent displacement was handled by way of gravitational at-
traction and repulsion, with Be acting as a moderator to the force applied to
the agent by the other species within the environment.
Having clarified the application of Xe, and its psychological justification,
we now outline the other two inputs required. Ye, application of negative
stimulus, was informed by the proximity of predators. As such, its component
of Be informed the repulsive quality of predators, prompting the agent to
flee from danger. Lastly, the variable Ze, representing the current levels of
pleasure, elation and ecstasy felt by the agent, acted as a retardant force
against the overall output vector. Psychologically, this represented the idea
that the more pleasurable the agent’s current situation, the less likely it
would be for it to want to change that situation. These informed the dir
direction vector.
The dir direction vector was calculated from each of the prey and predator
positions, prey consisting of an attraction att compound and predators having

















Table 9.1: Representation of the local situation
f1 f2 p1 p2 Total
δdist 2 −1 3 −2
weight 0.5 1 1 0.5
X =
∑{$+} 1 − − 1.0
Y =
∑{S−} − − − 1 1.0
Z =









F representing the set of prey (or ’food’), P denoting the set ’predators’,
and Pos signifying the position of the considered member of the simulation.
This provided the new displacement vector for the agent and allowed the
updating of each individual’s position in the world.
Following this, the future stimulus input vector, which was to be sent
back to MATLAB as a new "input.txt" file, was calculated. In Millenson’s
theory, emotion is directly linked to the agent’s local situational stimuli. In
the case of this prototype, these referred to the relative positions of local
prey and predators.
Consider a local situation with two prey, identified as f1 and f2, and two
predators, p1 and p2. From their proximities could be computed the new
emotional output vector compounds, X representing the removal of positive
stimuli (
∑{$+}), Y the addition of negative stimuli (∑{S−}), and Z both
the removal of negative stimuli and addition of positive stimuli (
∑{S+, $−}),
in line with figure 2.1 and equations given in Chapter Four.
As shown in table 9.1, δdist value, corresponding to the difference between
the current distance and the previous one for a given individual, would require
calculation. Were this value negative, the corresponding individual would
be coming closer to the agent, hence applying fear-related emotions if the
individual were a predator, or pleasure-related emotions if the individual
were prey.
Before computing the three stimulus compounds, weighting values corre-
sponding to the difference between the senses used to detect the individual
are necessary to consider. In the example presented in table 9.1, 1 was given
for individuals in the viewing of the agent, while 0.5 was assigned to those
located only within hearing range. In practical terms, this meant that a
viewed predator was considered to have twice the stimulus impact of a heard
one. We concede that observationally this point is open to debate: things
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that are only heard, for example, can be frightening until they are seen to
be harmless. In this simulation, however, the environment and agent inter-
actions were not complex enough to justify such an exhaustive approach.
Indeed, attempting to do so would likely have required so many exceptions
that it would have diluted the value of the emotion model’s inclusion.
The weightings themselves were situationally subjective and could hypo-
thetically be amended depending upon the importance one wished to place
upon specific sensory stimuli. The weightings included in table 9.1 are pro-
vided for illustrative purposes only.













δdistf if δdistf < 0∑
p∈P
δdistp if δdistp > 0
(9.11)
before being fed back into the MATLAB module to obtain a revised
emotional state.
9.4 Testing of Game Implementation
The system was tested several times for stability. Generally, stability tests
were simple, single-predator, single-prey environments. Such environments
being explored at length in the context of Millenson already [6], however, this
work directed its attention specifically towards more complex environments
with multiple predators and multiple prey. Two such tests are discussed and
analysed at length within this work from the context of perceived behaviours
the emotion model applied to the agent.
The testing environment for Tests 1 and 2 had several uniformities:
• The agent began each simulation with a given amount of energy, which
decreased at a constant rate over time.
• The maximum speed of predators and prey was consistant across both
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experiments.
• The maximum speed of the agent was consistent across both exper-
iments. Each simulation began with five predators and twenty prey
present within the environment.
• The relative size of the environment was consistent across both exper-
iments.
• The starting position and orientation of each of the predators and prey
were determined randomly for both simulations.
• The maximum rate of change of orientation of the agent was consistent
for both simulations.
Log files of the elements of stimulus vector J were recorded, along with
the elements of the emotional state vector EM and the emotionally-influenced
behaviour vector Be. In addition, the agent’s orientation and displacement
were recorded. In order to grant some measure of understanding regarding
the agent’s behaviour, graphs of J, Be, and a graph of the agent’s rate of
change of orientation δθ, are provided in the subsequent behavioural analyses
in an effort to demonstrate the urgency the agent felt at any given moment
to alter course.
9.5 Analysis of Prototype Tests
9.5.1 Experiment 1
Figure 9.2 illustrates the positions and orientations of the agent, predators
and prey at the start of this experiment; figure 9.3 indicates the stimulus
vector J; figure 9.4 indicates the emotional behaviour vector Be; and, figure
9.5 indicates the rate of change of orientation, δθ, all over time. Note that
each unit of time equates to 0.2s, the testing refresh rate of the system.
The agent begins this run with nothing present in its field of vision, and
five prey within alternative sensory detection range. This prompts a hard
about-face from the agent, at maximum magnitude of δθ, shown in figure 9.5
as the plateau from t = 0 to t = 20. It is also noted that during this process,
the fact that the agent is initially forced to move away from the prey in order
to make a pursuit turn increases his anger, which then trails off and pleasure
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Figure 9.2: Experiment 1: Starting Positions and Orientations
Figure 9.3: Experiment 1: Stimulus Vector J over time
increases as he begins to close the gap and briefly spikes as he consumes one
of his prey.
The initial spike in Y , applied negative stimulus shown in figure 9.3, indi-
cates the pursuit path of the agent leading to detection by a predator. This
forces the agent to alter course slightly, pursuing two prey but abandoning
the third; this causes an increase in all emotion-informing stimuli, again, in
line with expectations.
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Figure 9.4: Experiment 1: Emotional Behaviour Vector Be over time
Figure 9.5: Experiment 1: Rate of Change of Orientation δθ over time
The next major spike in applied negative stimulus occurs when a second
predator encounters the agent, at t = 46. As figure 9.3 illustrates, through
the highly variable nature of the anxiety-inducing experience, two predators
are both hovering in the edge of the agent’s vision. Figure 9.4 indicates
the impact this has on agent behaviour, increasing the repulsive weighting
of predators along similar lines, and figure 9.5 indicates the agent’s path
darting from side to side, each time attempting to escape a predator only
for the other to move into it’s field of vision. This could be considered as
simulating terror-induced confusion.
As both predators fall in to pursue the agent, it reacts by running be-
tween them, outpacing their advance. This path also decreases the distance,
albeit slightly, between the agent and his prey, indicated by the increased
application of positive stimulus shown in figure 9.3, which is then reinforced
by the removal of negative stimulus caused by his outpacing the predators.
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The noisy, but comparatively steady turn indicated just prior to t = 100
on figure 9.5 marks the agent’s pursuit course of his prey, moderated by the
proximity of the nearest predator. The agent takes a sweeping path, slightly
increasing the removal of positive stimulus, as shown by the increase in X
in figure 9.3, the result of which increases the attraction of the prey, leading
the agent to make an increase in rate of change of orientation to make a run
towards them. This tactic succeeds, allowing the agent to devour two more
prey by t = 160, and a third by t = 190. This, combined with the fact his
path has let him make ground on the pursuing predator, gives significant
reinforcement to the Z stimulus component, as shown in figure 9.3.
Shortly after t = 200, another predator begins pursuing the agent. The
introduction of this predator on the agent’s flank, outside his field of vision,
prompts the slight increase in Y shown in figure 9.3 at this time. The sharp
indecision in angle seen in the spiking oscillations in figure 9.5 circa t = 220 to
t = 240 are caused by conflicting desires to escape the predator, and consume
the one remaining prey of the small party the agent began the simulation
chasing.
The increase in pleasure seen prior to t = 250, however, is caused by
another entire school of prey swarming into the agent’s field of vision. These
five prey, which soon merge with another four, distract the agent entirely
from the lone prey he had been pursuing, allowing it to escape.
Unfortunately for our agent, following this flock of prey leads him directly
into the path of another predator, travelling in exactly the opposite direction.
This causes the Y spike and plateau shown in figure 9.3 at t = 260. Regret-
tably, the number of prey beyond the predator is too great a temptation,
and while he makes some attempt to skim past the predator, he fails and is
devoured, ending the simulation.
9.5.2 Experiment 2
Figure 9.6 illustrates the positions and orientations of the agent, predators
and prey at the start of this experiment; figure 9.7 indicates the stimulus
vector J; figure 9.8 indicates the emotional behaviour vector Be; and, figure
9.9 indicates the rate of change of orientation, δθ, all over time. Again, it
should be noted that each unit of time equates to 0.2s, the testing refresh
rate of the system.
In this simulation, the agent begins with no predators in detectable range,
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Figure 9.6: Experiment 2: Starting Positions and Orientations
Figure 9.7: Experiment 2: Stimulus Vector J over time
and two prey, one nearer than the other. This leads the agent to make a sharp
turn until t = 10, as shown in figure 9.9. The abandonment of one prey in
favour of another causes a slight increase in the X variable of J that we
consider to be mild annoyance, but it quickly tails off as the agent focusses
on its pursuit.
At t = 20, the agent begins to close distance with the prey, leading to
an expected increase in Z as shown in figure 9.7. After t = 25, however,
figure 9.7 displays a spike in Y , followed in quick succession by another
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Figure 9.8: Experiment 2: Emotional Behaviour Vector Be over time
Figure 9.9: Experiment 2: Rate of Change of Orientation δθ over time
two. This is caused by two predators entering the agent’s field of vision
near-simultaneously, leading to the same terror-induced confusion response
discussed in the previous experiment.
In this state of confusion, the agent turns away from one predator towards
another, then veers in a swooping escape trajectory, managing to come up
on the tail of the prey he was chasing, which by now has been joined by
a second. This daring maneuvre explains the fear plateau from t = 40 to
t = 60. The subsequent Z spike and plateau, caused by the urgent reduction
of negative stimulus (escape from the predator) and application of positive
stimulus (closing on the prey) might be considered ecstatic relief at the gam-
bit paying off. Also, we note the steady, carefully modulated course the agent
follows during this pursuit, as shown in figure 9.9.
This strong elation-related response tails off by t = 120, the prey altering
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their course to cross the path of the predators, thus forcing the agent to
take a wider arc and increase distance from them, leading to the wavering X
increase shown in figure 9.7; again, mild annoyance.
We witness, however, a steady increase in Z from t = 125 to t = 155
brought about by a school of new prey entering the agent’s field of vision
and closing with them. Parallel to this, we see an increase in Y , as the path
of pursuit of the prey also leads to a decrease in range from the remaining
pursuing predator.
By t = 170, the complexity of the environment, and the sheer number of
potential prey, combined with the ever-present threat of the predator forcing
course alterations, has prompted a decrease in Z as the agent is unable to
close distance with any significant number of prey, nor open up distance with
the pursuing predator, and an increase in X as the agent is forced to ignore
an increasing number of prey just to avoid the predator.
Circa t = 190, the agent moves to an extremely close distance with the
single prey it has managed to keep tracking, prompting a Z response, only
to be denied its meal by the arrival of yet another predator which generates
a spike in Y and forces the agent to abandon its meal by turning away,
generating an increase in X, as shown in figure 9.7.
His new course, however, brings the agent to track another two prey.
Opening distance on the predator and closing with the prey, remembering
that the agent has not eaten since the simulation began, increases Z. How-
ever, the path ultimately requires the agent to cut across the path of the
predator, prompting spikes in Y .
At t = 250, our agent’s perseverence is apparently rewarded, as a school
of prey move into view, on a trajectory that leads away from the predator,
accounting for the increase in Z and sudden decrease in Y shown in figure
9.7 for this period. At the last, however, just Z makes a final peak and the
agent is on the verge of consuming three prey at once, his energy reaches






This work initially set out to explore the concept of emotion representation
through fuzzy logic, with a view to establishing new inroads in terms of the
application of psychologically sound, computationally consistent models of
emotion to agent behaviour. In order to draw this work to a conclusion, it is
necessary to consider every aspect of the programme of research, objectively,
and consider whether or not it has contributed towards that goal.
To that end, this chapter seeks to draw the various threads that have run
throughout this report together, and assess the success or otherwise of the
project in the context of those goals outlined in the introductory chapter.
Subsequently, we discuss each aspect in turn, beginning with discussions
of the intended scope of the project, and whether or not those limits were
adhered to.
Following this, the aims and objectives outlined at the outset of this
work are considered individually. We then revisit the contributions this work
sought to make to the field, before critically reviewing the overall project and
outlining some of the future work that it prompts.
10.2 Scope
We recollect that the scope of the psychological aspect of this project was
specifically set to exclude the incipient generations of new models of emotion.
While this was adhered to, it is worth making brief observations regarding
the multiple interpretations of Millenson’s theory and clarifying why these
in and of themselves were not beyond the scope of the project.
The differences between Millenson A and Millenson B, as we denote them
in this work, came about due to alternative interpretations of vague linguis-
tics in Millenson’s own work. Both fundamentally adhere to the psychologi-
cal structure and geometry of his model in terms of input and output; where
they differ are the causal connections between the two. As such the difference
is computational, rather than psychological, and without clarification from
Millenson himself over which computational representation most closely ob-
serves the psychology of his model, we are left to draw our own conclusions
on the basis of performance.
Thus neither is a novel psychological theory in its own right, merely two
novel interpretations of an already published psychologically grounded the-
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ory of emotion. As such, their parallel development did not extend beyond
the scope of the project. Other limitations in terms of psychological scope,
such as the express developmental consideration of models combining situa-
tional input and emotional output, were observed; although, naturally, the
literature review itself extends somewhat beyond this as it seeks to set overall
psychological context for this work.
In terms of the computational scope of the work, all limits declared at
the outset of this work were adhered to. Orders of fuzzy logic higher than
second were not considered, and no calibration training was used in order to
ensure results were not skewed in favour of an ideal outcome.
10.3 Aims and Objectives
Within this work, we have furthered the field of affective computing in the
context of consideration of multi-value logic representations of psychologi-
cally grounded emotion models. The models have been presented in a general
context, rather than in terms of any specifically associated control system,
and can be taken on a modular basis in that light. We believe the work
here shall prompt further exploration into the arena of psychologically con-
sistent emotion modelling, and its place within the wider fields of affective
computing and human-like agents.
This work has shown, from defined first principles, how psychologically
grounded models of emotion might be extrapolated and represented through
fuzzy logic systems. This process has been performed in such a way as
to demonstrate that such abstractions can be made without sacrificing the
conceptual nature of the psychological theories themselves, thus observing
analogue across disciplines.
Each implementation presented within this work has been constructed in
accordance with the fuzzy logic representations outlined in Chapters Four
and Five. As such, they have been fashioned in a form that adheres to the
psychological principles upon which they are built. While one implementa-
tion proved unsuitable for testing as a function of developmental limitations,
even its structure is presented in a form drawn from the psychological geom-
etry of its parent theory.
Of the five implementations this work provides testing data regarding, all
were analysed in the context of the psychological meaning of their results.
Through this process, consistency was maintained with the goals declared at
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the outset of this work.
10.4 Contributions of Thesis
In this section, we consider the original contributions discussed in Chapter
One, and address them individually.
• Research of psychologically grounded models of emotional state suitable
for computational representation.
• Construction of mathematical representations of one or more psycho-
logically grounded models of emotional state, using type-1 fuzzy logic
systems.
• Construction of mathematical representations of one or more psycho-
logically grounded models of emotional state, using type-2 fuzzy logic
systems.
• Computational implementations of these representations for the pur-
poses of comparison and review.
The primary contribution of this work has been the conversion, represen-
tation and implementation of two wholly disparate, psychologically grounded
theories of emotion. These theories have been implemented in a fashion that
demonstrably adheres to the psychology upon which they are based, and us-
ing mechanism sympathetic to the abstract nature of the concepts they rep-
resent. As such, this work has presented novel methodologies to the field of
emotion modelling, and established a firm foundation for future exploration
of the role emotion might play in the behaviour of affective or human-like
agents.
In addition, this work has approached representation of two psycholog-
ical theories from the perspective of fuzzy logic. The representations and
implementations presented herein are thoroughly unique to this work, but
generated in a way that permits them to be projected onto a multitude of
functional scenarios.
The work has presented the first two computational representations of a
psychologically grounded emotion theory utilising higher-order fuzzy logic.
Specifically they have utilised type-2 fuzzy logic which is in itself a growth
area within artificial intelligence research.
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Three implementations have been presented utilising type-1 fuzzy logic,
and three implementations have been presented utilising type-2 fuzzy logic.
Of those three type-1 implementations, all have been subject to a robust
scheme of testing. Of the type-2 implementations, two were subject to an
equally severe testing regime. The type-2 representations, and their imple-
mentations, have been compared and contrasted with like type-1 systems,
and are presented in a fashion that it is expected shall make further compar-
isons between such systems more straightforward.
10.5 Critical Review
In this section of the conclusion, we are required to present a critical overview
of all work produced over the course of this research project. Within this
section, we also consider future work that is prompted by that already un-
dertaken herein.
First, let us consider our mathematical representations of Millenson’s
theory. Contextually, the decision to pursue two different interpretations of
Millenson’s theory, based upon ambiguous linguistics, provided much scope
for abstraction and consideration of the nature of the stimulus-emotion links
he proposed. This decision generated a broader base of comparison, and
forced a deeper level of internal comparison than would have been possible
had our attentions focussed solely on one interpretation of Millenson and our
interpretation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
Mathematically and, importantly, computationally, Millenson is more
readily applicable to agent control systems than the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
The simple connections between environmental stimuli and emotional out-
put provide a model that can be easily applied in the context of any agent
environment that includes both positive and negative stimulus.
One could draw the implied conclusion that Millenson’s model is simpler
because it is less psychologically sound than the Geneva Emotion Wheel.
While this could be argued, the effectiveness of the implementation of Mil-
lenson B in type-1 fuzzy logic, in the context of our Chapter relating to
prototyping would suggest that at the very least Millenson’s theory can be
used to generate sound, emotionally complex agent behaviour.
We should not consider the ’deaths’ of the agents within that prototype as
indications that the implementation failed in its task. The act of modelling
the emotional state, and using it to inform decision-making, is not an act of
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optimisation. Emotionally governed responses are not necessarily rational or
optimal, and to set optimisation of agent survivability as a criterion of success
would be counterproductive and counter-intuitive. Instead, considering the
agent’s behaviours in the context of the emotions it is ’experiencing’, the
reasons behind the two deaths can be seen as verifications of the purpose of
the model.
In the context of the implementations of Millenson’s psychological theory,
our representations largely held psychological analogue with the original the-
ory, save in the case of the type-2 implementation of Millenson B. This loss
in analogue could be fixed by simply rebalancing the membership functions
that define the system’s inputs and outputs, but to do so would have made
meaningful comparison between it and the type-1 implementation of Mil-
lenson B less likely. In addition, significant redefinition of the membership
functions might have given rise to an entirely incipient third interpretation
of the Millenson theory. We intend to pursue this in future work.
Assessing the overall contributions of our investigations into Millenson’s
psychological theory, we conclude that this portion of the programme of
research has provided a new approach to the concept of emotion modelling
through fuzzy logic. Aside from that, it also includes the only known example
of type-2 fuzzy logic being applied in the context of emotion modelling, at
the time of writing.
Considering next our investigations into the Geneva Emotion Wheel, the
picture is more mixed. The only successful implementation of our repre-
sentational model of the Geneva Emotion Wheel generated an error return
in 3.6% of cases, assuming uniform distribution of input value. The type-2
implementation, while we believe it to be numerically and psychologically
sound, proved unsuitable for testing in the environment we selected for its
development.
That said, if Millenson represented a ’plug and play’ approach to emotion
modelling for simple agents governed by fuzzy logic, the Geneva Emotion
Wheel by its very nature provides a more cerebral definition of the emotional
state. In this, we propose that our mathematical representation of Scherer’s
psychological theory lends itself particularly to the field of human behaviour
simulation, where experience and reaction can be far more subtle than those
observed in our prototype testing of Millenson’s theory.
We assert that to truly determine the effectiveness, or otherwise, of any
representation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel would require prototyping de-
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veloped exclusively with the intention of assessing the subtle nuances of
human/humanlike-agent interactions. Further to this, it is possible that
rather than our mathematical representation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel
being optimal for control purposes, it might instead be more usefully ap-
plied to assessment of user emotions, and in terms of anticipating emotional
trends.
One interesting feature discussed during our contextual analysis was the
concept of sympathetic emotions, where basic emotions that lie close to each
other on the circumplex might be fired by an experience that would be seen
to more directly define a different named emotion. The clearest example of
this came in the corresponding triggering of a high Disgust response to a
situation that made the agent feel Shame/Guilt. We hypothesise that this
could either represent agent disgust at the situation that causes it to feel
Shame/Guilt, or disgust with itself for whichever action has prompted the
Guilt response. We assert that this warrants further exploration, from both
a psychological and computational standpoint.
Taking into account the above, we maintain that our investigations into
mathematical representation of the Geneva Emotion Wheel have yielded use-
ful contributions to the field of computational emotion modelling at large,
and in particular in the context of the application of fuzzy logic to the field.
As such, this portion of the research programme served its purpose with
as much validity as our investigations into Millenson’ theory, just in a less
pragmatic fashion.
Considering our own work with respect to recent research addressing the
application of fuzzy logic in the context of representation of emotional state,
we reference three appropriate and contemporary publications. Leon, et al ,
present work considering affect-aware behaviour modelling [47]. Their work
specifically directs its attention towards demonstrating the value of a va-
lence-based emotional component in the modelling of user emotional state.
Focussing on architecture, they produce preliminary results supporting the
benefits of including consideration of emotional state in affective agents. Our
own work, generating several representations of emotional state that relate
specifically to environmental factors, including valence in both cases, could
be taken further in this direction. In particular, we might consider emotion
determination with respect to a user, rather than defining an emotional state
for an agent.
A more recent publication by Kazemifard, et al , [42] discusses specifically
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the value of emotions in terms of their place in decision-making. In particular,
their work presents a computational model designed to map events within an
agent’s universe to resultant emotional states, with a view to making such
an architecture scalable and versatile. Unlike our work, which considers the
abstract case and bases application upon implementation-specific definitions
of environmental input, their system is multi-layered and self-informing. The
architecture they define could provide inspiration in the context of future,
exploratory implementations of the emotional state models presented in our
work. The abstracted nature of our own model makes this of particular in-
terest to us, as the systems we define rely on no predetermined quantitative
associations between environment and input, and as such can be tuned rela-
tively easily.
Lastly, we consider the work of Su, [95], connecting emotion and person-
ality to expressive character motion in a narrative environment. In his work,
he presents an exhaustive analysis of the connection between emotion and
expression and, by extension, affect. His focus being primarily on narrative is
particularly interesting to us in the context of future exploration of our own,
more abstracted work. In particular, the connections he presents between
event and affect provide useful inspiration regarding potential software util-
isation of our fuzzy logic implementations.
Before drawing our account to a close, we consider possible future research
that might take inspiration from our initial forays into the field. The fur-
ther implementation of mathematical representations of the Millenson theory,
with a view to inclusion in more complicated environments is an obvious area
that our initial prototyping suggests warrants further investigation. Hav-
ing demonstrated psychologically justifiable behaviours in a pedagogic case,
more detailed environments featuring multiple agents and multiple, disparate
sources of stimuli may yield valuable insight into emotionally-governed multi-
agent interactions.
Similarly, the prototyping of systems governed by type-2 implementations
of Millenson’s theory would allow for a greater level of contextual compari-
son between these and their type-1 counterparts, perhaps providing a more
definitive answer as to the benefits higher order fuzzy logic can bring to the
field. As has already been observed, redevelopment and redefinition of the
type-2 implementation of Millenson B such that it meets our success criteria
without sacrificing analogue with the type-1 implementation, mathematical
representation or psychological theory is already underway.
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In terms of future work relating to the Geneva Emotion Wheel, aside
from the prototyping already mentioned, the development of a functional
type-2 implementation of our mathematical representation may well provide
a deeper insight into the impact of type-2 fuzzy uncertainty when applied in
environments with a subtler emotional context. In addition, it would permit
comparison of behaviour on a numerical level with the type-1 implementa-
tion.
As regards further development of the type-1 implementation, redesigning
the system such that the aberrant errors no longer occur is an obvious first
step in further development. Beyond this, we advocate a revisitation of the
mathematical representation with a view to using fuzzy numbers as input
values, and perhaps approaching the geometry through a system relating to
polar coordinates rather than cartesians.
To conclude, this work has provided new insights into the application of
fuzzy logic to emotion modelling, and presented entirely novel mathematical
representations of two psychological theories of emotion. In so doing, it has
provided a basis for future exploration, and contextual comparison, in an
arena which it is anticipated shall continue to expand, as a fundamental
aspect of the broader topic of affective computing, for many years to come.
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